1. CLASSICAL, NONCLASSICAL AND NEOCLASSICAL INTENTIONS
- Author
-
Jeanne Peijnenburg
- Subjects
Philosophy of science ,Action (philosophy) ,Statement (logic) ,Criticism ,Von Wright ,Psychology ,Epistemology - Abstract
Kuipers’ model of action explanation is compared, first with that of Anscombe, and then with models in the post-Anscombian tradition. Whereas Kuipers and Anscombe differ on the question of the first-person view, the difference with post-Anscombian writers concerns the so-called intentional statement. Kuipers criticizes the models of both Hempel and von Wright for their lack of an intentional statement. Kuipers’ own model seems immune to this criticism, since it contains no less than two intentional statements, a “specific” and an “unspecific” one. I argue that, contrary to appearances, it is not so immune. The call for intentional statements is in fact a call for intentions that are irreducible to beliefs and desires. Kuipers’ intentional statements, however, are about intentions that can be so reduced.
- Published
- 2005
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