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Our paper is motivated by the rationalism / constructivism contrast in the International Relations (IR) field. By reinterpreting this contrast we seek to redirect reflection about theoretical synthesis in the field. Our argument has four steps. First, we introduce a broader intellectual setting for the rationalism / constructivism contrast by situating it as a contemporary iteration of the economic / sociological contrast classically articulated throughout the history of the modern social sciences. Second, we pragmatically give concrete content to each side of this contrast in relation to recent IR. Engagement with Weber and Parsons helps us to subdivide the economic side into parametric vs. strategic variants, and the sociological in terms of traditional vs. value-rational action. Third, we argue that synthesis of economic and sociological approaches is both viable and desirable in concrete studies of strategic interaction. Fourth, to conclude, we compare our argument to recent efforts to promote analytic eclecticism in political science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

BOOK EXPLAINS SUPREME COURT'S VRA LAW AS RESULT OF 2 IDEAS:(1) JUDICIAL RATIONALISMBased on Hayek's idea of "constructivist rationalism," which Hayek used to critique the planned economy: that the political branches did not have the knowledge necessary to regulate social and economic life. What Hayek said about the political branches of government is equally true of the judicial branch. What distinguished Supreme Court jurisprudence through the last half of the twentieth century as much as anything was its assumption that it could rationally reconstruct American republicanism from the top down in accordance with a preconceived vision of "fairness"-began with reapportionment cases of 1960s.(2) POLITICS OF MULTICULTURALISMI define the politics of multiculturalism as a vision of America that considers race and ethnicity not merely as sources of identity and of mutual interest but as legally determinative categories that afford legitimate foundations for claims to representation and political rule.MADISONIAN v. MULTICULTURAL REPUBLICANISM. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper investigates the 'extension' of market liberalism into the private sphere, with special attention to the sexual domain. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Despite the presence of enduring bilateral rivalries, recurrent militarized interstate disputes, and notoriously violent internal political processes, South American states have paradoxically avoided a major intra-regional war since the end of the Chaco War in 1935 between Bolivia and Paraguay. Contending that realist and liberal explanations are inconclusive, this paper advances an alternative explanation: the ?Militarist Peace? hypothesis. This proposition centers on the socio-political role of the military institution at both national and regional levels. I argue that through an evolutionary, social process, the military of the region developed common socio-economic values, beliefs, principles and objectives. This fostered the armed forces? increasing identification with the interest, progress and success of the transnational and national dimensions of the military institution in South America. The increasingly transnational identity of the military transformed their traditional mission as protectors of the state from external threats to national political players and guardians of the state from internal political foes in their respective polities. The direct consequence of this evolutionary dynamic is the ?external-peace-and-internal-violence paradox? in South America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We compare the impact of ‘deferential’ judicial review and ‘Lochnerized’ judicial review on legislative outcomes. In the ‘Lochnerized’ system, judges use their veto power to substitute their class-based personal policy preferences for the policies enacted by the legislature. In the deferential system, in contrast, judges defer to the legislature in ordinary matters of socioeconomic policy and do not strike down the legislation. To compare the two types of judicial regimes, we develop a simple game-theoretic model with a legislature composed of a majority and minority party, a set of lower courts, and an appellate court. The legislative majority initially chooses whether to enact a policy. Any policy it enacts could be reviewed by a lower court. Some lower court decisions are in turn successfully appealed to the appellate court. We first identify how legislative anticipation of non-deferential judicial review affects legislative decisions. Secondly, we show that judicial review provided by an activist, politicized judiciary in which every judicial decision is politically motivated and legally unprincipled nonetheless secures important constitutional values better than deferential judicial review. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through reviewing what we know to date about the consequences and outcomes of revolutions, this paper argues that one of the most important consequences of revolution is its escalation of the state-building imperative. Seen in this light, ideology and international pressures can be understood as crucial for understanding revolutionary outcomes, through conditioning and reinforcing the effects of state-building pressures. Together, these variables account for many of the outcomes of revolution typically examined by social scientists interested in post-revolutionary state and society development. More generally, the paper demonstrates that revolutions have consequences for the very processes that (re)create a state’s political, social and/or economic order. Revolutions affect the structure and process of politics, the policy decisions of leaders, the likelihood of success or failure of those policies, and even the nature of the actors most likely to participate in, be excluded from, or benefit from social, political, and economic interactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]