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The article examines the new discourse on medical professionalism and responsibility through the prism of conflicts among moral values, especially with regard to truth-telling. The discussion is anchored in the renaissance of English-language writing on medical ethics in the 18th century, which paralleled the rise of humanitarianism and the advent of the word "responsibility". Following an analysis of the meanings of the value of responsibility in general and in medical practice in particular, it is argued that, similarly to the Aristotelian notion of equity, responsibility of care is a second-order value, which corrects virtues, laws and norms in exceptional circumstances. Virtues and practices of the second order, such as responsibility and deliberation, bear especially on professional doctoring, which includes a commitment to give priority to the good of the patient over one's own good. It is argued that, in situations of conflict, and particularly conflicts between personal moral identity and the good of patients, the fundamental professional commitment is to critical and rational deliberation and to the cultivation of psycho-moral flexibility. This leads indirectly to moral growth and strengthening of professional character. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the first part of this article we survey the concept of human rights from a philosophical perspective and especially in relation to the "right to healthcare". It is argued that regardless of meta-ethical debates on the nature of rights, the ethos and language of moral deliberation associated with human rights is indispensable to any ethics that places the victim and the sufferer in its centre. In the second part we discuss the rise of the "right to privacy", particularly in the USA, as an attempt to make the element of personal free will dominate over the element of basic human interest within the structure of rights and when different rights seem to conflict. We conclude by discussing the relationship of human rights with moral values beyond the realm of rights, mainly human dignity, free will, human rationality and response to basic human needs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents and discusses a recent Israeli proposal to legislate on the rights of the dying patient. A gap exists between elitist biases of the committee proposing the law, and popular values and sentiments. The proposed law divides the dying patients into two groups: "those who wish to go on living" and "those who wish to die". The former will have a right to life prolonging extraordinary care. It is not clear who would foot the bill for this care. Also it is hard to see how this munificence could fail to discriminate against all other patients. Both the secular ethicists and the rabbis involved in drawing up the proposal accepted the assumption that it is good for some terminal patients to die. The rabbis objected, however, to direct and active interventions that shorten life. The solution arrived at was to install timers in the ventilators so as to allow them to expire automatically unless the patient wishes For their resetting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]