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The stagnating EU accession process needs political will and procedural changes allowing eastern candidates to advance. In the meantime, they should be more supported to use the full potential of existing opportunities for gradual economic and sectoral integration with the EU. An upgraded Eastern Partnership needs a comprehensive security dimension linking resilience, connectivity, and defense policy, as well as cooperation in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The protracted regional conflicts (in Moldova and the South Caucasus) require a more active EU engagement as existing OSCE formats continue to be blocked, and Russia's role and military presence weaken. New openings for conflict resolution mean higher demand for the EU's diplomatic, monitoring, and peacekeeping capacities. A new eastern Neighborhood Policy should be designed for the wider region, connecting the Black Sea and the South Caucasus with Central Asia and thus creating viable alternatives to the competing geoeconomic and governance "offers" of China, Russia, and Turkey.

The implementation of the European Union's (EU) Green Deal to reduce emissions by 2030 and to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 will have an impact on the EU's trade policy and on its trade relations with its non-EU partners. With the ongoing decarbonisation process of European economic sectors, the EU's climate policy will be in­creasingly integrated into its trade policy through measures such as the Carbon Bor­der Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and by strengthening the environment chapters of its trade agreements. Therefore, the debate on the future of Turkey-EU trade rela­tions should focus on future prospects for decarbonisation and trade if both sides are keen to maintain or deepen their trade relations. In the current context, which is rife with geopolitical and energy security considerations, a long-term vision and a holistic approach are needed now more than ever. (author's abstract)

In Poland and Turkey, restrictions placed on abortion is just one of the many examples of democratic hollowing and attacks on the rights of women and marginalised genders in recent years. Civil society organisations (CSOs) in both countries advocate for access to safe and legal pregnancy terminations but face numerous restrictions in doing so. This paper explores these challenges, drawing on material collected from expert interviews, CSO publications and other media.

It has become cliché to argue that Turkish-Iranian relations oscillate between a con­trolled rivalry and limited cooperation. However, in Iraq and Syria, rising tensions between Turkey and Turkey-affiliated groups on the one hand and Iran and Iran-backed groups on the other, have put the two countries on a collision course. Con­flictual relations between Turkey and Iran have the potential to destabilise the Middle East and the South Caucasus, spawning additional security risks as well as waves of migration towards Europe. Such a situation could also complicate matters related to European energy security. Europe should remain alert and help to ease tensions through de-escalation mechanisms. In this regard, efforts to strengthen Iraqi sover­eignty may serve as a pre-emptive measure. (author's abstract)

Millions of Turkish voters are geared up for the twin (parliamentary and presidential) elections that are scheduled to take place in June 2023 at the latest. After nearly 20 years in power, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's rule may seem unassailable to many observers of Turkish politics. However, owing to the economic downturn and rifts in his ruling party, this will be the first election in which Erdoğan is not the clear favourite. Six oppo­sition parties of different ideological origins have come together to pick a joint presidential candidate to stand against Erdoğan and to offer a common platform for restoring parliamentary democracy. Although the opposition alliance has reasonable chances of defeating Erdoğan's ruling bloc, their victory would not guarantee a smooth process of transition to parliamentary democracy. If the opposition can defeat Erdoğan, the new government would need to undertake the arduous tasks of estab­lishing a meri­tocratic bureaucracy, restructuring Turkey's diplomatic course and economic policy, and switching back to parliamentary rule. Due to the opposition alliance's diverse com­position, accomplishing these goals may be as difficult as winning the elections.

Among the many significant geopolitical consequences of Russia's war against Ukraine has been the reinvigoration of the Middle Corridor, both as a regional economic zone comprising Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Turkey but also as an increasingly attrac­tive alternative route between Europe and China. Russia's war has disrupted overland connectivity via the New Eurasian Land Bridge, also known as Northern Corridor, which passes through - now heavily sanctioned - Russian and Belarusian territory. While the Middle Corridor will not be able to fully replace the Northern Corridor, regional integration along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route is likely to increase its potential at the expense of Russia in the long-term. Ankara's close cultural ties with the Central Asian republics combined with the latter's willingness to diversify their foreign relations away from Moscow and Beijing provide Turkey with greater leverage in the region. The EU and Turkey share a common interest in enhancing Eurasian connectivity for several reasons: to promote peace and prosperity in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, to enhance commercial access to Central Asia, to increase the resilience of European supply chains, and to diversify European energy supplies. Strengthening Eurasian connectivity would also work to balance Russian, Chinese, and Iranian influence in Central Asia. (author's abstract)

With the background of the Syrian crisis, irregular migration, and authoritarianism -strengthened by the collapse of the Peace Process of the Turkish state with the Work­ers' Party of Kurdistan (PKK) in 2015 and the 2016 coup attempt - the Turkish gov­ernment has amended the Citizenship Law, changed policies concerning refugees and irregular migrants, and re-designed access to basic citizenship rights in the last decade. Due to these amendments and changes, tens of thousands of Syrians have been awarded Turkish citizenship. A few millions of them are now settled in Turkey and exercising social and education rights without being Turkish citizens. This state of affairs contra­dicts previous Turkish policies for citizenship and supports the claims that the gov­ernment under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been con­structing a more Islamic and less secular Turkish nationhood. Concomitantly, the basic citizenship rights of Kurds and members of the Gulen community have been massively violated. This indicates that being Muslim or Turkish does not protect citizens from discrimination.

Although electricity grids shape and define both political and economic spaces, the geopolitical significance of electricity remains underestimated. In political communities and beyond, such grids establish new channels for projecting geopolitical influence and new spheres of influence. In the Europe-Asia continental area, integrated electricity grids meet inter­connectors - that is, cross-border transmission lines linking different elec­tric grids. Interconnectors define new, partly competing vectors of integra­tion that extend beyond already integrated electricity grids. In this context, it is attractive for non-EU states to belong to the electricity system of continental Europe. This is because interconnected synchronous systems form "grid communities" that share a "common destiny" - not only in terms of electricity supply but also in terms of security and welfare. Germany and the EU must develop an electricity foreign policy in order to optimise, modernise, strengthen and expand the European electricity grid. Above all, however, Germany and the EU should help shape interconnectivity beyond the EU's common integrated electricity grid. China is gaining considerable influence in the electricity sector, setting standards and norms as well as expanding its strategic outreach - to the benefit of its own economy. Its efforts are part of Beijing's larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an attempt to reorient global infrastructure and com­mercial flows. In the EU's eastern neighbourhood, geopolitical issues have dominated the configuration of electricity grids since the end of the Cold War. There is unmistakable competition over integration between the EU and Russia. The eastern Mediterranean region, the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions, and Central Asia are, each in their own way, changing from peripheral zones into interconnecting spaces. The EU, China, Russia and - across the Black Sea - Iran and Turkey are competing in these zones to influ­ence the reconfiguration o

Die Steuerung irregulärer Migration ist zu einem Schwerpunkt der Beziehungen zwischen der EU und der Türkei geworden. Zwei Sichtweisen dominieren in der euro­päischen Diskussion über dieses Thema: eine "fürsorgliche", die sich auf das Wohl­ergehen der Flüchtlinge konzentriert, und eine "besorgte", deren Fokus auf der Sicher­heit der EU-Außengrenzen und den Ängsten europäischer Bürger liegt. Ein Faktor wird in den europäischen Debatten über Migration weitgehend übersehen: die wachsende Unzufriedenheit der türkischen Bevölkerung mit den sozialen und politischen Verhältnissen im eigenen Land. Schließlich nimmt die Türkei weltweit am meisten Flüchtlinge auf und hat dabei gleichzeitig mit einer schweren Wirtschafts­krise und einer festgefahrenen Regierung zu kämpfen. Die migrationspolitische Zusam­men­arbeit von EU und Türkei wird nur dann langfristig Früchte bringen, wenn dieser wach­senden Unzufriedenheit Rechnung getragen wird. Denn weder die Förderung der Rechte von Flüchtlingen in der Türkei noch eine verlässliche Sicherheitskoopera­tion sind auf Dauer ohne die Akzeptanz der türkischen Aufnahmegesellschaft mög­lich. Im Hinblick darauf sollte die EU der Türkei ihre Absicht signalisieren, mehr Flücht­linge aufzunehmen, und die Integrationsbemühungen vor Ort proaktiver unterstützen. (Autorenreferat)

Ende 2021 fand ein erstes Treffen im Rahmen der sogenannten "3+3-Kooperations­plattform" statt. Die Initiative strebt an, die südkaukasischen Länder Armenien, Aser­baidschan und Georgien - das indes seine Nichtteilnahme verkündet hat und fern­blieb - sowie die Regionalmächte Iran, Russland und Tür­kei zusammenzubringen. Ziel ist, die multilaterale Kooperation auszubauen; weitere Treffen sollen in regel­mäßi­gem Turnus folgen. Die Plattform ist Ausdruck von Dynamiken regio­naler Neu­ordnung im Südkaukasus infolge des Krieges in und um Berg-Karabach im Herbst 2020 und damit verbunden dem Gestaltungsanspruch Russlands und der Türkei. Sie ist zudem ein Beispiel dafür, wie diese Neuordnungsprozesse bereits vor den tekto­nischen Verschiebungen im Kontext des gegenwärtigen Krieges in der Ukraine die Spiel­räume für die EU in der Region verschoben haben. (Autorenreferat)

Turkey’s neo-Eurasianist ideologues describe themselves as "Kemalist Eurasianists". They argue that "Eurasianism calls for a cultural, military, political and commercial alliance with Turkey's eastern neighbors, notably Russia, Iran, the Turkic countries of Central Asia, and even Pakistan, India and China" and is hostile towards any type of pro-Western policy in the Eurasian space. Turkey's neo-Eurasianists transformed from incarcerated villains to coalition partners in government and the bureaucracy. This spectacular reversal of fortunes could only materialize due to the special circumstances that arose from the ruthless power struggle between Turkey's Islamists. Nationalist-Islamism and Eurasianism overlap as they both despise West­ern dominance in the international order, feel threatened by the liberal cultural-civilizational siege of the West and thus have a common counter-hegemonic view of the world. Turkish Islamists and Eurasianists believe that a post-Western world is in the making. They argue that the unipolarity of the 1990s is over and that the West is essentially in an unstoppable decline - not least because of its degeneration in values. The true significance of Turkish "Eurasianism" does not lie in its capacity to shape foreign and security policy although that cannot be totally dis­regarded; rather, its real contribution to the current regime comes from its critical role in widening and solidifying consent to authoritarian rule in Turkey. (author's abstract)

The Ukraine crisis poses two particularly uneasy questions for Turkey: How to uphold a power balance in the Black Sea? And how to manage its relations between Russia, Ukraine and the West? So far, Ankara’s policy towards Moscow consists of both deter­rence and dialogue. In regards deterrence, Turkey is closer to the non-EU members of NATO such as the US and the UK. Meanwhile, Turkey’s policy of dialogue is similar to that of EU members, most notably Germany. However, while there is a certain degree of similarity between the stances of Turkey and some Western countries in the current crisis, their convergence of interests has not yet resulted in any meaningful coopera­tion. In the short term, the parallel track of deterrence and dialogue still gives Turkey some leeway to continue its multi-vector manoeuvring. The Ukrainian imbroglio is, however, a manifestation of a crisis concerning the current European security order, or more precisely the lack thereof, thus making it necessary to define the role of not only Russia but also Turkey in any European design for a new security architecture. (author's abstract)

Russia's attack on Ukraine has once again highlighted Europe's heavy dependence on Russian natural gas and thus, among other things, underlined the significance of energy cooperation between the European Union (EU) and Turkey. Traditionally, Turkish-European energy relations have prioritised the diversification of energy resources in the face of Europe's dependence on Russia. The new emerging political, geopolitical, and energy context will have repercussions on Turkish-European energy relation. However, it is the ambitious process of decarbonisation of the economy and energy launched by the EU that will decisively shape the nature and future of Turkey-EU energy relations. Indeed, both European and Turkish interests related to energy security, energy affordability, and climate change mitigation require EU-Turkey co­operation in the decarbonisation process, which is expected to be very challenging. Energy transition is the key to medium- and long-term energy security for both sides. (author's abstract)

Managing irregular migration is a focal point of EU-Turkey relations today. European perspectives on this issue, for the most part, are split into two camps: a "caring" one, which concentrates on the well-being of refugees, and a "concerned" one, which focusses on the external border security of the European Union (EU) and the anxieties of EU citizens. Widely overlooked in the European discussions is the mounting social and political discontent in Turkey, which is hosting the largest refugee population worldwide while facing a serious economic crisis alongside a severe governance dead­lock. To bear fruits in the long run, any EU-Turkey migration cooperation should account for this growing discontent. After all, neither the advancement of the rights of refugees in Turkey nor reliable security cooperation is possible without accord by the Turkish political class and society. To this end, the EU should signal to Turkey its inten­tion to resettle more refugees and support local integration efforts more proactively. (author's abstract)

Die Türkei beansprucht im östlichen Mittelmeer einen Festlandsockel, der unmittelbar an das Küstenmeer der Republik Zypern und an das der griechischen Inseln heranreicht. Griechenland und Zypern machen dort jedoch ebenfalls Festlandsockelrechte geltend. Die daraus erwachsenden Spannungen destabilisieren die Region. Eine verbindliche Festlegung der maritimen Grenzen zwischen den drei Staaten würde Rechtssicherheit bringen. Gegenüber Griechenland hat die Türkei signalisiert, dass sie nicht ausschließe, unter gewissen Bedingungen den Internationalen Gerichtshof hiermit zu betrauen. Eine Abgrenzung im Gebiet westlich der Insel Zypern kommt für Ankara jedoch erst dann in Betracht, wenn die Zypernfrage vollständig geklärt ist. Solange keine Abgrenzung durch Übereinkunft oder durch ein inter­nationales Gericht erfolgt ist, müssen die drei Staaten gemäß dem Völkerrecht Zurückhaltung in Bezug auf die umstrittenen Seegebiete üben. Bohrungen auf dem Festlandsockel, die der Förderung von Erdgas dienen, sind in einem umstrittenen Gebiet nur zulässig, wenn hierüber Ein­vernehmen zwischen den betreffenden Staaten herrscht. Vorläufige Vereinbarungen, die eine gemeinsame Erschließung um­stritte­ner Seegebiete vorsehen, können zu einer Annäherung der Parteien bei­tragen und gegebenenfalls sogar den Weg für längerfristige Lösungen ebnen. Gerade mit der wachsenden Bedeutung des östlichen Mittelmeers als energiewirtschaftlicher Transit- und Verbindungsraum könnten sich neue Chancen für eine Zusammenarbeit eröffnen. (Autorenreferat)

Covid-19 pandemisi kültür sanat sektörününde ağır bir darbeye yol açtı, sanatçıları daha fazla risk ve kısıtlamalarla karşı karşıya bıraktı ve sınırötesi hareketlilik ve iş birliği olanaklarına ket vurdu. Bu metin, pandeminin dönüştürdüğü bir dünyada sanatsal ifade özgürlüğü alanlarının nasıl korunabileceğini inceleyen raporun temel bulgu ve önerilerini özetlemektedir. Rapor kırılgan, ötekileştirilen ve tehdit altındaki sanatçıların görüşlerini ve pandeminin getirdiği zorluklarla baş etmek için geliştirdikleri stratejileri ortaya koymaktadır. Rapor ayrıca, sanatçı hareketlilik ve koruma programlarının bu sanatçıların ihtiyaçlarına yönelik sunduğu desteğin güçlü ve zayıf yönlerini de incelemektedir. Covid krizinin riskin tanımını nasıl daha karmaşık ve tartışmalı hale getirdiğini ortaya koyarak rapor "risk altında sanatçı" tabirine dair eleştirel bir perspektif sunmaktadır. Türkiye örneği üzerinden baskıcı ortamlardaki deneyimlere odaklanan rapor böylelikle pandeminin uzun erimli etkileri, gelecekteki benzer krizler ve ciddi kısıtlamalar durumunda sanatsal özgürlük ve hareketliliğin nasıl desteklenebileceğine dair öneriler geliştirmektedir. İngilizce raporun tamamına buradan erişilebilir: www.doi.org/10.17901/akbp1.01.2022, The COVID-19 pandemic has hit the creative and cultural sectors hard and restricts the mobility and opportunities of artists worldwide. What did we learn from this period about how to support artists and cultural activists in situations of political, social, and economic threat? With a focus on Turkey, this report provides perspectives and experiences related to artists' challenges during the pandemic, as well as their strategies to cope with them. It also examines the responses by organizations supporting artistic freedom and mobility in this period and provides recommendations for future practices.

The Covid-19 pandemic has hit the creative and cultural sectors hard; it has led to further risks and restrictions for artists, particularly for those who were already vulnerable, marginalized, or persecuted. It also hindered opportunities for cross border mobility and collaboration, thereby creating major obstacles for mobility and temporary relocation programs which aim to enable artists from restrictive political contexts to continue their practice. By learning from the experience of the Covid crisis, and particularly from restrictive contexts such as Turkey, this report explores how to support artists and maintain spaces of artistic freedom despite these circumstances. The report provides artists' perspectives and experiences related to the challenges of the pandemic, and presents the strategies they used to cope with them. As Covid exposed the interlinkage between economic, political, and psychosocial risks, the report provides a critical perspective on the concept of "risk" and of being "at-risk." It also examines the challenges and opportunities that affected the work of organizations supporting artistic freedom and mobility, and how those organizations were able to respond to the needs of artists in this period. Drawing on practices that emerged in response to the pandemic, the report develops recommendations to guide future attempts to expand transnational solidarity for artistic freedom in the face of the pandemic’s long-term impacts, as well as any future threats or obstacles of similar nature.

This paper follows the plight of Walter Ruben (1899-1982), an Indologist who had begun his career in Frankfurt am Main and later became one of the leading Indologists of the German Democratic Republic. In mid-1930s, he escaped Nazi persecution by seeking exile in Turkey. Relying on archival research in the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities (BBAW) and the Prime Ministry's Republican Archives (BCA) in Istanbul, the Turkish press, and oral historical sources, together with the publications of Ruben during his Ankara years, I bring to light Ruben's life trajectory during his exile and internment with a balanced analysis of his 'production of knowledge' as a scholar at risk. The scholarly pressure and difficulties Ruben faced as an endangered scholar hired by a single-party authoritarian state delineate the precariousness and vulnerabilities of life as an exile academic. His original research and writing during his forced internment in Kırşehir, on the other hand, marks another dimension of his exile years, namely his endless effort to look for a real refuge within his intellectual production.

Syria is central to the current shape of Turkey-Russia relations. It offers a model of partnership for both countries in a context where their interests are competitive. However, the Syrian-centric cooperation between Turkey and Russia is also special and is thus unlikely to be replicated elsewhere due to structural constraints and contextual nuances. The limits of the Syrian-style model of cooperation between Ankara and Moscow can be observed in Libya as well as Nagorno-Karabakh. Even though the institutional and elite ownership of Turkey’s Western relations has weakened, no similar institutional basis exists in Turkey’s relations with Russia. As such, the current Ankara-Moscow axis is to a great extent defined by the personal ties between the countries’ leaders and geopolitical imperatives. However, if the current shape of relations endures much longer, these personalised relations will gain structural foundations. A major problem for Turkey in its relations with Russia remains the asymmetry, even if interdependent, in favour of Moscow. Yet, the nature of asymmetry is dynamic and subject to change, as Turkey has engaged in what can be termed dependency reduction on Russia, both geopolitically and structurally (energy-wise). Developments at the broader international level, a new administration in the US, and rising tension between Ukraine and Russia indicate that Turkey would face more constraints and higher costs for its hitherto geopolitical balancing act between the West and Russia. The close relations in recent years between Ankara and Moscow also point to the need for Turkey and the West to redefine the nature of their relations, as the Cold War framework of Turkey-US relations and the accession framework of Turkish-European relations increasingly appear to be ill-suited to the present realities. (author's abstract)

In stark contrast to Germany's Bundestag elections in 2017, Turkey has hardly been mentioned in this year's election campaign. Nevertheless, today’s relatively relaxed atmosphere between Berlin and Ankara and the lack of prominence ascribed to their relationship in the German election campaign do not mean that shaping future foreign policy on Turkey will be an easy undertaking. Ankara is making a number of demands on the European Union (EU). Cooperation on refugee matters and efforts to deepen the customs union with the EU are to continue. The Turkish government also wants to be involved in European consultations. It is now up to Germany's new federal government to make its position known on these matters. However, Turkey is no easy partner to deal with and in order to achieve rules-based cooperation, Berlin and Brussels must, for their part, formulate clear conditions, for example, when it comes to cooperation on migration and defence. They also need to decide how to shape Turkey’s future relationship with Europe. (author's abstract)

Relations between Turkey and Russia are a puzzle to many in the West. How sustainable is the relationship? What is it grounded on? And what can the West learn from it? Central to the relationship is its bilateral nature. Relations between Ankara and Moscow are based on the mutual recognition of security interests. The resulting dynamics have shaped Turkish-Russian cooperation since the 1990s and can be observed in the current partnership in Syria. Mutual regard for the other’s security concerns is facilitated by the prospect of collaborative projects that promise greater advantages than continued conflict. Trust is of secondary importance, as is the quality of personal relations between the Turkish and Russian presidents. More important is the interdependence between Russia and Turkey. The potential for confrontation or cooperation between Ankara and Moscow in regional conflicts depends on current priorities rather than past rivalries. The form and extent of their collaboration are determined not by which side of the conflict they are on, but by their respective motives. (author's abstract)

Ahead of his trip to Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus on July 20, 2021, the Turkish President announced that he would be bringing "good news" to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Speculation ran rampant that Erdoğan would use the 47th anniversary of the Turkish invasion to announce that Azerbaijan, Pakistan, or Kyrgyzstan would establish diplomatic relations with the TRNC, which is currently recognized only by Turkey. But Erdoğan merely unveiled the construction of a pomp­ous presidential palace that would befit a future, independent "Turkish Cypriot State". The Turkish president is still reluctant to back up his words of international recognition of the TRNC with deeds. But the visit shows that Ankara is working to­ward the final division of the island, and Erdoğan's actions made it clear once again that he alone calls the shots in northern Cyprus. (author's abstract)

The visit of a high-ranking Turkish delegation to Cairo in early May 2021 indicates a turning-point in the relations between Turkey and Egypt. Since the 2013 military coup in Egypt, the leaders of these two Mediterranean countries had been extremely hos­tile towards each other. The current rapprochement, which might lead in a best case scenario to a resumption of diplomatic relations, thus comes as a surprise. But it is limited in scope. The main obstacles to a closer partnership between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdel Fatah al-Sisi are differences in the ideological foundations of their regimes. The aim of these current shifts in foreign policy is to increase the presidents' room for manoeuvre. Their regimes are under pressure due to regional, international, and domestic developments. Germany and the EU should support the normalisation attempts because they can contribute to de-escalation in the region. Both regimes’ current weaknesses in foreign policy and the economy provide an opportunity to call for political change in other areas. (author's abstract)

Im zweiten Karabach-Krieg vom Herbst 2020 vermittelte Russland einen Waffenstillstand und erweiterte seine militärische Präsenz im Südkaukasus, indem es eine Friedenstruppe im restlichen Berg-Karabach stationierte. In diesem Krieg hatten aserbaidschanische Streitkräfte die Südprovinz Karabachs und die zuvor von armenischen Truppen kontrollierten Territorien in dessen Umgebung eingenommen. Laut internationalen Beobachtern hat die Dominanz Russlands und der Türkei bewirkt, dass sich die geopolitischen Koordinaten im Kaukasus auf Kosten westlicher und globaler Akteure verlagerten. In Moskaus Perspektive besteht der Kaukasus aus Russlands Föderationssubjekten im Nordteil und seinem "nahen Ausland" im Südteil der Region. Für seine Politik im Südkaukasus nutzte der Kreml ungelöste Territorialkonflikte als machtpolitische Hebel. Mit seiner Unterstützung für die von Georgien abtrünnigen Landesteile Abchasien und Südossetien will Moskau das am stärksten nach Westen ausgerichtete "nahe Ausland" bestrafen. Im Karabach-Konflikt dagegen war Russland trotz enger sicherheitspolitischer Verbindung mit Armenien auf Neutralität bedacht und stellte sich nicht grundsätzlich gegen west­liche Konfliktmediatoren im Verhandlungsrahmen der OSZE. Russlands Ordnungsmacht im Südkaukasus wird durch die enge mili­tärische Allianz der Türkei mit Aserbaidschan eingeschränkt. Auch Iran tritt verstärkt als Akteur in der Region auf. Das geopolitische Gewicht dort verschiebt sich zu den historischen Regional- und Großmächten. Globale und westliche Akteure sind aber noch nicht aus der Region ver­bannt. Der Karabach-Konflikt bleibt im Brennpunkt internationaler Politik. Das wurde sechs Monate nach Kriegsende offenbar, als die Grenzkonflikte zwischen Armenien und Aserbaidschan sich im Mai 2021 erneut zuspitzten. (Autorenreferat)

Die geopolitische Bedeutung von Strom wird unterschätzt, obwohl Stromnetze Räume konstituieren. Sie etablieren neue Einflusskanäle und Macht­sphären in politischen Gemeinwesen und über sie hinaus. Im Kontinentalraum Europa-Asien treffen Verbundnetze und Interkonnektoren, also grenzüberschreitende Übertragungsnetzverbindungen, aufeinander. Interkonnektoren markieren neue, teilweise konkurrierende Integrationsvektoren, die Verbundnetze transzendieren. Dabei ist die Zugehörigkeit zum europäischen Netzverbund attraktiv, denn synchrone Netze sind Schicksalsgemeinschaften, in denen Sicherheit und Wohlfahrt geteilt werden. Deutschland und die EU müssen eine Strom-Außenpolitik entwickeln, um das europäische Stromnetz zu optimieren und modernisieren, zu verstärken und zu erweitern. Vor allem aber sind Deutschland und die EU gefordert, Interkonnektivität über das eigene Verbundnetz hinaus mitzugestalten. Chinas Strategie, mit seiner Belt and Road Initiative Infrastrukturen auf das Reich der Mitte auszurichten, wird auch beim Strom immer offensichtlicher. Dabei setzt Peking Standards und Normen und baut seine strategische Reichweite auch zum Vorteil der eigenen Wirtschaft aus. In der östlichen EU-Nachbarschaft dominiert die Geopolitik seit dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts die Konfiguration der Stromnetze. Eine Integrationskonkurrenz zwischen der EU und Russland ist unübersehbar. Das östliche Mittelmeer, der Kaspische Raum und Zentralasien wandeln sich von Peripherien in neue Verbindungsräume. Dort konkurrieren die EU, China, Russland und jenseits des Schwarzen Meeres auch Iran und die Türkei um Einfluss bei der Neukonfiguration der Stromnetze. (Autorenreferat)

Die Beziehungen zwischen der Türkei und Russland stellen viele im Wes­ten vor Rätsel. Wie tragfähig ist das Verhältnis, welche Rolle spielt der Westen darin, worauf stützt es sich, und was kann der Westen daraus lernen? Von zentraler Bedeutung ist der bilaterale Rahmen. Die Beziehungen zwischen Ankara und Moskau fußen auf der gegenseitigen Anerkennung der Sicherheitsinteressen des jeweils anderen. Die sich daraus ergebende Schlüsseldynamik ist nicht nur in der aktuellen türkisch-russischen Part­nerschaft in Syrien zu beobachten, sondern prägte bereits die Zusammenarbeit in den 1990er Jahren. Das gegenseitige Eingehen auf Sicherheitsbedenken des anderen Partners wird durch die Aussicht auf gemeinsame Projekte erleichtert, deren Um­setzung mehr Vorteile verspricht als ein Verharren im Konflikt. Vertrauen spielt dabei ebenso eine untergeordnete Rolle wie die Qualität der persönlichen Beziehungen zwischen dem türkischen und dem russischen Präsidenten. Vielmehr kommt es auf die Interdependenzen an, die Russland und die Türkei miteinander verbinden. Das Potenzial für Konfrontation oder Kooperation zwischen Ankara und Moskau in regionalen Konflikten bemisst sich nach den gegenwärtigen Prioritäten, nicht nach Rivalitäten der Vergangenheit. Ausschlaggebend für Form und Ausmaß der Zusammenarbeit ist nicht die Frage, auf welcher Seite des Konfliktes sie stehen, sondern die nach ihren jeweiligen Beweggründen. (Autorenreferat)

Between 2020 and 2021, Israel concluded normalisation agreements with four Arab states. They were celebrated internationally as a breakthrough. Meanwhile, since 2018, and largely unnoticed by the public, Arab states have started repairing their relations with Syria. Finally, in January 2021, Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) ended their boycott of Qatar during the meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Al-Ula, Saudi Arabia. Changing assessments of the regional security situation and converging interests have enabled these rap­prochements. However, these developments do not mean that the region is moving towards peace and stability; on the contrary, long-lasting conflicts remain unresolved and the threat perceptions of third actors are being exacerbated. Germany and its partners in the EU should avoid being co-opted by local and regional conflicting par­ties and should instead focus on supporting regional conflict management. (author's abstract)

Russia and Turkey are backing opposing warring parties in three active conflicts. How­ever, this adversarial positioning has not hindered cooperation between Moscow and Ankara. They reign in opposing sides and, in effect, stage-manage their respective theatres of wars. Through multilateral arrangements, Europe is an enabler of Tur­key's position and could leverage its support to push Ankara to cooperate more effec­tively with its Western partners. (author's abstract)

Turkey's new Presidential System has failed to realise the goals that it was said to achieve with its introduction despite the disapproval of half the population. Contrary to the ruling party’s claims in favour of the new governance system, two and a half years after its introduction, parliament is weaker, separation of powers is undermined, the judiciary is politicised, institutions are crippled, economic woes are mounting and authoritarian prac­tices prevail. Despite the almost unlimited and unchecked power that the new system grants to the President over institutions, his space for political manoeuvre is, surprisingly, narrower than it was in the parliamentary system. Providing the otherwise divided opposition a joint anchor of resistance, the Presidential System unintentionally breathed life into the inertia of Turkey’s political party setting. The formation of splinter parties from the ruling party, primarily address­ing the same conservative electorate, alongside the changing electoral logic with the need to form alliances to win an election, poses a serious challenge to the ruling party and its leader - the President. Despite the oppositional alliance’s electoral victory in 2019 local elec­tions, it is at the moment unclear whether the forming parties share a common vision for steps towards democratic repair. Together with the institutional havoc caused by the Presidential System, the blurry outlook of the opposition requires caution about an easy and rapid positive transformation. While the European Union should be realistic in regard to expectations towards democratic reform, it should also strike a balance between cooperation in areas of mutual benefit and confronting Ankara when necessary to protect the interests of the Euro­pean Union and its member states. (author's abstract)

Am 2. März 2021 hat die türkische Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Ermittlungen gegen die Demokratische Partei der Völker (HDP) eingeleitet, am 17. März die Klageschrift auf deren Verbot beim Verfassungsgericht eingereicht. Der Generalstaatsanwalt hat ferner beantragt, 687 Funktionären der Partei zu verbieten, sich in den nächsten fünf Jahren poli­tisch zu betätigen. Das würde auf den Ausschluss fast aller HDP-Politiker von der Politik hinauslaufen und so die politischen Kanäle für die Diskussion und Lösung der Kurden­frage auf Jahre verschließen. Zwar hat das Verfassungsgericht am 31. März die Klageschrift wegen verfahrensrechtlicher Mängel zurückgewiesen. Doch am 6. Juni teilte die Generalstaatsanwaltschaft mit, dass sie einen weiteren Vorstoß zum Verbot der Partei unternommen hat. Damit besteht die Gefahr, dass die Verhinderung ziviler und gewaltfreier kurdischer Politik Wasser auf die Mühlen der illegalen Arbeiter­partei Kurdistans (PKK) ist und sich der Kurdenkonflikt erneut per­petuiert. Der Vor­gang wirft ein Schlaglicht auf die Verschränkung von Politik und Justiz in der Türkei und macht strukturelle Mängel der türkischen Verfassungsordnung deutlich. (Autorenreferat)

2020/21 unterzeichnete Israel Abkommen mit vier arabischen Staaten, die international als Durchbruch gefeiert wurden. Von der Öffentlichkeit weitgehend unbemerkt vollzieht sich unterdessen seit 2018 eine Wiederannäherung arabischer Staaten an Syrien. Schließlich beendeten mit dem Treffen des Golfkooperationsrates (GKR) im saudischen Al-Ula im Januar 2021 Ägypten, Bahrain, Saudi-Arabien und die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate (VAE) ihren Boykott Katars. Veränderte Lagebeurteilungen und das Konvergieren von Interessen haben die (Wieder-)Annäherungen ermöglicht. Damit bewegt sich die Region aber nicht auf Frieden und Stabilität zu; langanhaltende Konflikte werden nicht beigelegt, Bedrohungsperzeptionen dritter Akteure verstärkt. Deutschland und seine Partner in der EU sollten sich nicht von lokalen und regio­nalen Konfliktparteien vereinnahmen lassen, sondern Ansätze regionaler Konflikt­bearbeitung unterstützen. (Autorenreferat)

Der Besuch einer hochrangigen türkischen Delegation in Kairo Anfang Mai 2021 mar­kiert einen Wendepunkt in den Beziehungen zwischen der Türkei und Ägypten. Das Verhältnis der Führungen dieser beiden bevölkerungsreichsten Mittelmeeranrainer war seit dem Militärputsch in Ägypten 2013 extrem feindselig gewesen. Die jetzige Annäherung, die in der Wiederaufnahme diplomatischer Beziehungen münden könnte, kommt insofern überraschend. Und ihr sind Grenzen gesetzt. Einer engeren Partnerschaft der Präsidenten Recep Tayyip Erdoğan und Abdel-Fatah al-Sisi stehen vor allem Unterschiede in den ideologischen Fundamenten ihrer Herrschaft entgegen. Der außenpolitische Kurswechsel soll den Handlungsspielraum beider Präsidenten ver­größern. Denn ihre Regime stehen aufgrund regionaler, internationaler, aber auch interner Entwicklungen unter Druck. Deutschland und die EU sollten die Annäherung unterstützen, weil sie zur Deeskalation in der Region beitragen kann. Die gegen­wärtige außenpolitische und wirtschaftliche Schwäche der Regime könnte auch eine Chance bieten, politisches Umdenken in anderen Bereichen einzufordern. (Autorenreferat)

Vor seiner Reise in den türkisch besetzten Norden der Insel am 20. Juli 2021 kündigte der türkische Staatspräsident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan eine "frohe Botschaft" für die nur von der Türkei anerkannte Türkische Republik Nordzypern (TRNZ) an. Spekula­tio­nen schossen ins Kraut, der Präsident werde zum 47. Jahrestag der türkischen Invasion verkünden, Aserbaidschan, Pakistan oder Kirgistan stünden bereit, diplomatische Beziehungen mit der TRNZ aufzunehmen. Doch Erdoğan gab lediglich den Bau eines pompösen Präsidentenpalastes bekannt, der einem künftigen, unabhängigen "Zyperntürkischen Staat" angemessen sein soll. Noch schreckt der türkische Präsident also davor zurück, seinen Worten von der internationalen Anerkennung der TRNZ Taten folgen zu lassen. Doch der Besuch zeigt, dass Ankara auf die endgültige Teilung der Insel hinarbeitet - und außerdem, dass in Nordzypern einzig und allein Erdoğan das Sagen hat. (Autorenreferat)

Frankreichs Präsident Emmanuel Macron hat das Ziel ausgegeben, die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen zu revitalisieren und eine "neue Partnerschaft" zwischen Paris und Berlin zu begründen. In der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik sowie in Teilen der Europapolitik konnte dieser Anspruch jedoch selten eingelöst werden. Hauptgrund hierfür sind strukturelle Veränderungen in den internatio­nalen Beziehungen, auf die Frankreich und Deutschland unterschiedlich reagieren: Paris sucht neue Wege, seine verteidigungspolitische Handlungsfähigkeit zu erhalten und das strategische Vakuum zu füllen, das entstanden ist durch das nachlassende Interesse der USA an Europa und seiner Peripherie. Berlin setzt auf die Weiterentwicklung von Nato und EU als grundlegenden Organisationen deutscher Außenpolitik. Zudem erschweren nationale Alleingänge, Desinteresse und ein ungenügender Erfahrungsaustausch einen bilateralen Interessen­ausgleich. Eine neue Intensität der bilateralen Zusammenarbeit setzt erstens voraus, dass sich Paris und Berlin in ihren bestehenden außen- und sicherheits­politischen Kooperationsformaten einer Gesamtschau der internationalen Gemengelage stellen. Sie müssen ihre jeweilige Betroffenheit sowie ihre Interessen offen besprechen und aus ihnen konkrete Maßnahmen ableiten. Zweitens müssen sie sich darauf verständigen, dass nationale Alleingänge unterbleiben und ein Desinteresse an den außen-, sicherheits- und europa­politischen Druckpunkten des Partners nicht geduldet wird. Die Deutsch-Französische Parlamentarische Versammlung sollte die Exekutiven beider Länder dazu anhalten, den Élysée-Vertrag wie den Vertrag von Aachen zu erfüllen. Zu diesen Ergebnissen kommen die sechs Fallstudien zu Libyen, zur Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, zur Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion, zu Russland, zur Nato und zur Türkei. (Autorenreferat)

The article demonstrates the challenges of the project, which argues that the pro-immigration policy of the Otto man/Turkish governments (1774-1989) was shaped by political concerns (concretely population and identity politics), in addition to humanitarian concerns. The pro-immigration policy, and more specifically the open-door policy, facilitated, encouraged, compounded, and even in some cases produced immigration. In other words it functioned as a "pull factor". As a working pa-per, this article will analyse epistemological, methodological and theoretical challenges that emanate from the scope of the topic. To examine two centuries of migration covering a territory extending to three continents and including millions of migrants, as well as those they were directly or indirectly tied to, is indeed quite a challenge.

Minimal discussion of foreign policy during the US presidential campaign has left President-elect Joe Biden pinned to very few specific foreign policy positions and given him great flexibility in carrying out his program. He would probably prefer to avoid confrontation with Turkey; in fact, he will likely explore areas of potential US‑Turkish cooperation, especially against Russia. However, Biden's core positions on human rights and rule of law, his long-time focus on Aegean and Eastern Mediter­ranean issues, and his seeming inclination to continue to fight ISIS in cooperation with the Syrian-Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) militia - deemed "terrorists" by Ankara - probably augur deepening difficulties in US-Turkish ties. Down the line, a make-or-break decision on the future of US-Turkish ties will likely hinge on the Biden Administration’s assessment of Turkish-Russian relations. Europe may have an important say on Biden's Turkish policy; a senior Biden adviser has said the new president will coordinate his approach to Turkey with the European Union. (author's abstract)

The Eastern Mediterranean crisis reflects two overlapping developments. On the one hand, it is a manifestation of Turkey’s increasingly assertive posturing in the inter­national arena. At the same time, it shows the intensity of the geopolitical competi­tion between Turkey and its adversaries, such as Egypt and the UAE. The EU Member States’ different levels and forms of engagement with Turkey obstruct a consensus on how to coherently respond to these developments. With accession negotiations stalled and discussions focused on areas of conflict rather than cooperation, EU-Turkey relations are mired in stalemate, while the militarization of foreign policy is becoming increasingly prevalent in the EU’s southern neighbourhood. (Autorenreferat)

Syria’s civil war has long since been decided in favour of the regime. There is no prospect of a negotiated settlement, reconciliation or lasting stabilisation. Syria faces enormous challenges, well beyond the rebuilding of infra­structure and housing. It will also need assistance to restart its economy, stabilise its currency and renew its public services, in particular education, health, electricity and water. The funds required for comprehensive reconstruction are extremely un­likely to become available, given the attitude of the Syrian leadership, the economic ramifications of the Covid-19 pandemic, and the geopolitical interests of regional and global powers. Nor are resources likely to be deployed in line with the needs of the population. The EU and its member states have made engagement in Syria's reconstruc­tion conditional on viable steps towards a negotiated conflict settle­ment and a political opening. They should adapt their approach to align better with the current realities and challenges on the ground. That means in particular targeting humanitarian aid more effectively, dismantling certain sectoral sanctions and supporting the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure - even in areas controlled by the Syrian government. This would represent a more effective contribution to improving living conditions and avoiding further erosion of public services. Lasting stabilisation will require fundamental reforms. In this vein, Brus­sels should spell out its "more for more" approach. Europe should refrain from normalising relations with the top leaders of the Assad regime and instead step up its support for prosecution of war crimes, grave human rights violations and the use of internationally banned weapons. (author's abstract)

Im Juli 2020 nährte eine militärische Auseinandersetzung zwischen armenischen und aserbaidschanischen Streitkräften die Sorge vor einem Rückfall in regelrechten Krieg, wie ihn die beiden Seiten von 1992 bis 1994 geführt hatten. Der neuerliche Vorfall war der schwerste militärische Zusammenstoß in einer Grenzzone außerhalb Berg-Karabachs seit 1994. Doch im Mittelpunkt der prekären zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen steht nach wie vor der ungelöste Konflikt um diesen De-facto-Staat und sie­ben aserbaidschanische Provinzen in seiner Umgebung, die unter der Kontrolle armenischer Truppen stehen. Der jüngsten Eskalation war von 2018 bis zum Frühjahr 2019 eine Phase der Entspannung vorausgegangen. Während dieser Zeit hatten die Kon­takte zwischen Armeniens und Aserbaidschans Staatsführern zugenommen und diese ihre Bereitschaft bekundet, sich verstärkt auf eine friedliche Konfliktregelung ein­zulassen und die Bevölkerungen in diesen Prozess einzubeziehen. Bald darauf aber wurde der Ton wieder schärfer. (Autorenreferat)

This article aims to present a picture of Turkish journalism in German exile. By Turkish journalism, I refer to the production and circulation of news about Turkey, in Turkish and for a Turkish-speaking audience - primarily those living in Turkey. By German exile, I mean journalists who have migrated from Turkey since 2010 due to the country’s increasingly oppressive political climate, which has made journalism a dangerous profession there. Under-standing news in this context as the outcome of processes of transnational transfer of knowledge and experience from one regime to another, I ask how dissident Turkish journalists currently living in exile in Germany practise their profession from a distance, and what tools they use to critically engage with the overall political situation in Turkey. For this project, I have been carrying out ethnographic research in Berlin since November 2018. This research stands at the intersection of the anthropology of journalism and transnational migration. In the light of mapping the journalism scene in Berlin through this filter, I anchor historical foundations of the current migrant media scene where paths cross each other to understand their political references and to situate them in the context of Turkish-German migration. Then, I discuss the process of project-based journalism, by exploring the challenges and opportunities offered by the conditions within which journalists can practise their profession from a physical and temporal distance. Reviewing the choice of the audience that journalists aim to target, I also show how they meet a need for community media that had remained unaddressed in the Turkish-German context, in connection to the difficulty of establishing solidarities among themselves. Finally, I discuss recent debates on what journalism should be - or what happens to the expertise when activism and profession collide.

The yearlong offensive on Tripoli by Khalifa Haftar’s forces has suffered fatal set­backs, and Libya’s conflicts are changing shape. Russia's and Turkey's attempts at carving out spheres of influence are bound to collide with the interests of other for­eign powers and with the fluidity of Libya's political landscape. Haftar could face increasing challenges to his authority over eastern and southern Libya. Rivalries with­in the anti-Haftar alliance will also return to the fore. Foreign intervention and the deep rifts that the war has inflicted on Libyan society will be the key obstacles to a political settlement. Western states should focus on preserving Libya’s unity and countering Russian influence as a matter of priority. (Autorenreferat)

The recent emergence of two splinter parties from the Justice and Development Party (AKP) points to a deepening crisis within the party and growing discontent toward party leader and president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Although the leaders of the two new parties, Ali Babacan and Ahmet Davutoğlu, are both former high-ranking AKP politicians, they differ significantly in their style of politics and ideological leanings. Babacan is trying to position himself at the center of Turkey's ideological spectrum and emphasize issues of good governance and the rule of law. Davutoğlu is aiming for the more conservative voters, focusing on the moral shortcomings of the current regime. Davutoğlu's strategy has better chances in the short term, whereas Babacan is poised for a long game. The importance of both parties relies on their potential to attract votes from the AKP base. In a country that is deeply divided into two almost equal-sized camps that support Erdoğan and oppose him, even a small fraction of votes shifting from the AKP to the opposition can be a game changer. (Autorenreferat)

The plight of refugees in the Syrian province of Idlib, on the Greek islands, and on the EU's external borders has worsened dramatically over the last few months. Once more, the European Union (EU) is split on questions of asylum and migration, and it portrays limited capacity to act in issues of foreign and security policy. What options does the EU have to address the deteriorating situation? This question has become even more pressing due to the spread of Covid-19. The EU-Turkey statement of 2016 has strengthened cooperation with Ankara on humanitarian aid and border controls, but it also has major weaknesses. A comprehensive approach is needed. The EU should prioritise providing new financial resources for Turkey that should be com­plemented by scaling-up assistance to Greece as well as to Syria's neighbours. In addition, the Europeans should support the creation of a safe zone in northern Idlib. (author's abstract)

Der Bürgerkrieg in Syrien ist längst militärisch zugunsten des Regimes entschieden. Eine verhandelte Konfliktregelung, eine Aussöhnung oder eine nachhaltige Stabilisierung sind für das Land nicht in Sicht. Syrien steht vor enormen Herausforderungen, die über den Wiederaufbau von Infrastruktur und Wohnraum weit hinausgehen. Dazu gehören vor allem Anschubhilfe für eine wirtschaftliche Erholung, die Stabilisierung der Währung und die Erneuerung staatlicher Versorgungsleistungen, ins­besondere bei Bildung, Gesundheit, Strom und Wasser. Der Ansatz der syrischen Führung, die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen der Covid-19-Pandemie und die geopolitischen Interessen der Regional- und Großmächte machen es äußerst unwahrscheinlich, dass ausreichend Mittel für einen umfassenden Wiederaufbau Syriens zur Verfügung stehen werden. Ebenso wenig ist zu erwarten, dass die Ressourcen gemäß dem Bedarf der Bevölkerung eingesetzt werden. Die EU und ihre Mitgliedstaaten haben ein Engagement beim Wieder­aufbau Syriens von tragfähigen Schritten in Richtung einer verhandelten Konfliktregelung und einer politischen Öffnung des Landes abhängig gemacht. Sie sollten ihren Ansatz so anpassen, dass er besser den Herausforderungen vor Ort und der aktuellen Realität entspricht. Das bedeutet insbesondere, humanitäre Hilfe effektiver einzusetzen, sektorale Sanktionen abzubauen und die Rehabilitierung von Basis­infrastruktur auch in Gebieten zu unterstützen, die unter Kontrolle der syrischen Regierung stehen. Auf diese Weise ließe sich wirksamer als bislang zur Linderung der Not und zur Verbesserung der Lebensbedingungen beitragen. Eine nachhaltige Stabilisierung Syriens ist allerdings nur zu erreichen, wenn dort tiefgreifende Reformen durchgeführt werden. In diesem Sinne sollten die Europäer ihren "More for More"-Ansatz ausbuchstabieren. Von einer vollständigen Normalisierung gegenüber den Spitzen des Assad-Regimes sollten die Europäer absehen. Stattdessen sind sie gefordert, die strafrechtliche Aufarbeitu

Das dramatisch anwachsende Flüchtlingselend in der syrischen Provinz Idlib, auf den griechischen Inseln und an den EU-Außengrenzen zeigt: Die Europäische Union ist asyl- und migrationspolitisch zerrissen sowie außen- und sicherheitspolitisch kaum handlungsfähig. Was kann sie dennoch unternehmen, um das Flüchtlingsdrama zu bewältigen? Diese Frage ist angesichts der Ausbreitung von Covid-19 noch dringlicher geworden. Die EU-Türkei-Erklärung von 2016 hat die Kooperation mit Ankara bei der humanitären Hilfe und der Grenzüberwachung gestärkt, weist aber große Schwächen auf. Ein umfassender Ansatz ist nötig. Die EU sollte sich darauf konzentrieren, der Türkei neue Finanzmittel zur Verfügung zu stellen, die ergänzt werden sollten durch massive Hilfen für Griechenland und die Nachbarstaaten Syriens. Zu­dem sollten sich die Europäer für die Schaffung einer Schutzzone in Nord­syrien einsetzen. (Autorenreferat)

Das Scheitern der Offensive Khalifa Haftars gegen Tripolis verändert den Libyen­konflikt fundamental. Russland und die Türkei versuchen, Einflusszonen abzugrenzen, doch politische Umbrüche in Libyen sowie andere Mächte könnten ihre Pläne durchkreuzen. Im Süden des Landes könnte Haftars Niederlage neue Konflikte hervor­rufen, im Osten seine Autorität zunehmend in Frage stellen. Auch unter seinen Gegnern entwickeln sich erneut Machtkämpfe. Die Aussichten für eine Rückkehr zu einem politischen Prozess sind schlecht. Zu groß sind die Hindernisse durch aus­ländische Intervention, zu tief die gesellschaftlichen Gräben, die der Bürgerkrieg verursacht hat. Für westliche Staaten sollte Priorität haben, Libyens Einheit zu bewahren und den Einfluss Russlands zurückzudrängen. (Autorenreferat)

Since Turkey’s controversial acquisition of the S-400 missile system from Russia, the narrative that the EU is facing a twin challenge from the East has been gaining currency in European capitals. Turkey and Russia are often portrayed as two authori­tarian regimes led by strong leaders who favour an omnipotent state at the expense of fundamental freedoms and liberal democratic institutions. Yet, putting these two countries into the same basket and formulating policies accordingly is problematic. The EU has separate sets of relations with Russia and Turkey. Ankara remains part of NATO and the EU’s Customs Union. That said, Turkey is quickly approaching a critical crossroad on its turbulent political journey: The country will either consolidate its authoritarian regime or return to democracy. The EU has a high stake in this matter, and thus it needs to take a proactive stance in favour of pro-democracy forces. (Autorenreferat)

On 27 November 2019, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that Turkey had concluded a treaty on military assistance and cooperation with the government of Fayez al-Sarraj in Libya. The agreement permits the deployment of Turkish troops into the civil-war-torn country. The announcement was met with almost unanimous criticism in Western Europe. The indignation grew even greater when it became known that Turkey was controlling and financing the smuggling of Islamic Syrian fighters into Libya. Reports of a dominant influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on the Libyan gov­ern­ment seemed to complete the picture of a strongly Islamist-motivated Turkish policy. However, Turkey's engagement in Libya is not driven by ideology, but rather by stra­tegic considerations and economic interests. Ankara is thus reacting to its isolation in the eastern Mediterranean, where the dispute over the distribution of gas resources is intensifying. At the same time, Turkey is drawing lessons from the war in Syria. An­kara has lost this war, but through its engagement in Syria, it has been able to estab­lish a conflictual - but viable - working relationship with Russia. The bottom line is that Turkey’s commitment to Libya is a shift in the focus of its foreign policy from the Middle East to the Mediterranean, a shift that will present entirely new challenges to Europe, the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (author's abstract)

In view of a substantial loss in local elections and an urge to demonstrate that the Turkish government is in control of the situation, Ankara’s attitude toward the ap­proximately four million Syrian refugees changed in July 2019. Security forces started to round up Syrian refugees, send them back to the Turkish provinces where they were registered, deport some, and encourage others to move to areas controlled by Turkey in northern Syria, including the conflict zone Idlib. The change in Turkish policy vis-à-vis the Syrian refugees as well as dramatic developments in Idlib have renewed international attention to the plight of the refugees. Ankara needs con­tinued European support to deal with the situation, particularly if a new wave of refugees is forced to flee to Turkey from Idlib. (author's abstract)

The ceasefire agreement for Idlib signed between Russia and Turkey on March 5th is a step towards de-escalation. Yet, it remains doubtful whether this can translate into more than just providing short-term relief. To secure EU support in Idlib, Turkey has sought to increase pressure on European countries by "opening" its borders for refugees to travel on to the EU. While Ankara's instrumentalization of refugees is appalling, the humanitarian situation requires European support. Hence, the EU should coordinate with the US to increase pressure on Russia to facilitate a safe zone in northern Idlib in addition to the further humanitarian assistance the EU has pledged. To respond to the immediate pressure on its borders, the EU will have little choice but to negotiate a new deal building on the 2016 EU-Turkey refugee agreement, given the continuing disagreement on asylum and migration policy among EU member states.