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This paper reviews the main macroeconomic trends and the debate on policy priorities in Italy since the advent of EMU. It argues that, in the decade up to the outbreak of the global crisis (1998-2007), in Italy the reform process came to a virtual standstill and fiscal policy was inconsistent with the commitments taken on at the European level. The paper suggests that the lack of resolute policy reactions to the institutional dysfunctions and structural weaknesses was due to the fragmentation of the political constituency, while a variety of favourable contingent factors masked the difficulties of the productive system. Had Italy been better positioned in terms of public finances and structural features in 2007, some of the adverse effects of the global and sovereign crises would have been avoided.

This paper analyses the roles which Belgium and Italy have played in the process ofEuropean monetary integration. It focusses on Belgian and Italian attitudes towards European integration and EMU, exchange rate policies, key concepts of the EMU strategies and concrete contributions. Overall, Belgium and Italy played an important and pace-setting role in the process of European monetary integration. The main difference is that Belgium has been a constant and consistent "pace-setter" inmonetary matters, whereas Italy was mainly active in the 1980s. Furthermore, the paper shows how important it was for a country to achieve a sound economic performance, especially a stable exchange rate, in order to have influence on theEuropean monetary scene.

Assessing the effects of monetary policy and wage bargaining on employment andinflation in the European Monetary Union (EMU), the first step sees development of a Post-Keynesian competitive claims model of inflation with endogenous money. In this model the NAIRU is considered to be a short-run limit to employment enforced by independent and conservative central banks. In the long run, however, the NAIRU will follow actual unemployment and is therefore also dependent on the forces determining aggregate demand, including monetary policies. But the NAIRU may also be reduced through effectively co-ordinated wage bargaining, as has been shown by institutional political economists. Applying these considerations to the economic performance of the EMU, different scenarios determined by wage bargainingcoordination and the European Central Bank's (ECB) monetary policies are developed. It is shown that the first phase of the EMU was dominated by uncoordinated wage bargaining across the EMU and an "anti-growth-bias" of theECB. Thus the euro area was plagued with nominal wage restraint, highunemployment and inflation above the ECB target. Economic performance will improve if the ECB abandons its asymmetric monetary strategy. This may be facilitated by a higher degree of effective wage bargaining co-ordination across the EMU.

The paper considers alternative exchange rate regimes for the East Europeanaccession candidates, both prior to EU accession and following EU accession but prior to EMU membership. We conclude that, from an economic point of view, EMU membership should be as early as possible. There is, however, a risk that prevailing interpretations of the inflation and exchange rate criteria for EMU membership could lead to unnecessary delays in EMU membership for the accession countries. Theexchange rate criterion for EMU membership requires that the candidate "has respected the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange ratemechanism of the European Monetary System without severe tensions for at least the last two yeas before the examination." Both this text and the precedents of Finland, Italy and Greece, support the view that the exchange rate criterion can be satisfied without two years of formal ERMII membership. Insistence on at least two years of formal ERMII membership for the accession countries, would result in an unnecessary, costly and potentially risky stay in EMU purgatory.

This paper examines the intentions and outturns of central bank policies in Europefrom the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates until the start ofEMU in 1999. It focuses on the lessons that can be drawn from the three dominant policy strategies of money targeting, exchange rate targeting and inflation targeting. Several of the lessons that are relevant to the euro area are shown to have been incorporated into the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank.

Il Fondo monetario europeo è stato oggetto del Secondo Seminario internazionale sui diritti economici e monetari europea , tenutosi a Ginevra nel dicembre del 1979. In questa introduzione del procedimento, l'autore passa in rassegna i punti di discussione e offre alcune osservazioni introduttive .. The European Monetary Fund was the subject of the Second International Seminar on European Economic and Monetary Union, held in Geneva in December of 1979. In this introduction to the proceedings, the author reviews the points of discussion and offers some introductory remarks. JEL: F33, F36

The work examines how the irrevocably fixed conversion rates for the currencies of countries participating in the EMU can be set. The authors recall the few provisions delineated in the Maastricht Treaty before examining the wide set of options available. If there are currencies in the ECU basket that do not participate to the single currency, setting conversion rates becomes more complicated. Moreover, the Lamfalussy rule for defining rates comports undesirable consequences. The authors conclude by proposing a multi-stage solution that is compatible with the recent Council regulation on the legal framework: announcement that the euro conversion rate will be set equal to the ECU market rate on the last day and a parallel agreement on the desired structure of bilateral rates of the inside countries. JEL Codes: F02, F15 Keywords: EMU, Conversion rates, European currency unit,

The problems regarding Italy's proposed adherence to the European Economic and Monetary Union are discussed, particularly, the procedures in determining the public budget and their possible changes. Transparency in the budget process is needed to be able to do this task. The implications of the proposed changes on the amendments to the Finance Bill and the consequences of the Maastricht Treaty should also be closely examined. The economic and legal rules must be made known well before switching to the European currency. JEL Codes: F15, H61

The recent collapse of the European Monetary System (EMS) is a setback in the move towards European economic and monetary union (EMU). Two major causes have been identified for one crisis in the EMS in September 1992 and its subsequent collapse on 2 August 1993: German reunification and the effects of the Maastricht Treaty. The active role of the German Bundesbank in the collapse of the EMS is examined. JEL Codes: F02, E50

The road towards an economic and monetary union in Europe has a long history, in which an important step was madeten years ago, with the establishment of the European Monetary System. Within it Germany and Italy have thus far been on two opposite sides, the "strong" one and the "weak" one. Cooperation should lead to a convergence among these sides, making the conditions and the behaviour of the member states of the system more homogenous. The present work summarises the Italo-German experience within the EMS to date, trying to show the level and the kind of convergence that has occurred in recent years. JEL Codes: F15

The work provides a theoretical analysis of monetary policy and unification in light of today’s debate among academic economists on EMU. A brief survey of the main issues concerning monetary policy is presented. The author then puts the subject in a broader perspective, showing that central questions concerning the optimality of currency areas are strictly related to the theory of monetary policy and, particularly, to the effectiveness of domestic monetary actions. Since participation in a monetary union implies loss of monetary sovereignty, the issue at hand is evaluating the effects of this loss on social welfare. Hence, the author argues that federal fiscal policy can play a crucial role in the adjustment mechanism. JEL Codes: F15, E52

The problems regarding Italy's proposed adherence to the European Economic and Monetary Union are discussed, particularly, the procedures in determining the public budget and their possible changes. Transparency in the budget process is needed to be able to do this task. The implications of the proposed changes on the amendments to the Finance Bill and the consequences of the Maastricht Treaty should also be closely examined. The economic and legal rules must be made known well before switching to the European currency. JEL Codes: F15, H61

The work examines how the irrevocably fixed conversion rates for the currencies of countries participating in the EMU can be set. The authors recall the few provisions delineated in the Maastricht Treaty before examining the wide set of options available. If there are currencies in the ECU basket that do not participate to the single currency, setting conversion rates becomes more complicated. Moreover, the Lamfalussy rule for defining rates comports undesirable consequences. The authors conclude by proposing a multi-stage solution that is compatible with the recent Council regulation on the legal framework: announcement that the euro conversion rate will be set equal to the ECU market rate on the last day and a parallel agreement on the desired structure of bilateral rates of the inside countries. JEL Codes: F02, F15

An economic analysis of the EU and EMU, from origin to likely future, is presented. JEL Codes: F15, E02

The recent collapse of the European Monetary System (EMS) is a setback in the move towards European economic and monetary union (EMU). Two major causes have been identified for one crisis in the EMS in September 1992 and its subsequent collapse on 2 August 1993: German reunification and the effects of the Maastricht Treaty. The active role of the German Bundesbank in the collapse of the EMS is examined. JEL Codes: F02, E50

The work provides a theoretical analysis of monetary policy and unification in light of today’s debate among academic economists on EMU. A brief survey of the main issues concerning monetary policy is presented. The author then puts the subject in a broader perspective, showing that central questions concerning the optimality of currency areas are strictly related to the theory of monetary policy and, particularly, to the effectiveness of domestic monetary actions. Since participation in a monetary union implies loss of monetary sovereignty, the issue at hand is evaluating the effects of this loss on social welfare. Hence, the author argues that federal fiscal policy can play a crucial role in the adjustment mechanism. JEL: F15, E52

The European Monetary Fund was the subject of the Second International Seminar on European Economic and Monetary Union, held in Geneva in December of 1979. In these concluding remarks, the author summarises some of the main points of discussion and offers some further considerations. JEL: F33, F36

The European Monetary Fund was the subject of the Second International Seminar on European Economic and Monetary Union, held in Geneva in December of 1979. In these concluding remarks, the author summarises some of the main points of discussion and offers some further considerations. JEL: F33, F36

The European Monetary Fund was the subject of the Second International Seminar on European Economic and Monetary Union, held in Geneva in December of 1979. In these concluding remarks, the author summarises some of the main points of discussion and offers some further considerations. JEL: F33, F36

The European Monetary Fund was the subject of the Second International Seminar on European Economic and Monetary Union, held in Geneva in December of 1979. In this introduction to the proceedings, the author reviews the points of discussion and offers some introductory remarks. JEL: F33, F36

Using area-wide data, we simulate the responses of inflation and real output following monetary shocks in the EMU. We find that short-term interest rate shocks have a significant impact on real activity, but hardly on prices. M3 shows a perverse short-term response to a monetary contraction, which should be taken into account when interpreting the reference value of money growth (the "first pillar" of the Eurosystem's monetary strategy). Shocks to the effective exchange rate have a rapid impact on prices, money growth and real activity. As the exchange rate itself is hardly affected by monetary policy shocks, though, there is little scope for an exchange rate policy. Rather, these findings underscore the important role that the exchange rate should play as an information variable within the "second pillar" of the monetary strategy.

This study aims at assessing empirically the determinants of changes in risk-weighted bank capital ratios in the 1990s in Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK and the US. Both bank-specific characteristics, factors at the banking industry level and the degree of undercapitalization are found to be relevant for bank capital ratios. The results suggest that in most cases either banks assess the risk of their portfolio as being higher than the outcomes generated by the Basel Capital Accord risk weighting scheme, or they need to take additional country- or bank-specific capital requirements into account when setting capital ratios. In all countries commercial banks face a downward pressure on their capital ratios due to an intensified competition. Finally, capital regulation seems to be effective in influencing bank capital ratios.

An economic analysis of the EU and EMU, from origin to likely future, is presented.

Using area-wide data, we simulate the responses of inflation and real output following monetary shocks in the EMU. We find that short-term interest rate shocks have a significant impact on real activity, but hardly on prices. M3 shows a perverse short-term response to a monetary contraction, which should be taken into account when interpreting the reference value of money growth (the "first pillar" of the Eurosystem's monetary strategy). Shocks to the effective exchange rate have a rapid impact on prices, money growth and real activity. As the exchange rate itself is hardly affected by monetary policy shocks, though, there is little scope for an exchange rate policy. Rather, these findings underscore the important role that the exchange rate should play as an information variable within the "second pillar" of the monetary strategy. JEL Codes: N1, E52, F36

This study aims at assessing empirically the determinants of changes in risk-weighted bank capital ratios in the 1990s in Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK and the US. Both bank-specific characteristics, factors at the banking industry level and the degree of undercapitalization are found to be relevant for bank capital ratios. The results suggest that in most cases either banks assess the risk of their portfolio as being higher than the outcomes generated by the Basel Capital Accord risk weighting scheme, or they need to take additional country- or bank-specific capital requirements into account when setting capital ratios. In all countries commercial banks face a downward pressure on their capital ratios due to an intensified competition. Finally, capital regulation seems to be effective in influencing bank capital ratios. JEL Codes: G21, G28

This paper analyses the roles which Belgium and Italy have played in the process of European monetary integration. It focusses on Belgian and Italian attitudes towards European integration and EMU, exchange rate policies, key concepts of the EMU strategies and concrete contributions. Overall, Belgium and Italy played an important and pace-setting role in the process of European monetary integration. The main difference is that Belgium has been a constant and consistent "pace-setter" in monetary matters, whereas Italy was mainly active in the 1980s. Furthermore, the paper shows how important it was for a country to achieve a sound economic performance, especially a stable exchange rate, in order to have influence on the European monetary scene. JEL Codes: F31, F36 Keywords: EMU, Exchange Rates, Integration

The paper considers alternative exchange rate regimes for the East European accession candidates, both prior to EU accession and following EU accession but prior to EMU membership. We conclude that, from an economic point of view, EMU membership should be as early as possible. There is, however, a risk that prevailing interpretations of the inflation and exchange rate criteria for EMU membership could lead to unnecessary delays in EMU membership for the accession countries. The exchange rate criterion for EMU membership requires that the candidate "has respected the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System without severe tensions for at least the last two years before the examination." Both this text and the precedents of Finland, Italy and Greece, support the view that the exchange rate criterion can be satisfied without two years of formal ERM II membership. Insistence on at least two years of formal ERM II membership for the accession countries would result in an unnecessary, costly and potentially risky stay in EMU purgatory. JEL Codes: F33, P33, F15 Keywords: EMU, EU, Exchange Rates

This paper examines the intentions and outturns of central bank policies in Europe from the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates until the start of EMU in 1999. It focuses on the lessons that can be drawn from the three dominant policy strategies of money targeting, exchange rate targeting and inflation targeting. Several of the lessons that are relevant to the euro area are shown to have been incorporated into the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank. JEL Codes: E52, E58, E31, F31, F36

Assessing the effects of monetary policy and wage bargaining on employment andinflation in the European Monetary Union (EMU), the first step sees development of a Post-Keynesian competitive claims model of inflation with endogenous money. In this model the NAIRU is considered to be a short-run limit to employment enforced by independent and conservative central banks. In the long run, however, the NAIRU will follow actual unemployment and is therefore also dependent on the forces determining aggregate demand, including monetary policies. But the NAIRU may also be reduced through effectively co-ordinated wage bargaining, as has been shown by institutional political economists. Applying these considerations to the economic performance of the EMU, different scenarios determined by wage bargainingcoordination and the European Central Bank's (ECB) monetary policies are developed. It is shown that the first phase of the EMU was dominated by uncoordinated wage bargaining across the EMU and an "anti-growth-bias" of theECB. Thus the euro area was plagued with nominal wage restraint, highunemployment and inflation above the ECB target. Economic performance will improve if the ECB abandons its asymmetric monetary strategy. This may be facilitated by a higher degree of effective wage bargaining co-ordination across the EMU. JEL Codes: E52, J52, F36, J31

The paper considers alternative exchange rate regimes for the East European accession candidates, both prior to EU accession and following EU accession but prior to EMU membership. We conclude that, from an economic point of view, EMU membership should be as early as possible. There is, however, a risk that prevailing interpretations of the inflation and exchange rate criteria for EMU membership could lead to unnecessary delays in EMU membership for the accession countries. The exchange rate criterion for EMU membership requires that the candidate "has respected the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange ratemechanism of the European Monetary System without severe tensions for at least the last two yeas before the examination." Both this text and the precedents of Finland, Italy and Greece, support the view that the exchange rate criterion can be satisfied without two years of formal ERMII membership. Insistence on at least two years of formal ERMII membership for the accession countries, would result in an unnecessary, costly and potentially risky stay in EMU purgatory. JEL Codes: F33, P33

This paper analyses the roles which Belgium and Italy have played in the process of European monetary integration. It focusses on Belgian and Italian attitudes towards European integration and EMU, exchange rate policies, key concepts of the EMU strategies and concrete contributions. Overall, Belgium and Italy played an important and pace-setting role in the process of European monetary integration. The main difference is that Belgium has been a constant and consistent "pace-setter" in monetary matters, whereas Italy was mainly active in the 1980s. Furthermore, the paper shows how important it was for a country to achieve a sound economic performance, especially a stable exchange rate, in order to have influence on the European monetary scene. JEL Codes: F31, F36