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Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared.

Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared.

The authority of bioethics as a field of inquiry and of bioethicists as scholars with a distinctive expertise is being questioned on various fronts. Sarah Franklin's 2019 Nature commentary 'Ethical research - the long and bumpy road from shirked to shared' is the latest example . In this paper, we respond to these challenges by focusing on two key issues. First, we discuss the theory and practice of bioethics. We argue that both of these endeavours are fundamental components of this field of inquiry and that bioethics cannot be reduced to the contribution that it makes to the production of biopolicy, as Franklin suggests. Second, we contend that bioethicists have distinctive skills and knowledge that place them at an epistemic advantage in discussing normative questions. Hence, we reject views that deny the specific contribution that bioethicists can bring to assessing the ethics and governance of science and technology. We conclude by arguing that-despite formal and substantive differences between disciplines-philosophers, social scientists and other scholars should join forces and engage in critical friendships rather than turf wars to move towards the just governance of science and technology., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2020. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared.

The benefits of full ectogenesis, that is, the gestation of human fetuses outside the maternal womb, for women ground many contemporary authors' arguments on the ethical desirability of this practice. In this paper, I present and assess two sets of arguments advanced in favour of ectogenesis: arguments stressing ectogenesis' equality-promoting potential and arguments stressing its freedom-promoting potential. I argue that although successfully grounding a positive case for ectogenesis, these arguments have limitations in terms of their reach and scope. Concerning their limited reach, I contend that ectogenesis will likely benefit a small subset of women and, arguably, not the group who most need to achieve equality and freedom. Concerning their limited scope, I contend that these defences do not pay sufficient attention to the context in which ectogenesis would be developed and that, as a result, they risk leaving the status quo unchanged. After providing examples of these limitations, I move to my proposal concerning the role of ectogenesis in promoting women's equality and freedom. This proposal builds on Silvia Federici's, Mariarosa Dalla Costa's and Selma James' readings of the international feminist campaign 'Wages for Housework'. It maintains that the political perspective and provocation that ectogenesis can advance should be considered and defended., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2020. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

In a recent paper - Lesbian motherhood and mitochondrial replacement techniques: reproductive freedom and genetic kinship - we argued that lesbian couples who wish to have children who are genetically related to both of them should be allowed access to mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs). Françoise Baylis wrote a reply to our paper - 'No' to lesbian motherhood using human nuclear genome transfer - where she challenges our arguments on the use of MRTs by lesbian couples, and on MRTs more generally. In this reply we respond to her claims and further clarify our position., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2019. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

In this paper, we argue that lesbian couples who wish to have children who are genetically related to both of them should be allowed access to mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs). First, we provide a brief explanation of mitochondrial diseases and MRTs. We then present the reasons why MRTs are not, by nature, therapeutic. The upshot of the view that MRTs are non-therapeutic techniques is that their therapeutic potential cannot be invoked for restricting their use only to those cases where a mitochondrial DNA disease could be 'cured'. We then argue that a positive case for MRTs is justified by an appeal to reproductive freedom, and that the criteria to access these techniques should hence be extended to include lesbian couples who wish to share genetic parenthood. Finally, we consider a potential objection to our argument: that the desire to have genetically related kin is not a morally sufficient reason to allow lesbian couples to access MRTs., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Article author(s) (or their employer(s) unless otherwise stated in the text of the article) 2018. All rights reserved. No commercial use is permitted unless otherwise expressly granted.)