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China has played an inconsistent role in multilateral governance, sometimes contributing to the creation and maintenance of international regimes, sometimes using its leverage to try to negotiate a greater voice in regime governance, and sometimes passively accepting regimes while free-riding on efforts to maintain them. We argue that theories of China's approach to multilateralism that rely on assumptions about its inherent disposition - or "type" - cannot account for this variation; we instead highlight the strategic context of each issue. An emerging global power such as China will be willing to invest more in supporting a regime when its outside options are relatively poor. When its outside options are good, its approach will depend on whether it is viewed as indispensable to effective regime support; if it is not a necessary player in maintaining regimes it will accept regimes as they are and tend to go along with the efforts of more established states, while if the emerging power is seen as indispensable by the other major players (in our case the US) it will threaten hold-up as a way to win concessions. We show that these two factors, outside options and indispensability, can help explain changes in China's strategy with respect to the issue of North Korea's nuclear program and the regulation of international finance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After long being viewed as potential flashpoint, relations across the Taiwan Strait have stabilized tremendously in recent years, reflecting moderation in the approaches both Beijing and Taipei have taken with regard to the cross-Strait sovereignty dispute. I consider whether this new-found stability in the Taiwan Strait is likely to persist. To do so, I discuss at some length how a conflict in the Taiwan Strait could occur, and I then consider how fundamental trends in cross-Strait relations-such as rapidly growing Chinese military power and deepening cross-Strait economic exchange-are affecting the likelihood of conflict. I argue that the relationship across the Taiwan Strait is likely to be more stable in the years ahead than was the case in the years preceding 2008; this conclusion holds even if there is a change in ruling party in Taiwan. But I also emphasize that the cross-Strait relationship has not been fundamentally transformed, and that the potential for serious conflict remains. I suggest in particular that a rapidly shifting cross-Strait balance of power has the potential to be highly destabilizing, if it comes to dominate other, more stabilizing, trends in China-Taiwan relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past 30 years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has transformed itself into a major actor in the international economy. This paper considers the extent to which China's growing economic power translates into political influence over the foreign policy behavior of its economic partners. In particular, I test quantitatively whether different types of economic exchange with China are correlated with a country's willingness to accommodate core Chinese interests. My findings call into question whether a systematic relationship exists between China's foreign economic ties and the willingness of other states to adopt foreign policies in line with PRC interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A broad range of indicators suggest that China has become much more globally active in recent years. Existing research has indentified a number of economic and strategic motivations behind China's increased diplomatic and economic activism. Yet there have been no efforts to systematically test the relative importance of different drivers of China's diplomatic priorities. What factors lead China to focus attention on relations with one country instead of another? Are economic or geostrategic factors more important, and are Chinese priorities changing over time? We argue that Chinese leadership travel abroad offers a useful, if imperfect, indicator of China's diplomatic priorities. Using a unique, newly compiled dataset, we analyze quantitatively the correlates of travel abroad by top Chinese leaders from 1998 to 2006. We find that geo-strategic factors appear to have been the primary drivers of travel decisions early on (while Jiang Zemin was president), but that economic factors appear paramount later (under the presidency of Hu Jintao). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent years have seen a rapid rise in the number of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) proposed and signed by Asian countries. What are the principal factors behind this sudden interest in bilateral FTAs in Asia? To address this question, we have collected data on all FTA projects in the Asian region. Our data include both those agreements that have been completed, and those that have been considered formally at some level. We hypothesize that the variables associated with the successful completion of an agreement may be quite different from the factors that lead an agreement to be proposed—or even negotiated—in the first place. In this preliminary analysis, we focus on general welfare considerations and the salience of domestic political constraints as important factors affecting the formation of bilateral FTAs. We find support for the effects of openness, a proxy for the domestic strength of protectionist economic interests. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article investigates whether partisan politics played a role in the diffusion process itself. Using a combination of existing data supplemented by some new measures of policy behavior, the authors find strong evidence that partisanship was a critical part of policy diffusion among European parliamentary democracies. Both left and right governments tended to liberalize capital controls when like-minded governments in power in major European nations liberalized their capital controls first.