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This paper seeks to explore the indirect effect of state legislative term limits on races for local office. Specifically, the research question of interest is: Are members of the State House of Representatives more likely to run for local office after the passage of term limits? Researchers have demonstrated that most term-limited legislators are still interested in remaining in public life. However, ambitious legislators in a state with limited opportunities for upward mobility such as Michigan may choose to return to local office rather than the traditional progression up the ?political ladder.? In order to address the question of interest, data were collected on the activities of legislators immediately after their last year in office in the Michigan House of Representatives between the years of 1982-2000. In all, 212 legislators were included in the analysis. The activities of a pre-term limit set of legislators (1982-1992) were compared to that of a post-term limit group of legislators (1993-2000). Overall, a multivariate probit model demonstrates that term limits do have a significant impact on a legislator’s decision to run for local office. Overall, legislators are 14.3% more likely to run for local government in the post term limit period. Other variables such as the presence of a senate election year, the Senate incumbent’s percent of the previous vote, and county population were also found to be significant at at least the .10 level with varying degrees of influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationsip between legislators and bureacrats is a complex one that includes collaboration, cooptation, delegation and monitoring. Legislative term limits have the potential to alter this relationship in a number of ways. This paper explores the impact of term limits on the relationship between state legislators and bureaucrats, using data from personal interviews with both pre and post-term limited members of Michigan’s House of Representatives. Three measures are used: The extent to which legislators rely on bureaucrats for information and guidance, the level of priority legislators assign to monitoring state agencies, and how well members evaluated themselves as a chamber in monitoring the implementation of programs. Overall, we find that term limits has some important, but limited effects on the relationships between legislators and bureaucrats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on a five-year panel study of the Michigan House of Representatives, this investigation explores the impact of term limits on four relationships between legislators: influence, friendships, consulting about a politically salient issue and consulting about a technical issue. We found that overall the number of people described as influential declined, but those that were named were primarily those in positions of formal leadership. Surprisingly we found that friendships did not decline with an influx of newcomers, but cross-party friendships did decline. Finally, we found that hubs or key consultants emerged in both vote cuing networks, but especially around the technical issue. We argue that some impacts of term limits depend on the number of newcomers, but others reflect institutional changes in the term-limited legislature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interaction between legislators and interest groups is a complicated two-way relationship that is likely to become even more complex in states that have adopted term limits. Based on a longitudinal study of member of the Michigan House of Representatives, the authors explore several facets of legislators’ perceptions of their relationship with lobbyists before and after term limits. Despite the claims of some term limits advocates that this reform would purge the state of cozy relationships between elected officials and special interests, the authors find that there is no difference between the extent to which legislators rely on interest groups and lobbyists for information and guidance on issues. Further they find that legislators may be more instead of less accessible to lobbyists after term limits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many Michigan House members say that the power of the executive branch, including both the governor and state agencies, increased after term limits. In this poster we explore the extent to which representatives say they consult the governor's office and state agency officials for information and guidance on a difficult issue. Additionally, we explore the amount of time legislators report spending monitoring state agencies and the grade they give themselves for performing this task. Our data are based on interviews with Michigan House members before and after term limits. We discover that after term limits, House members consult executive branch actors more extensively about a difficult issue than they did before term limits. Additionally we discover that the small amount of time they spent monitoring state agencies before term limits declined after term limits. The grade they give themselves for this activity declined too. Based on open-ended comments made by the Representatives we interviewed, we found that the number who did not realize that they should exercise oversight over the executive branch increased after term limits and more representatives also revealed in their comments that they did not understand what monitoring state agencies involved. Hence we suggest that these are some of the ways in which the executive branch has become more powerful relative to the legislature after terrm limits. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]