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In this paper, I examine whether and how some intuitions about the nature of our minds are preserved within the paradigm inspired by the hypothesis of the “extended mind”. These intuitions include the ideas of the mind as a locus of cognition, a space in which we exhibit a special (and maybe privileged) access and an unified and homogeneous realm of interrelated states. All these aspects are manifestations of one idea: the authority exhibited by the cognitive agent in the control of her cognitive activity. Along the paper, I present different ways of understanding the programs interested in situating cognitive activities (situated cognition, embodied cognition, embedded cognition, extended cognition, distributed cognition, collective cognition…). I will briefly revise some criticisms of the hypothesis of the extended mind. I will argue that what is at stake is the kind of cognitive authority that exhibits an agent once it is conceived as integrating and coordinating internal and external elements in her cognitive activities. This kind of hybridization is grounded not only in the different contributions of both elements but also in the fact that the cognitive evaluations involved are based on a certain criterion of homogeneity of the intentional and rational space. I will also discuss traditional examples of cognitive extensions through the coordination of internal and external representations, and the use of cognitive artefacts. Finally, I will present some doubts about whether these external elements must be considered as parts of the mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]