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The author reflects voting machines used in U.S. elections, stating that election officials should build on existing voting technology in 2008. The article is one of two articles in the issue articulating a point/counterpoint perspective on direct-recording electronic voting machines (DREs). Topics include the development of a quantifiable risk analysis framework for the evaluation of voting systems and end-to-end (E2E) voting systems.

Focuses on the use of paperless direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines in the U.S. Ability of DRE voting machines to hide the internal mechanics of voting to the voters; Improve in integrity of elections; Protection of DRE voting machines.

The author reflects on voting machines used in U.S. elections, stating that paperless electronic voting machines should be banned from use in elections. The article is a rebuttal to another article found elsewhere in the issue on the topic of direct-recording electronic voting machines (DREs). Topics include voter-marked ballots, precinct-count optical scan technology (PCOS), and the independent verification of vote tallies. Also discussed is the impossibility of trustworthy elections with DREs.

The author reflects on voting machines used in U.S. elections, stating categorically that paperless electronic voting machines should be banned from use in elections. The article is one of two articles in the issue articulating a point/counterpoint perspective on direct-recording electronic voting machines (DREs). Topics include independent verification, breathtaking blunders in the security designs of DREs and a computer virus introduced into a DRE system.

A response by David L. Dill to a letter to the editor about his article “The U.S. Should Ban Paperless Electronic Voting Machines" in the October 2008 issue is presented.

The author reflects on voting machines used in U.S. elections, stating that elections in the U.S. should not go to paper ballots but instead continue to move towards direct-recording electronic voting machines (DREs). The article is a rebuttal to another article found elsewhere in the issue on the topic of (DREs). Topics include end-to-end (E2E) verifiability, money spent on precinct-count optical scan systems, and consistent election procedures. Also discussed are tightened security requirements to eliminate known vulnerabilities.