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Objective: UK campaigners for a law permitting assisted dying (AD) restricted to those with a maximum life expectancy of 6 months claim that this would largely remove the need for UK residents to seek AD in Switzerland. We wanted to discover whether this prediction was correct., Methods: We analysed the diagnoses of UK residents who had such deaths including, for the first time, data from all three of the main Swiss providers of AD to non-residents, comparing them with figures from Oregon, which has a 6-month restriction., Results: Only 22.7% of UK residents had cancer (Oregon 72.5%) while nearly half (49.6% and over half including dementias) had neurological conditions (Oregon 11.2%) and many with prognoses of much more than 6 months., Conclusion: Overall, less than half would meet a 6-month prognosis criterion. This has significant implications for patients, palliative care clinicians and legislators., Competing Interests: Competing interests: CB and GW are members of MDMY (my death my decision)., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2025. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ Group.)

Enduring intolerable suffering, an essential eligibility criterion in Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD) in Canada and elsewhere, is a contradiction in terms, in that suffering must be tolerable to be endured. Cases of people who were approved for MAiD but who elected to die naturally, thus tolerating their suffering, bear out the unreliability of this central safeguard. The clinical assessment of intolerable suffering may be strengthened by adopting a definition of intolerable suffering centred on clinically evidenced physical and psychological decompensation. This argument also raises important questions about the risks of MAiD clinicians subjectively defining, approving and providing MAiD in ways that deviate from accepted legal and clinical concepts and ethics. Examples show some prolific clinicians describe MAiD in terminology that differs from such norms, as a personal mission, as personally pleasurable, and as a rights-based service. These alternative views are explored for their risks in assessing and providing MAiD for intolerable suffering. This further demonstrates the need for conceptual clarity in legislation, improved vetting and monitoring of clinicians, and a different assessment process to protect patients and clinicians., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2025. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ Group.)

Objectives: Assisted dying has been legally available in Oregon in the USA for 25 years, since when official reports have been published each year detailing the number of people who have used this option as well as sociodemographic and information about the process. The aim of this study was to examine changes over time in these data., Methods: We collated and reviewed data on 2454 assisted deaths included in annual reports on assisted deaths published by the Oregon Health Authority from 1998 to 2022. Descriptive statistics were used to describe time trends., Results: The number of assisted deaths in Oregon increased from 16 in 1998 to 278 in 2022. Over this time, patients' health funding status changed from predominantly private (65%) to predominantly government support (79.5%), and there was an increase in patients feeling a burden and describing financial concerns as reasons for choosing an assisted death. There has been a reduction in the length of the physician-patient relationship from 18 weeks in 2010 to 5 weeks in 2022, and the proportion referred for psychiatric assessment remains low (1%). Data are frequently missing, particularly around complications., Conclusions: The number and characteristics of people accessing assisted deaths, and the process, have changed since data collection started in 1998. Prospective studies are needed to examine the relationship between socioeconomic factors and the desire for an assisted death in Oregon., Competing Interests: Competing interests: CR provides content for the website ‘Keep Assisted Dying Out of Healthcare’. IF is a board member of Living & Dying Well and is co-chair of the All Party Parliamentary Group for Dying Well. AW was a part-time paid researcher for Living and Dying Well from June 2021 to June 2022., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2024. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

In a recent paper, Braun argued for an autonomy-based approach to assisted suicide as a way to avoid the expressivist objection to assisted dying laws. In this paper, I will argue that an autonomy-based approach actually extends the expressivist objection to assisted dying because it is not possible for one agent to assist another in pursuit of a goal without expressing that it would be good for that goal to come about. Braun argued that assisted dying should be viewed purely as an individual's autonomous action, but this requires the assistance of the medical professional to be understood as that of a non-moral automaton, such as a suicide booth. Instead, it will be argued that a beneficent motivation to promote human flourishing provides moral reasons for both non-interference in the actions, for example, suicide, of competent agents and for considering whether assisting another agent with their goal will promote their flourishing., Competing Interests: Competing interests: TD receives a School of Law Studentship from the University of Manchester., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2024. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

According to the expressivist objection, laws that only allow assisted dying for those suffering from certain medical conditions express the judgement that their lives are not worth living. I have recently argued that an autonomy-based approach that legally allows assisted suicide for all who make an autonomous request is a way to avoid the expressivist objection. In response to this, Thomas Donaldson has argued that rather than avoiding the expressivist objection, an autonomy-based approach extends this objection. According to Donaldson, this is because helping a person achieve a goal requires endorsement of that goal. In this reply, I show that Donaldson misunderstands the target of the expressivist objection: it is not aimed at an individual's attitude towards another person's death but rather at a legal regulation. Moreover, helping someone end their life does not necessarily require endorsing this goal-instead, respect for a person's autonomous choice can be another reason for providing assisted suicide. Donaldson also assumes that the autonomy-based approach requires doctors to accept autonomous requests for assisted dying. Yet, this approach merely makes it legal for individuals (not necessarily only doctors) to provide assisted suicide to autonomous persons but does not require anyone to do so., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2024. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

In their paper titled Choosing death in unjust conditions: hope, autonomy and harm reduction, Wiebe and Mullin argue against the stance of diminished autonomy in chronically ill, disabled patients living in unjust sociopolitical environments who pursue medical assistance in dying (MAiD). They suggest that it would be paternalistic to deny these people this choice and conclude that MAiD should actually be seen as a form of harm reduction for them.This response to their article argues that basing discussions surrounding this important topic on a single bioethical concept does not address the needs of this cohort and is restrictively siloed. The discussion should include considerations of human rights and the need for legislative reforms to address social conditions, in addition to traditional bioethical principles. Work in this area needs to become interdisciplinary and collaborative as well as integrate input from the patients themselves. The concept of the dignity of these patients, in its broadest sense, needs to be infused into the discussion in order to optimise the exploration for solutions for this cohort.The stance of MAiD as harm reduction, in this context, does not meet the definition of harm reduction, nor does it represent a commitment to the best interests of these patients., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2024. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

In the paper, titled 'Choosing death in unjust conditions: hope, autonomy and harm reduction,' Wiebe and Mullin argue that people living in unjust social conditions are sufficiently autonomous to request medical assistance in dying (MAiD). The ethical issue is that some people may request MAiD primarily because of unjust social conditions, not their illness, disease, disability or decline in capability. It is easily agreed that people living in unjust social conditions can be autonomous. Nevertheless, Wiebe and Mullin fail to appreciate that autonomy is only a necessary condition for MAiD. In addition to autonomy, one must decide that providing assisted dying to a patient because they are living in unjust social conditions is ethical. Central to making this ethical decision is the principle of non-maleficence, famously articulated as 'do no harm.' The authors admit that performing MAiD in response to unjust social circumstances is harmful, but they justify this harmful action by appealing to the principle of harm reduction. A fundamental flaw of their approach is that it relies on the legislative definition of intolerable suffering, which is based on circular reasoning and given that 99.2% of patients that have applied for MAiD satisfied this criterion, it is essentially equivalent to no standard/criterion. Canadian society is struggling with the ethical implications of its permissive MAiD programme, and, fundamental to this debate, will be determining the proper balance between autonomy and non-maleficence for people living in unjust social conditions., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2024. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Background: Voluntary assisted dying (VAD) became legal in the Australian state of Victoria on 19 June 2019 and will be legal in Western Australia from 2021. Other Australian states are progressing similar law reform processes. In Australia and internationally, doctors are central to the operation of all legal VAD regimes. It is broadly accepted that doctors, as a profession, are less in favour of VAD law reform than the rest of the community. To date, there has been little analysis of the factors that motivate doctors' support or opposition to legalised VAD in Australia., Aim: To review all studies reporting the attitudes of Australian doctors regarding the legalisation of VAD, including their willingness to participate in it, and to observe and record common themes in existing attitudinal data., Design: Scoping review and thematic analysis of qualitative and quantitative data., Data Sources: CINAHL, Embase, Scopus, PubMed and Informit were searched from inception to June 2019., Results: 26 publications detailing 19 studies were identified. Thematic analysis of quantitative and qualitative findings was performed. Three overarching themes emerged. 'Attitudes towards regulation' encompassed doctors' orientation towards legalisation, the shortcomings of binary categories of support or opposition and doctors' concerns about additional regulation of their professional practices. 'Professional and personal impact of legalisation' described tensions between palliative care and VAD, and the emotional and social impact of being providers of VAD. 'Practical considerations regarding access' considered doctors' concerns about eligibility criteria and their willingness to provide VAD., Conclusion: A detailed understanding of medical perspectives about VAD would facilitate the design of legislative models that take better account of doctors' concerns. This may facilitate their greater participation in VAD and help address potential access issues arising from availability of willing doctors., Competing Interests: Competing interests: LW and BW receive funding from the Australian Research Council, the National Health and Medical Research Council and Commonwealth and State Governments for research and training about the law, policy and practice relating to end-of-life care. In relation to implementation of voluntary assisted dying, they have been engaged by the Victorian Government to design and provide the legislatively mandated training for doctors involved in voluntary assisted dying., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2021. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Background: The legalisation of medical assistance in dying in numerous countries over the last 20 years represents a significant shift in practice and scope for many clinicians who have had little-to-no training to prepare them to sensitively respond to patient requests for hastened death., Aims: Our objective was to review the existing qualitative literature on the experiences of healthcare providers responding to requests for hastened death with the aim of answering the question: how do clinicians make sense of, and respond to patients' expressed wishes for hastened death?, Methods: We performed a systematic review and meta-synthesis of primary qualitative research articles that described the experiences and perspectives of healthcare professionals who have responded to requests for hastened death in jurisdictions where MAiD (Medical Assistance in Dying) was legal or depenalised. A staged coding process was used to identify and analyse core themes., Results: Although the response to requests for hastened death varied case-by-case, clinicians formulated their responses by considering seven distinct domains. These include: policies, professional identity, commitment to patient autonomy, personal values and beliefs, the patient-clinician relationship, the request for hastened death and the clinician's emotional and psychological response., Conclusion: Responding to a request for hastened death can be an overwhelming task for clinicians. An approach that takes into consideration the legal, personal, professional and patient perspectives is required to provide a response that encompasses all the complexities associated with such a monumental request., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2021. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Medical assistance in dying (MAiD) is a globally polarising topic which often sparks debate surrounding the ethical and moral dilemmas that arise with a life-ending intervention. To gain a better understanding of this intervention, it is important to explore the experience of those most intimately affected by MAiD. Family caregivers of those with a terminal illness are the backbone of the healthcare and support team, often providing a substantial amount of informal care while at the same time coping with their own distress and anticipatory grief. However, we know the least about how MAiD impacts the psychosocial well-being of these same individuals. The aim of this article is to explore the experience of MAiD from the family caregiver perspective, namely their beliefs and opinions about the intervention, how the process of MAiD impacts them, how the intervention shapes their view of their loved one's quality of death, and the psychosocial outcomes after the passing of their loved one. Beyond the literature, challenges within both the clinical and research realms will be discussed and future directions will be offered. While MAiD is currently legal in only a small number of countries, a better understanding of the impact of MAiD will help inform policy and legislation as they are developed in other jurisdictions. Further, this article aims to inform future research and clinical interventions in order to better understand and support those seeking MAiD and their families., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2021. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Objectives: On 19 June 2019, assisted dying became lawful in Victoria, the second most populous state in Australia. Section 8 of the Voluntary Assisted Dying Act is a legislative safeguard that is designed to ensure a patient's request for assistance to die is voluntary. This section prohibits health practitioners from initiating a conversation about assisted dying with the patient. This article explores the potential implications of this prohibition for effective communication between doctors and their patients, and the ability of doctors to provide high quality end-of-life (EOL) care in some cases., Method: The authors reviewed and analysed literature on the importance of communication at the EOL including the need to understand and appropriately respond to Desire to Die or Desire to Hasten Death statements. A legal critique of section 8 of the Victorian Voluntary Assisted Dying Act was also undertaken to determine the scope of this new duty and how it aligns with existing legal obligations that would otherwise require doctors to provide information about EOL options requested by a patient., Results: Contemporary literature suggests that open and honest communication between doctor and patient including the provision of information about all EOL options when sought by the patient represents good clinical practice and will lead to optimal EOL care. The provision of such information also reflects professional, ethical and legal norms., Conclusion: Despite (arguably) promoting an appropriate policy objective, the legislative prohibition on health professionals initiating conversations about voluntary assisted dying may, in cases where patients seek information about all EOL options, lead to less optimal patient outcomes., Competing Interests: Competing interests: LW has been engaged by the Victorian Government to design and provide the legislatively mandated training for doctors involved in voluntary assisted dying. LW is also a member of the board of Palliative Care Australia (but this article only represents her views not those of Palliative Care Australia). BW has been engaged by the Victorian Government to design and provide the legislatively mandated training for doctors involved in voluntary assisted dying. DK is on the Voluntary Assisted Dying Review Board (but this article represents her views only). JD is a former member of the Physicians’ Advisory Committee for Dying with Dignity Canada, a group that advocated for the legalisation of voluntary assisted dying in Canada. He currently works at Bruyere Continuing Care, a Catholic healthcare facility. This article does not represent the views of either Dying with Dignity Canada or Bruyere Continuing Care. LD has no competing interests., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2020. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

On 11 September 2019, the verdict was read in the first prosecution of a doctor for euthanasia since the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act of 2002 was installed in the Netherlands. The case concerned euthanasia on the basis of an advance euthanasia directive (AED) for a patient with severe dementia. In this paper we describe the review process for euthanasia cases in the Netherlands. Then we describe the case in detail, the judgement of the Regional Review Committees for Termination of Life on Request and Euthanasia (RTE) and the judgement of the medical disciplinary court. Both the review committees and the disciplinary court came to the conclusion there were concerns with this case, which mainly hinged on the wording of the AED. They also addressed the lack of communication with the patient, the absence of oral confirmation of the wish to die and the fact that the euthanasia was performed without the patient being aware of this. However, the doctor was acquitted by the criminal court as the court found she had in fact met all due care criteria laid down in the act. We then describe what this judgement means for euthanasia in the Netherlands. It clarifies the power and reach of AEDs, it allows taking conversations with physicians and the testimony of the family into account when interpreting the AED. However, as a practical consequence the prosecution of this physician has led to fear among doctors about prosecution after euthanasia., Competing Interests: Competing interests: ECAA and SvdV receive funding from the Dutch Association for Voluntary End of Life (NVVE)., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2020. Re-use permitted under CC BY. Published by BMJ.)

Conscience objection is a proposed way of ensuring that medical practitioners who object to physician-assisted suicide may avoid having to be involved in such a procedure if this is legalised. This right on the part of healthcare professionals already exists in certain circumstances. This paper examines the ethical and legal grounds for conscientious objection for medical professionals and shows how it is heavily criticised in circumstances where it is already used. The paper comes to the conclusion that as the grounds and application of conscience objection are no longer as widely accepted, its future application in any legislation can be called into question., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2019. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Background: The Supreme Court of Canada removed the prohibition on physicians assisting in patients dying on 6 February 2015. Bill C-14, legalising medical assistance in dying (MAID) in Canada, was subsequently passed by the House of Commons and the Senate on 17 June 2016. As this remains a divisive issue for physicians, the Canadian Neurosurgical Society (CNSS) has recently published a position statement on MAID., Methods: We conducted a cross-sectional survey to understand the views and perceptions among CNSS members regarding MAID to inform its position statement on the issue. Data was collected from May to June 2016., Results: Of the 300 active membes of the CNSS who recevied the survey, 89 respondents completed the survey, 71% of whom were attending neurosurgeons and 29% were neurosurgery residents. Most respondents,74.2%, supported the right of physicians to participate in MAID with 7.8% opposing. 37% had current patients in their practice fitting the criteria for MAID. 23.6% had been asked by patients to assist with MAID, but only 11% would consider personally providing it. 84% of neurosurgeons surveyed supported the physicians' right to conscientious objection to MAID while 21% thought attending surgeons should be removed from the inquiry and decision-making process. 43.8% agreed that the requirment to refer a patient to a MAID service should be mandatory. Glioblastoma multiforme (65%), quadriplegia/quadriparesis secondary to spinal tumour/trauma (54%) and Parkinson's disease (24%) were the most common suggested potential indications for MAID among the neurosurgical population., Conclusions: Our results demonstrate that most neurosurgeons in Canada are generally supportive of MAID in select patients. However, they also strongly support the physicians' right to conscientious objection., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2019. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Drawing the line on physician assistance in physician-assisted death (PAD) continues to be a contentious issue in many legal jurisdictions across the USA, Canada and Europe. PAD is a medical practice that occurs when physicians either prescribe or administer lethal medication to their patients. As more legal jurisdictions establish PAD for at least some class of patients, the question of the proper scope of this practice has become pressing. This paper presents an argument for restricting PAD to the terminally ill that can be accepted by defenders as well as critics of PAD for the terminally ill. The argument appeals to fairness-based paternalism and the social meaning of medical practice. These two considerations interact in various ways, as the paper explains. The right way to think about the social meaning of medical practice bears on fair paternalism as it relates to PAD and vice versa. The paper contends that these considerations have substantial force when directed against proposals to extend PAD to non-terminally ill patients, but considerably less force when directed against PAD for the terminally ill. The paper pays special attention to the case of non-terminally ill patients who suffer from treatment-resistant depression, as these patients present a potentially strong case for extending PAD beyond the terminally ill., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2019. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Objectives: Assisted suicide in Switzerland is mainly performed by right-to-die societies. Medical involvement is limited to the prescription of the drug and certification of eligibility. Palliative care has traditionally been perceived as generally opposed to assisted suicide, but little is known about palliative care physicians' involvement in assisted suicide practices. This paper aims to describe their perspectives and involvement in assisted suicide practices., Methods: A qualitative interview study was conducted with 23 palliative care physicians across Switzerland. Thematic analysis was used to interpret data., Results: Swiss palliative care physicians regularly receive assisted suicide requests while none reported having received specific training in managing these requests. Participants reported being involved in assisted suicide decision making most were not willing to prescribe the lethal drug. After advising patients of the limits on their involvement in assisted suicide, the majority explored the origins of the patient's request and offered alternatives. Many participants struggled to reconcile their understanding of palliative care principles with patients' wishes to exercise their autonomy. The majority of participants had no direct contact with right-to-die societies, many desired better collaboration. A desire was voiced for a more structured debate on assisted suicide availability in hospitals and clearer legal and institutional frameworks., Conclusions: The Swiss model of assisted suicide gives palliative care physicians opportunities to develop roles which are compatible with each practitioner's values, but may not correspond to patients' expectations. Specific education for all palliative care professionals and more structured ways to manage communication about assisted suicide are warranted., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Article author(s) (or their employer(s) unless otherwise stated in the text of the article) 2019. All rights reserved. No commercial use is permitted unless otherwise expressly granted.)

This article explores the ethical challenges of providing Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID) in a paediatric setting. More specifically, we focus on the theoretical questions that came to light when we were asked to develop a policy for responding to MAID requests at our tertiary paediatric institution. We illuminate a central point of conceptual confusion about the nature of MAID that emerges at the level of practice, and explore the various entailments for clinicians and patients that would flow from different understandings. Finally, we consider the ethical challenges of building policy on what is still an extremely controversial social practice. While MAID is currently available to capable patients in Canada who are 18 years or older-a small but important subsection of the population our hospital serves-we write our policy with an eye to the near future when capable young people may gain access to MAID. We propose that an opportunity exists for MAID-providing institutions to reduce social stigma surrounding this practice, but not without potentially serious consequences for practitioners and institutions themselves. Thus, this paper is intended as a road map through the still-emerging legal and ethical landscape of paediatric MAID. We offer a view of the roads taken and considered along the way, and our justifications for travelling the paths we chose. By providing a record of our in-progress thinking, we hope to stimulate wider discussion about the issues and questions encountered in this work., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2019. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

The aim of this article is to use data from Belgium to analyse distinctions between palliative sedation and euthanasia. There is a need to reduce confusion and improve communication related to patient management at the end of life specifically regarding the rapidly expanding area of patient care that incorporates a spectrum of nuanced yet overlapping terms such as palliative care, sedation, palliative sedation, continued sedation, continued sedation until death, terminal sedation, voluntary euthanasia and involuntary euthanasia. Some physicians and nurses mistakenly think that relieving suffering at the end of life by heavily sedating patients is a form of euthanasia, when indeed it is merely responding to the ordinary and proportionate needs of the patient. Concerns are raised about abuse in the form of deliberate involuntary euthanasia, obfuscation and disregard for the processes sustaining the management of refractory suffering at the end of life. Some suggestions designed to improve patient management and prevent potential abuse are offered., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Article author(s) (or their employer(s) unless otherwise stated in the text of the article) 2018. All rights reserved. No commercial use is permitted unless otherwise expressly granted.)

On 19 July 2016, three medical organisations filed a federal lawsuit against representatives from several Vermont agencies over the Patient Choice and Control at End of Life Act. The law is similar to aid-in-dying (AID) laws in four other US states, but the lawsuit hinges on a distinctive aspect of Vermont's law pertaining to patients' rights to information. The lawsuit raises questions about whether, and under what circumstances, there is an ethical obligation to inform terminally ill patients about AID as an end-of-life option. Much of the literature on clinical communication about AID addresses how physicians should respond to patient requests for assisted dying, but neglects the question of how physicians should approach patients who may not know enough about AID to request it. In this article, I examine the possibility of an affirmative duty to inform terminally ill patients about AID in light of ethical concerns about professional responsibilities to patients and the maintenance of the patient-provider relationship. I suggest that we should not take for granted that communication about AID ought to be patient-initiated, and that there may be circumstances in which physicians have good reasons to introduce the topic themselves. By identifying ethical considerations that ought to inform such discussions, I aim to set an agenda for future bioethical research that adopts a broader perspective on clinical communication about AID., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/.)

In June 2016, following the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada to decriminalise assistance in dying, the Canadian government enacted Bill C-14, legalising medical assistance in dying (MAID). In 2014, the province of Quebec had passed end-of-life care legislation making MAID available as of December 2015. The availability of MAID has many implications, including the possibility of combining this practice with organ donation through the controlled donation after cardiac death (cDCD) protocol. cDCD most often occurs in cases where the patient has a severe neurological injury but does not meet all the criteria for brain death. The donation is subsequent to the decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment (LST). Cases where patients are conscious prior to the withdrawal of LST are unusual, and have raised doubts as to the acceptability of removing organs from individuals who are not neurologically impaired and who have voluntarily chosen to die. These cases can be compared with likely scenarios in which patients will request both MAID and organ donation. In both instances, patients will be conscious and competent. Organ donation in such contexts raises ethical issues regarding respect for autonomy, societal pressure, conscientious objections and the dead-donor rule. In this article, we look at relevant policies in other countries and examine the ethical issues associated with cDCD in conscious patients who choose to die., Competing Interests: Competing interests: M-CF is a member of the Transplant Québec ethics committee. JA is the secretary of the Transplant Québec ethics committee., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/.)

The Belgian model of 'integral' end-of-life care consists of universal access to palliative care (PC) and legally regulated euthanasia. As a first worldwide, the Flemish PC organisation has embedded euthanasia in its practice. However, some critics have declared the Belgian-model concepts of 'integral PC' and 'palliative futility' to fundamentally contradict the essence of PC. This article analyses the various essentialistic arguments for the incompatibility of euthanasia and PC. The empirical evidence from the euthanasia-permissive Benelux countries shows that since legalisation, carefulness (of decision making) at the end of life has improved and there have been no significant adverse 'slippery slope' effects. It is problematic that some critics disregard the empirical evidence as epistemologically irrelevant in a normative ethical debate. Next, rejecting euthanasia because its prevention was a founding principle of PC ignores historical developments. Further, critics' ethical positions depart from the PC tenet of patient centeredness by prioritising caregivers' values over patients' values. Also, many critics' canonical adherence to the WHO definition of PC, which has intention as the ethical criterion is objectionable. A rejection of the Belgian model on doctrinal grounds also has nefarious practical consequences such as the marginalisation of PC in euthanasia-permissive countries, the continuation of clandestine practices and problematic palliative sedation until death. In conclusion, major flaws of essentialistic arguments against the Belgian model include the disregard of empirical evidence, appeals to canonical and questionable definitions, prioritisation of caregiver perspectives over those of patients and rejection of a plurality of respectable views on decision making at the end of life., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/.)

Background: In 2002, physician-assisted dying was legally regulated in the Netherlands and Belgium, followed in 2009 by Luxembourg. An internationally frequently expressed concern is that such legislation could stunt the development of palliative care (PC) and erode its culture. To study this, we describe changes in PC development 2005-2012 in the permissive Benelux countries and compare them with non-permissive countries., Methods: Focusing on the seven European countries with the highest development of PC, which include the three euthanasia-permissive and four non-permissive countries, we compared the structural service indicators for 2005 and 2012 from successive editions of the European Atlas of Palliative Care. As an indicator for output delivery of services to patients, we collected the amounts of governmental funding of PC 2002-2011 in Belgium, the only country where we could find these data., Results: The rate of increase in the number of structural PC provisions among the compared countries was the highest in the Netherlands and Luxembourg, while Belgium stayed on a par with the UK, the benchmark country. Belgian government expenditure for PC doubled between 2002 and 2011. Basic PC expanded much more than endowment-restricted specialised PC., Conclusions: The hypothesis that legal regulation of physician-assisted dying slows development of PC is not supported by the Benelux experience. On the contrary, regulation appears to have promoted the expansion of PC. Continued monitoring of both permissive and non-permissive countries, preferably also including indicators of quantity and quality of delivered care, is needed to evaluate longer-term effects., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.)

Even among advocates of legalising physician-assisted death, many argue that this should be done only once palliative care has become widely available. Meanwhile, according to them, physician-assisted death should be banned. Four arguments are often presented to support this claim, which we call the argument of lack of autonomy, the argument of existing alternatives, the argument of unfair inequalities and the argument of the antagonism between physician-assisted death and palliative care. We argue that although these arguments provide strong reasons to take appropriate measures to guarantee access to good quality palliative care to everyone who needs it, they do not justify a ban on physician-assisted death until we have achieved this goal., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.)

While assisted suicide (AS) is strictly restricted in many countries, it is not clearly regulated by law in Switzerland. This imbalance leads to an influx of people-'suicide tourists'-coming to Switzerland, mainly to the Canton of Zurich, for the sole purpose of committing suicide. Political debate regarding 'suicide tourism' is taking place in many countries. Swiss medicolegal experts are confronted with these cases almost daily, which prompted our scientific investigation of the phenomenon. The present study has three aims: (1) to determine selected details about AS in the study group (age, gender and country of residence of the suicide tourists, the organisation involved, the ingested substance leading to death and any diseases that were the main reason for AS); (2) to find out the countries from which suicide tourists come and to review existing laws in the top three in order to test the hypothesis that suicide tourism leads to the amendment of existing regulations in foreign countries; and (3) to compare our results with those of earlier studies in Zurich. We did a retrospective data analysis of the Zurich Institute of Legal Medicine database on AS of non-Swiss residents in the last 5 years (2008-2012), and internet research for current legislation and political debate in the three foreign countries most concerned. We analysed 611 cases from 31 countries all over the world. Non-terminal conditions such as neurological and rheumatic diseases are increasing among suicide tourists. The unique phenomenon of suicide tourism in Switzerland may indeed result in the amendment or supplementary guidelines to existing regulations in foreign countries., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.)

This article explores the role of the physician in the Assisted Dying Bill, which is currently progressing through the House of Lords. The Supreme Court decision in Nicklinson and Others has alerted Parliament to the possibility that the current prohibition against assisted suicide may breach Article 8 of the European Convention in relation to the right to choose how to end one's life. In this article, the role of healthcare professionals in the proposed legalisation of physician-assisted suicide is examined, together with consideration of key ethical concerns over who might be permitted to access assisted dying. Whether the proposed law presents an ethically sound alternative to the current prohibition against assisting in suicide is not clear, but Parliament must now respond in order to address human rights issues and the call to legalise medically assisted suicide., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.)

This paper considers the problems that arise when death, which is a philosophically difficult concept, is incorporated into healthcare metrics, such as the quality-adjusted life year (QALY). These problems relate closely to the debate over euthanasia and assisted suicide because negative QALY scores can be taken to mean that patients would be 'better off dead'. There is confusion in the literature about the meaning of 0 QALY, which is supposed to act as an 'anchor' for the surveyed preferences on which QALYs are based. In the context of the debate over euthanasia, the QALY assumes an ability to make meaningful comparisons between life-states and death. Not only is this assumption questionable, but the ethical debate is much more broad than the question of whether death is preferable to a state of living. QALYs are derived from preferences about health states, so do not necessarily reflect preferences about events (eg, dying) or actions (eg, killing). This paper presents a new kind of problem for the QALY. As it stands, the QALY provides confused and unreliable information when it reports zero or negative values, and faces further problems when it appears to recommend death. This should preclude its use in the debate over euthanasia and assisted suicide. These problems only apply where the QALY involves or seems to involve a comparison between life-states and death, and are not relevant to the more general discussion of the use of QALYs as a tool for comparing the benefits derived from treatment options., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.)

Some issues in medical ethics have been present throughout the history of medicine, and thus provide us with an opportunity to ascertain: (1) whether there is progress in medical ethics; and (2) what it means to do good medical ethics. One such perennial issue is physician assistance in dying (PAD). This paper provides an account of the PAD debate in this journal over the last 40 years. It concludes that there is some (but limited) progress in the debate. The distinctions, analogies and hypothetical examples have proliferated, as have empirical studies, but very little has changed in terms of the basic arguments. The paper further argues that many of the contributions to the debate fail to engage fully with the concerns people have about the legal introduction of PAD in the healthcare system, perhaps because many of the contributions sit on the borderline between academic analysis and social activism., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.)

Context: In The Netherlands, approximately 45% of patients' requests for euthanasia are granted by a physician. After a rejected request, some patients approach non-physicians and ask them for assistance in suicide. Recently, a non-physician who assisted his mother's suicide was declared guilty without punishment., Aim: The aim of the current study was to investigate the opinion of the Dutch general public on non-physician-assisted suicide., Methods: A cross-sectional survey among the Dutch general public was performed. A total of 1113 respondents were included (response rate 80%). The survey covered two case descriptions in which a patient asks a non-physician for assisted suicide after a non-granted request for physician-assisted dying. In both cases, a son, friend or professional facilitates the suicide by either the provision of information or the purchase of lethal medication. Respondents were invited to give their opinion on these cases and in addition on 10 propositions on non-physician-assisted suicide., Results: When a son provides information on how to acquire lethal medication in case of a patient with a terminal illness, this involvement is accepted by 62% of the respondents. The actual purchase of lethal medication receives less support (38%). If the patient suffers without a serious disease, both forms of assistance are less accepted (46% and 24%, respectively). In addition, only 21% support the legalisation of non-physician-assisted suicide. The Dutch public prefer involvement of a physician in assisted suicide (69%)., Conclusions: The Dutch general public consider non-physician-assisted suicide in some specific cases a tolerable alternative for patients with a rejected request for physician-assisted dying if the assistance is limited to the provision of information. However, the majority do not support the legalisation of non-physician-assisted suicide., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.)

In this article, I assess the position that voluntary euthanasia (VE) and physician-assisted suicide (PAS) ought not to be accepted in the cases of persons who suffer existentially but who have no medical condition, because existential questions do not fall within the domain of physicians' professional expertise. I maintain that VE and PAS based on suffering arising from medical conditions involves existential issues relevantly similar to those confronted in connection with existential suffering. On that basis I conclude that if VE and PAS based on suffering arising from medical conditions is taken to fall within the domain of medical expertise, it is not consistent to use the view that physicians' professional expertise does not extend to existential questions as a reason for denying requests for VE and PAS from persons who suffer existentially but have no medical condition.

Public and healthcare professionals differ in their attitudes towards euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (PAS), the legal status of which is currently in the spotlight in the UK. In addition to medical training and experience, religiosity, locus of control and patient characteristics (eg, patient age, pain levels, number of euthanasia requests) are known influencing factors. Previous research tends toward basic designs reporting on attitudes in the context of just one or two potentially influencing factors; we aimed to test the comparative importance of a larger range of variables in a sample of nursing trainees and non-nursing controls. One hundred and fifty-one undergraduate students (early-stage nursing training, late-stage nursing training and non-nursing controls) were approached on a UK university campus and asked to complete a self-report questionnaire. Participants were of mixed gender and were on average 25.5 years old. No significant differences in attitude were found between nursing and non-nursing students. There was a significant positive correlation between higher religiosity and positive attitude toward euthanasia (r=0.19, p<0.05) and a significant negative relationship between internal locus of control and positive attitude toward PAS (r=-0.263, p<0.01). Multivariate analyses revealed differing predictor models for attitudes towards euthanasia and PAS, and confirm the importance of individual differences in determining these attitudes. The unexpected direction of association between religiosity and attitudes may reflect a broader cultural shift in attitudes since earlier research in this area. Furthermore, these findings suggest it possible that experience, more than training itself, may be a bigger influence on attitudinal differences in healthcare professionals.

Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (PAS) by request and/or based on an advance directive are legal in The Netherlands under strict conditions, thus providing options for patients with Huntington's disease (HD) and other neurodegenerative diseases to stay in control and choose their end of life. HD is an inherited progressive disease characterised by chorea and hypokinesia, psychiatric symptoms and dementia. From a qualitative study based on interviews with 15 physicians experienced in treating HD, several ethical issues emerged. Consideration of these aspects leads to a discussion about the professional role of a physician in relation to the personal autonomy of a patient. Such a discussion can raise awareness that talking about end-of-life wishes with an HD patient is part of the legal, professional and moral responsibility of the physician, and that a letter of intent on behalf of the physician can improve active participation in the process. Discussion of these issues can help to advance the debate on euthanasia and PAS in HD and other neurodegenerative diseases.

Context: The attitudes of medical professionals towards physician assisted dying have been widely discussed. Less explored is the level of agreement among physicians on the possibility of 'rational suicide'-a considered suicide act made by a sound mind and a precondition of assisted dying legislation., Objective: To assess attitudes towards rational suicide in a representative sample of senior doctors in England and Wales., Methods: A postal survey was conducted of 1000 consultants and general practitioners randomly selected from a commercially available database. The main outcome of interest was level of agreement with a statement about rational suicide., Results: The corrected participation rate was 50%; 363 questionnaires were analysed. Overall 72% of doctors agreed with the possibility of rational suicide, 17% disagreed, and 11% were neutral. Doctors who identified themselves as being more religious were more likely to disagree. Some doctors who disagreed with legalisation of physician assisted suicide nevertheless agreed with the concept of rational suicide., Conclusions: Most senior doctors in England and Wales feel that rational suicide is possible. There was no association with specialty. Strong religious belief was associated with disagreement, although levels of agreement were still high in people reporting the strongest religious belief. Most doctors who were opposed to physician assisted suicide believed that rational suicide was possible, suggesting that some medical opposition is best explained by other factors such as concerns of assessment and protection of vulnerable patients.

Background: There is an established link between depression and interest in hastened death in patients who are seriously ill. Concern exists over the extent of depression in patients who actively request euthanasia/physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and those who have their requests granted., Objectives: To estimate the prevalence of depression in refused and granted requests for euthanasia/PAS and discuss these findings. Methods A systematic review was performed in MEDLINE and PsycINFO in July 2010, identifying studies reporting rates of depression in requests for and cases of euthanasia/PAS. One author critically appraised the strength of the data using published criteria., Results: 21 studies were included covering four countries. There was considerable heterogeneity in methods of assessing depression and selecting patients. In the highest quality studies, in the Netherlands and Oregon, 8-47% of patients requesting euthanasia/PAS had depressive symptoms and 2-17% of completed euthanasia/PAS cases had depressive symptoms. In the Netherlands, depression was significantly higher in refused than granted requests, and there was no significant difference in the rate of depression between euthanasia cases and similar patients who had not made a request for euthanasia., Conclusion: It is unclear whether depression increases the probability of making a request for euthanasia/PAS, but in the Netherlands most requests in depressed patients are rejected, leaving a depression rate in cases that is similar to the surrounding population. Less evidence is available elsewhere, but some level of depression has been identified in patients undergoing euthanasia/PAS in all the countries studied. Whether the presence of depression is ever compatible with an ethical decision on euthanasia/PAS is discussed.

Battin et al examined data on deaths from physician-assisted suicide (PAS) in Oregon and on PAS and voluntary euthanasia (VE) in The Netherlands. This paper reviews the methodology used in their examination and questions the conclusions drawn from it-namely, that there is for the most part 'no evidence of heightened risk' to vulnerable people from the legalisation of PAS or VE. This critique focuses on the evidence about PAS in Oregon. It suggests that vulnerability to PAS cannot be categorised simply by reference to race, gender or other socioeconomic status and that the impetus to seek PAS derives from factors, including emotional state, reactions to loss, personality type and situation and possibly to PAS contagion, all factors that apply across the social spectrum. It also argues, on the basis of official reports from the Oregon Health Department on the working of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act since 2008, that, contrary to the conclusions drawn by Battin et al, the highest resort to PAS in Oregon is among the elderly and, on the basis of research published since Battin et al reported, that there is reason to believe that some terminally ill patients in Oregon are taking their own lives with lethal drugs supplied by doctors despite having had depression at the time when they were assessed and cleared for PAS.

The mental competence of people requesting aid-in-dying is a key issue for the how the law responds to cases of assisted suicide. A number of cases from around the common law world have highlighted the importance of competence in determining whether assistants should be prosecuted, and what they will be prosecuted for. Nevertheless, the law remains uncertain about how competence should be tested in these cases. This article proposes a test of competence that is based on the existing common law but which is tailored to cases of assisted suicide. The test will help doctors, other health professionals and lawyers determine whether the suicidal person was able to competently request assistance. Such knowledge will help to reduce some of the current uncertainty about criminal liability in cases of assisted suicide.

David Shaw presents a new argument to support the old claim that there is not a significant moral difference between killing and letting die and, by implication, between active and passive euthanasia. He concludes that doctors should not make a distinction between them. However, whether or not killing and letting die are morally equivalent is not as important a question as he suggests. One can justify legal distinctions on non-moral grounds. One might oppose physician-assisted suicide and active euthanasia when performed by doctors on patients whether or not one is in favour of the legalisation of assisted suicide and active euthanasia. Furthermore, one can consider particular actions to be contrary to appropriate professional conduct even in the absence of legal and ethical objections to them. Someone who wants to die might want only a doctor to kill him or to help him to kill himself. However, we are not entitled to everything that we want in life or death. A doctor cannot always fittingly provide all that a patient wants or needs. It is appropriate that doctors provide their expert advice with regard to the performance of active euthanasia but they can and should do so while, qua doctors, they remain hors de combat.

The purpose of the present study was to examine whether or not strong values might influence physicians' estimations of future events. In an empirical study about physicians' attitudes towards physician assisted suicide (PAS) we asked about the physicians' main reasons for being pro, doubtful or contra PAS and also asked them to estimate what would happen with patients' trust if PAS were to be legally accepted in Swedish society. Finally we asked the physicians about their own trust in healthcare in the event of PAS being legally accepted. We found that in contrast to those who were pro PAS and doubtful, the group who were against PAS did not discriminate between their own opinion and their estimation of what they thought might happen with patients' trust in the future. Against the backdrop of the present study, we present a hypothesis maintaining that feeling strongly against controversial medical procedures is associated with being inclined to let one's own beliefs influence our capacity to interpret and estimate empirical results. We think this hypothesis merits closer examination.

Background: In Switzerland, right-to-die organisations assist their members with suicide by lethal drugs, usually barbiturates. One organisation, Dignitas, has experimented with oxygen deprivation as an alternative to sodium pentobarbital., Objective: To analyse the process of assisted suicide by oxygen deprivation with helium and a common face mask and reservoir bag., Method: This study examined four cases of assisted suicide by oxygen deprivation using helium delivered via a face mask. Videos of the deaths were provided by the Zurich police. Dignitas provided protocol and consent information., Results: One man and three women were assisted to death by oxygen deprivation. There was wide variation in the time to unconsciousness and the time to death, probably due to the poor mask fit. Swiss law prevented attendants from effectively managing the face mask apparatus. Purposeless movements of the extremities were disconcerting for Dignitas attendants, who are accustomed to assisting suicide with barbiturates. None of the dying individuals attempted self-rescue., Conclusions: The dying process of oxygen deprivation with helium is potentially quick and appears painless. It also bypasses the prescribing role of physicians, effectively demedicalising assisted suicide. Oxygen deprivation with a face mask is not acceptable because leaks are difficult to control and it may not eliminate rebreathing. These factors will extend time to unconsciousness and time to death. A hood method could reduce the problem of mask fit. With a hood, a flow rate of helium sufficient to provide continuous washout of expired gases would remedy problems observed with the mask.

Recent evaluation of the practice of euthanasia and related medical decisions at the end of life in the Netherlands has shown a slight decrease in the frequency of physician-assisted death since the enactment of the Euthanasia Law in 2002. This paper focuses on the absence of euthanasia cases concerning patients with dementia and a written advance euthanasia directive, despite the fact that the only real innovation of the Euthanasia Law consisted precisely in allowing physicians to act upon such directives. The author discusses two principal reasons for this absence. One relates to the uncertainty about whether patients with advanced dementia truly experience the suffering they formerly feared. There is reason to assume that they don't, as a consequence of psychological adaptation and progressive unawareness (anosognosia). The second, more fundamental reason touches upon the ethical relevance of shared understanding and reciprocity. The author argues that, next to autonomy and mercifulness, "reciprocity" is a condition sine qua non for euthanasia. The absence thereof in advanced dementia renders euthanasia morally inconceivable, even if there are signs of suffering and notwithstanding the presence of an advance euthanasia directive. This does not mean, however, that advance euthanasia directives of patients with dementia are worthless. They might very well have a role in the earlier stages of certain subtypes of the disease. To illustrate this point the author presents a case in which the advance directive helped to create a window of opportunity for reciprocity and shared decision-making.

Introduction: The Dutch Euthanasia Act (2002) states that euthanasia is not punishable if the attending physician acts in accordance with the statutory due care criteria. These criteria hold that: there should be a voluntary and well-considered request, the patient's suffering should be unbearable and hopeless, the patient should be informed about their situation, there are no reasonable alternatives, an independent physician should be consulted, and the method should be medically and technically appropriate. This study investigates whether physicians experience problems with these criteria in medical practice., Methods: In 2006, questionnaires were sent to a random, stratified sample of 2100 Dutch physicians (response rate: 56%). Physicians were asked about problems in their decision-making related to requests for euthanasia or assisted suicide after enforcement of the 2002 Euthanasia Act., Results: Of all physicians who had received a request for euthanasia or assisted suicide (75%), 25% had experienced problems in the decision-making with regard to at least one of the criteria of due care. Physicians who had experienced problems mostly indicated to have had problems related to evaluating whether or not the patient's suffering was unbearable and hopeless (79%) and whether or not the patient's request was voluntary or well considered (58%)., Discussion: Physicians in The Netherlands most frequently reported problems related to aspects in which they have to evaluate the patient's subjective perspective(s). However, it can be questioned whether placing emphasis on these subjective aspects is an adequate fulfilment of the duties imposed on physicians, as laid down in the Dutch Euthanasia Act.