1. Formal Analysis and Implementation of a TPM 2.0-based Direct Anonymous Attestation Scheme
- Author
-
Liqun Chen, Jorden Whitefield, Christopher J. P. Newton, Stephan Wesemeyer, Helen Treharne, and Ralf Sasse
- Subjects
021110 strategic, defence & security studies ,Authentication ,Cryptographic primitive ,Formal verification ,Security protocols ,TPM ,DAA ,business.industry ,Computer science ,0211 other engineering and technologies ,020206 networking & telecommunications ,Cryptography ,02 engineering and technology ,Cryptographic protocol ,Digital signature ,Embedded system ,0202 electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering ,Direct Anonymous Attestation ,Trusted Platform Module ,business - Abstract
Direct Anonymous Attestation (Daa) is a set of cryptographic schemes used to create anonymous digital signatures. To provide additional assurance, Daa schemes can utilise a Trusted Platform Module (Tpm) that is a tamper-resistant hardware device embedded in a computing platform and which provides cryptographic primitives and secure storage. We extend Chen and Li's Daa scheme to support: 1) signing a message anonymously, 2) self-certifying Tpm keys, and 3) ascertaining a platform's state as recorded by the Tpm's platform configuration registers (PCR) for remote attestation, with explicit reference to Tpm2.0 API calls. We perform a formal analysis of the scheme and are the first symbolic models to explicitly include the low-level Tpm call details. Our analysis reveals that a fix pro-posed by Whitefield et al. to address an authentication attack on an Ecc-Daa scheme is also required by our scheme. Developing a fine-grained, formal model of a Daa scheme contributes to the growing body of work demonstrating the use of formal tools in supporting security analyses of cryptographic protocols. We additionally provide and benchmark an open-source C++implementation of this Daa scheme supporting both a hardware and a software Tpm and measure its performance., Proceedings of the 15th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ISBN:978-1-4503-6750-9
- Published
- 2020