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Juan Linz posited his "perils of presidentialism" argument in 1978. Yet contrary to Linz's predictions, since then presidential democracies have been much less likely to break down. Still, presidents continue to confront challenges to remaining in office for their full terms. Between 1978 and 2006 30% of all democratically-elected presidents worldwide faced serious efforts to remove them from office, and 12% were actually forced from office prior to the end of their terms. Thus far scholars have focused on the sources of these crises. In this paper, by contrast, we focus on their effects. Do these crises represent a serious new peril of presidentialism, or, to echo Linz, do we see crisis and re-equilibration, with few lasting consequences? This empirical question has important theoretical and normative implications. If we observe profound consequences following from these challenges, then even with the military largely sidelined and regime collapse not at issue, presidentialism would remain associated with normatively bad outcomes. Yet if we find that challenges or failures have minimal effects, then early presidential exit may represent an under-appreciated equilibrating mechanism that helps resolve executivelegislative conflict. In this case, early presidential exit might actually reveal democracy's vitality across the region. Both the pessimistic and optimistic views find some conjectural support among scholars, yet more systematic empirical analysis provides little support for the pessimistic view. Although presidential challenges and falls are surely difficult crises, their effects are limited and ephemeral. We thus conclude that challenges and falls cause only superficial and ephemeral damage to democratic governance in Latin America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that social movements respond to two dimensions of political opportunity in deciding when and how to seek political influence in multilevel governance. One dimension, the degree of access or openness, is already common in the literature on transnational social movements. A second dimension of political capacity - the ability to generate authoritative outcomes - is also important, but much less studied. Both activists and scholars can assess institutions in multi-level governance for their simultaneous placement on these two dimensions. I briefly review the four resulting quadrants and the kinds of strategies social movements are likely to choose in them, discussing trade institutions that might fit in each: strong and open, strong and closed, weak and open, and weak and closed. I use this framework to argue that the Mercosur free trade area fits best in the weak and closed quadrant, and thus it is not surprising that regional social movements have directed little time to this level of governance. I also briefly review the politics of GMOs in the Mercosur region, showing that the politics of GMOs in Brazil and Argentina have surprisingly different patterns of political opportunity for their national movements that have led to very different concrete results. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores why and how do South Americans demand their president leave office early. It argues that the challenged president were more likely to be personally implicated in scandal, to pursue neoliberal policies, and to lack a congressional majority than their unchallenged counterparts. It concludes with a discussion of the potential implications of these regional patterns for presidentialism as a whole.