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Most research on variation in campaign finance focuses on why some candidates raise and spend more than others. There are fewer studies attempting to explain variation in aggregate fundraising across states. This paper takes up this question by exploring differences in per capita campaign fundraising across state legislatures: why does aggregate fundraising by legislative candidates vary across states even when controlling for population? Using data from 2003-2010 for all state legislative chambers, I find that institutional design features, rather than political and economic forces, are the primary predictors of variation in campaign fundraising. Smaller districts, more professional legislatures, stronger legislatures vis-à-vis governors, and weak campaign finance regulations all increase fundraising. Contrary to expectations, the level of partisan competition, the cost of living, the size of the state budget, and the wealth of a state do not have a major impact on fundraising levels. These findings suggest that existing fundraising levels are not inevitable and can be manipulated by institutional reforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Critics of deliberative democracy argue that average people are either unable or unwilling to engage in thoughtful, reasoned discussion over policy issues. Through an analysis of conversational dynamics in 10 National Issues Forums, I found that deliberators typically gave reasons to support their arguments, most commonly with factual statements or examples drawn from personal experience. However, the logical connections between evidence and conclusions were often tenuous: even though the evidence presented was relevant, deliberators frequently neglected to explain how and why it supported their conclusions. Further, they rarely explored the premises underlying their arguments, assuming away key points of contention. These findings indicate that the obstacle to effective deliberation does not lie in citizens' inability or reluctance to give reasons to support their opinions, as they routinely did so. Instead, a more significant barrier to effective deliberation lies in deliberators' capacity (or willingness) to construct coherent arguments. These findings also indicate that the manner in which citizens engage in policy discussions can limit some of the beneficial outcomes hypothesized by deliberation proponents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the expansion of state-level efforts to legislate in the area of immigration in 2006 and 2007. At the center of analysis of state and federal policy content are two questions: how have states chosen to enter a field where their efforts may be preempted by federal law, and are state policies capable of altering the nation's immigration policy. We find that there is wide variation in how states have tackled immigration, both in terms of the types of policies they enact as well as whether they are pro- or anti-immigrant. As for states' capacity to influence federal immigration policy, we find that states influence immigration policy by adding immigration-specific policy to policy areas traditionally the province of state government. Further, state efforts have largely complemented federal policy; even though states' activity may be spurred by unhappiness with a lack of federal action, for the most part they have not taken a confrontational approach. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public financing has been implemented in many jurisdictions as part of an effort to increase competitiveness, make the campaign finance system more democratic, and reduce money raised from private sources. But does it accomplish these goals? Even though some research has been done on public financing in state elections, we know little about its impact in municipal elections. This paper analyzes the impact of partial public financing programs in New York and Los Angeles City Council races. I find that its effect on competitiveness, fundraising, and the cost of elections is minor and does not accomplish the goals desired by reformers. Even though it may have some positive impact, partial public financing programs do not fundamentally alter the dynamics of city council elections. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mayoral candidates need to assemble a fundraising coalition so they can raise sufficient funds to be competitive. What is the nature of those coalitions? Are they narrow coalitions of like minded interests, or are they broad coalitions encompassing many different groups? Further, are the coalitions assembled by opposing candidates fundamentally different, or do most candidates receive their funds from the same sources? This article explores these questions through an analysis of five open seat mayoral elections in New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle. The results show that mayoral elections are not characterized by competing coalitions of donors. Most candidates assemble broad coalitions of many different groups and because of this breadth, candidates often have internally inconsistent coalitions. Further, the fundraising coalitions of opposing candidates are usually quite similar. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines campaign finance patterns in three cities: Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle. We ask how much money candidates for city council seats need to raise to be competitive and to win. Each of the three cities exhibited markedly different fundraising dynamics. In general Los Angeles more closely resembles state and national elections in terms of the importance of fundraising, while San Francisco and Seattle?s elections have fewer commonalities with higher levels of government. We conclude that how much candidates need to raise to be legitimate contenders for city council seats is heavily influenced by how elections are organized and city/district size. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on social networks and political participation has generally focused on the role of social networks in mobilizing citizens to participate. In this paper, I examine a different question: once citizens decide to participate, how can they use social networks to help them achieve their political goals? Based on interviews with citizens in a mid-sized city, I argue that social networks are a political resource akin to time, money and civic skills, and that they can facilitate participation by helping citizens achieve various political tasks. I close the paper by exploring the implications that this finding has for our understanding of local politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]