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This article revisits the motives behind the Czechoslovak scheme "Russian Action", which granted thousands of Russian "migr"s residence and financial support in Czechoslovakia during the 1920s and 1930s. In particular, it looks at the efforts to bring to Czechoslovakia Russian civil war refugees living in Constantinople. Historians have conventionally focused on Prague as the home to intellectual and cultural exiles from Russia and have also decreed that the "migr" policies of Czechoslovakia were driven principally by the humanitarian concerns of a liberal and democratic government. This article looks, instead, at the regime's deep-seated political motives, in particular its plans for a future, Bolshevik-free Russia, reconstructed under its guiding hand. In so doing, it raises questions about Czechoslovakia's self-image, ideology and place within the international hierarchy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent collection of essays on Germany''s relations with Latin America Natalja Karthaus argued that ‘Latin America was never a priority area for German foreign policy’. Natalja Karthaus, ‘Lateinamerika als Bezugsfeld der (bundes-) deutschen Außenpolitik’, in Manfred Mols and Christoph Wagner, eds., Deutschland-Lateinamerika: Geschichte, Gegenwart und Perspektiven (Frankfurt/Main: Vervuert, 1994), 53. Karthaus''s verdict can, in fact, be extended to the Luso-Hispanic world as a whole, thus including Portugal and also, for most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Spain. On aspects of the history of German – Spanish relations see now Conrad Kent, Thomas K. Wolber and Cameron M. K. Hewitt, eds., The Lion and the Eagle; Interdisciplinary Essays on German – Spanish Relations over the Centuries (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2000). Even Hitler''s foreign policy, despite its global aspirations, is included in Karthaus''s assessment. The focus of this article is largely on Brazil, Argentina, Spain and Portugal. These four countries were of comparatively greater importance to the Nazi regime than the other Latin American countries. On the latter see, inter alia, Jobst-H. Floto, Die Beziehungen Deutschlands zu Venezuela 1933 bis 1958 (Frankfurt/Main, Vervuert, 1991); María M. Camou, Los vaivenes de la politica exterior uruguaya ante la pugna de las potencias; las relaciones con el Tercer Reich (1933–1942) (Montevideo: Fundación de Cultura Universitaria, 1990); Klaus Volland, Das Dritte Reich und Mexiko. Studien zur Entwicklung des deutsch-mexikanischen Verhältnisses 1933–1942 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Ölpolitik (Frankfurt/Main, Berr: Peter Lang, 1976). To Hitler, both Latin America and the Iberian Peninsula (with the exception of Spain during the first year of that country''s civil war and again in 1940/41) were of marginal relevance to his foreign policy objectives. This verdict notwithstanding Nazi Germany maintained regular, indeed in some areas close, relations to the countries of Latin America and the Iberian peninsula which warrant closer examination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Just war, international law, and world order are all historically conditioned realities that interrelate with one another in complex ways. This paper explores their historical development and current status while critically examining their interrelationship. It begins with exploring just war as a basic frame for analysis and interconnection with the other two realities. Just war is not an abstract body of moral thought but instead a practically informed morality of war rooted in Christian thought and law, Roman law, and the practice of statecraft. The essay notes the importance of the ideas of jus gentium and jus naturale in just war's fundamental formation, as well as the parallel between its three basic features--sovereign authority, just cause, and the end of peace--and the three goods or ends of politics as classically defined, namely, order, justice, and peace. The essay then moves out to explore the historical and thematic relations between just war tradition and international law, especially the law of war, arguing that these together define a moral and legal structure that is normative for world order. The final section of the paper considers the functioning of the institutions of world order in the context of challenges from rival cultural understandings of war, law, and world order and from the rise of nonstate actors in the international sphere, arguing for dialogical efforts aimed at strengthening both the moral and legal basis for world order against contemporary threats to that order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a new approach for investigating the determinant of the mark-up of prices over costs. We estimate basic price equations around an expression for marginal cost that is derived from a cost minimisation problem, using a vector error correction approach to avoid endogeneity bias. Observed basic prices include the mark-up over marginal costs, and this mark-up is of interest to policymakers as an indicator of competition and ultimately as a determinant of the level of equilibrium employment. We look at the factors driving this mark-up, and in particular look at the role of EMU, as well as globalisation, the European Single Market and openness to trade and the introduction of the euro. We use a panel data set that includes both EMU and non-EMU members. The results indicate an important role for trade liberalisation in determining the mark-up, but openness itself and the introduction of the euro do not appear to have a significant role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article builds on the recent willingness among British, Canadian, and imperial historians to question older national histories, and to re-examine how the divergent societies, economies, and polities of the empire once interacted in a wider 'British world'. It argues that the press acted as a key mechanism for the transmission of political ideas through the permeable internal boundaries of empire. This is demonstrated through analysis of contemporary debate over the Canadian American reciprocity proposals of 1911. This controversy provided an opportunity for political groups in Britain and Canada to use the press to forge alliances with each other and work together on a specific issue. Two key forces made this possible. In Britain, constructive imperialists had since 1903 sought to rally Dominion support for tariff reform, initially with limited success. In Canada, neither western farmers nor eastern manufacturers seemed interested in imperial preference. It was the reciprocity proposals that changed the situation, providing the second driving force. Canadian manufacturing interests, seeking to prevent the lowering of tariff barriers against United States rivals, began to court British constructive imperialists. As a result political conflict was reshaped both in colony and metropole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The challenge that confronts corporate decision-makers in connection with global labor conditions is often in identifying the standards by which they should govern themselves. In an effort to provide greater direction in the face of possible global cultural conflicts, ethicists Thomas Donaldson and Thomas Dunfee draw on social contract theory to develop a method for identifying basic human rights: Integrated Social Contract Theory (ISCT). In this paper, we apply ISCT to the challenge of global labor standards, attempting to identify labor rights that could serve as guides for corporations producing or outsourcing outside of their home country. In addition to identifying areas of universal agreement, we also examine whether ISCT is, in fact, a sufficient basis for determining worker rights; we seek to define the parameters of the "sweatshop" problem; we include the application and results of our ISCT analysis as applied to labor standards: the global labor rights hypernorms; and conclude that ISCT is sufficient only for rights that are universal. We also discuss whether market-driven decisions can identify the boundaries of labor rights, or at least assure that market outcomes are compatible with maintaining labor rights, in order to respond to the shortcomings of ISCT. We conclude with some comments on directions of analysis for labor rights determination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The failure of the UN Security Council to adequately and effectively address the Syrian crisis has brought renewed scrutiny to the veto and its capricious use during mass atrocity situations. In response to these concerns, the idea of a code of conduct to regulate the exercise of the veto during humanitarian situations is now being increasingly advanced by several states, including France and the United Kingdom. This paper disputes the utility of such a code and argues that it would not make any significant difference to the way mass atrocity crimes are addressed. I examine three core arguments often extended to justify the merit and the utility of the norm: the circumvention argument, the naming and shaming argument, and the Charter reform argument. I show how each of these arguments is undermined by mistaken notions about the norm's procedural effectiveness, and the role the veto plays in cases of what Simon Chesterman calls "inhumanitarian noninterventions." Additionally, drawing on interviews conducted with diplomats at the United Nations in New York, I present evidence that resistance to a code of conduct comes not only from the permanent five members of the Council but also from the nonpermanent members, further imperiling the idea's capacity to effect change. Ultimately, I contend that the current global effort to curtail the influence of the veto is nothing more than a journey down the rabbit hole: exciting, but ultimately distracting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Targeted sanctions, namely asset freezes and travel bans, are no longer the province of foreign policy alone. They are increasingly often used by governments in response to crime, such as corruption, human rights abuse, cybercrime, drug trafficking, and transnational organized crime writ large. Such sanctions are imposed based on permissive evidential standards, such as that of "credible evidence" or "reasonable grounds to suspect." Their advent has added a new layer to a multi-tier system of state responses to crime. First, there is the traditional approach of criminal prosecution and conviction based on the criminal standard of proof. Second, one rung below is non-conviction based asset forfeiture, a notionally civil confiscation of supposed proceeds of crime that eschews the need for compliance with a suite of criminal trial safeguards. At the third level of this hierarchy are crime-based targeted sanctions, which vest the state with the greatest latitude in dealing with suspected criminals. Based on a wide-ranging analysis of international practice, this article contends that not only are crime-based sanctions de facto a criminal justice tool, but also that a coherent set of principles is required to determine their relationship with other responses to criminal behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper asks whether humanitarian intervention is legal and reviews contemporary legal arguments on both sides. It finds that both views are sustainable by conventional accounts of the sources of international law; humanitarian intervention is at once legal and illegal. The paper then considers the implications of this for the idea of the rule of law in world politics. The power of international law in this case comes from its utility as a resource for justifying state policies, not as a means for distinguishing compliance from non-compliance. Law remains important to world politics, but in a different way than usually understood. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

To many observers Japanese decision-making is an enigma that defies conventional analysis. Neither the traditional rational actor model of decision-making, nor alternative pluralist models proposed for the analysis of Western democracies fit the Japanese case. As a result Japanese security policy decision-making is described as ‘reactive’ or even non-existent. Likewise, the anomaly of Japanese decision-making is ultimately predicted to be resolved through a process of ‘normalization’ whereby Japanese policy formation evolves into a form that does fit these models. However, this paper contends that the fact that Japan’s security decision-making does not fit commonly-used models is due rather to the limitations of those models. Japan’s security policy, like that of all states, is gradually evolving, but this does not mean that it is about to become just like the West. This paper addresses how a conjuncture of external factors and internal factors has stimulated important changes in Japanese security policy-making which are frequently missed or misinterpreted by observers. In order to understand Japanese security policy-making, and to chart its future course, a refined cybernetic approach is introduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a response to Jeff McMahan‘s “Just Cause for War” ( Ethics & International Affairs 19, 2005). McMahan holds, as many have, that there is a just cause for war against group X only if X have made themselves liable to military force by being responsible for some serious wrong. But he interprets this liability requirement in a very strict way. He insists (1) that one may use force against X for purpose Y only if they are responsible for a wrong specifically connected to Y; and (2) that one may use force against an individual member of X only if he himself shares in the responsibility for the wrong. This paper defends a more permissive, and more traditional, view of just war liability against McMahan’s claims. Against McMahan‘s first claim it argues that certain “conditional just causes,” such as disarming an aggressor, deterring future aggression, and preventing lesser humanitarian crimes, can be legitimate goals of war against X even if X have no specific liability connected to them. Against McMahan’s second claim it argues that soldiers who have no responsibility for X‘s wrong may nonetheless be legitimately attacked because in becoming soldiers they freely surrendered their right not to be killed by enemy combatants in a war between their and another state, so killing them in such a war is not unjust. Though initially a criticism of McMahan, the paper makes positive proposals about conditional just causes and the moral justification for directing force at soldiers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In one fundamental sense, a British post-war consensus certainly existed: repudiation and denigration of interwar governments and their leaders. Stanley Baldwin was the chief victim, as it became widely believed during the 1940s that he had 'failed to rearm' the nation in the 1930s. Examination of the history of Baldwin's reputation after his retirement — precisely why and how it collapsed reveals a striking case of the contingent construction of historical interpretation. Partisan politics, legitimation of a new regime, a Churchillian bandwagon, self-exoneration, and selective recollection together reinforced hindsight and a wartime appetite for scapegoats to create a public myth, which despite manifest evidence to the contrary was accepted as historical 'truth' by historians and other intellectuals. The main indictment was accepted even by Baldwin's appointed biographer, who added a further layer of supposed psychological deficiencies. Attempts to establish an effective defence were long constrained by official secrecy and the force of Churchill's post-war prestige. Only during the 1960s did political distance and then the opening of government records lead to more balanced historical assessments; yet the myth had become so central to larger myths about the 1930s and 1940s that it persists in general belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sir Herbert Butterfield, Master of Peterhouse, Cambridge (1955-68), Regius Professor of History (1963-68), and author of The Whig Interpretation of History (1931), was one of the leading historians of the twentieth century. A diplomatic historian and student of modern historiography, Butterfield was deeply concerned too with contemporary international relations, wrote much on the subject and, in 1958, created the 'British Committee on the Theory of International Politics'. Drawing upon published and unpublished material, this article seeks to sketch an outline of Butterfield's career and thought, to examine his approach to international relations, and to reconsider his reputation in the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The globalisation of agrifood systems is a mega-trend with potentially profound nutritional implications. This paper describes various facets of this globalisation process and reviews studies on nutritional effects with a particular focus on developing countries. Results show that global trade and technological change in agriculture have substantially improved food security in recent decades, although intensified production systems have also contributed to environmental problems in some regions. New agricultural technologies and policies need to place more emphasis on promoting dietary diversity and reducing environmental externalities. Globalising agrifood systems also involve changing supply-chain structures, with a rapid rise of modern retailing, new food safety and food quality standards, and higher levels of vertical integration. Studies show that emerging high-value supply chains can contribute to income growth in the small farm sector and improved access to food for rural and urban populations. However, there is also evidence that the retail revolution in developing countries, with its growing role of supermarkets and processed foods, can contribute to overweight and obesity among consumers. The multi-faceted linkages between changing agrifood systems and nutrition are a new field of interdisciplinary research, combining agricultural, nutritional, economics and social sciences perspectives. The number of studies on specific aspects is still limited, so the evidence is not yet conclusive. A review at this early stage can help to better understand important relationships and encourage follow-up work. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper specifies the conditions for conflict in Central Asia. Given Russian preponderance this should be an easy case for neorealism. But we demonstrate that the consequences of Russia's superior power will depend on the nature of its regime and domestic stability in Central Asia. The type of nationalism, the robustness of political institutions, and the success or failure of economic reform will be critical conditions for Central Asian stability. The paper also evaluates the prospects for conflict resolution and prevention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the legacy of British scholar, historian and political theorist David Mitrany and his functional approach to world government. It considers Mitrany's pragmatic ideas about international organizations and the functionalism of social work in the early 1940s. A brief history of his career as an assistant European editor of a series of publications on the economic and social history of war in 1922 is discussed. The article also highlights some of his academic accomplishments in terms of European political affairs and his contributions on the academics of international politics.

Focuses on United States policy maker for Puerto Rico Ernest Gruening's model for a reformist policy which the United States could pursue for the rest of Latin America. Initial support of President Franklin Roosevelt for the program; Program as one the three ideological alternatives in the early stages of the Good Neighbor Policy; Collapse of Gruening's scheme.

The article focuses on Ebenezer Smith Platt, a young British colonial, confined in London's infamous Newgate prison during 1777. On February 17, John Wilkes, the controversial politician, pamphleteer, and propagandist, rose to address the British House of Commons to illustrate the oppressive, unwarrantable and alienating effects of the proposed act on Americans by citing the case of Platt. Platt, whom Wilkes identified as an American merchant from Georgia, accused of treason, had allegedly been denied his basic judicial right to habeas corpus, and Wilkes intimated that the notoriety of this case was influencing the American commissioners in Paris to seek a French alliance. Ebenezer Smith Platt was possessed of a prominent family lineage--one that reached back to New England's first Puritan settlements. The travels of Ebenezer began during his Long Island boyhood. By the late 17605 Jonas Platt had taken his family to New York City, leaving his elderly father and half-brother Jeremiah to administer the family's extensive Suffolk County landholdings.

Studies in Australian history have lamentably neglected the military traditions of First Australians prior to European contact. This is due largely to a combination of academic and social bigotry, and loss of Indigenous knowledge after settlement. Thankfully, the situation is beginning to change, in no small part due to the growing literature surrounding the Frontier Wars of Australia. All aspects of Indigenous customs and norms are now beginning to receive a balanced analysis. Yet, very little has ever been written on the laws, customs and norms that regulated Indigenous Australian collective armed conflicts. This paper, co-written by a military legal practitioner and an ethno-historian, uses early accounts to reconstruct ten laws of war evidently recognized across much of pre-settlement Australia. The study is a preliminary one, aiming to stimulate further research and debate in this neglected field, which has only recently been explored in international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite a pervasive trend towards state retrenchment in Latin America since the 1980s, there remains significant variation in the levels of privatization across the region. However, very few cross-national studies of the determinants of privatization have been conducted and we still do not truly know why states privatize. This paper examines the determinants of privatization for 14 Latin American states over the period 1975 to 2003. I contend that privatization is best conceptualized as a two-stage process involving an initial decision to privatize, followed by a subsequent decision concerning the extent and intensity of privatization. In addition, privatization cannot be simply explained by either international or domestic level-variables. Rather, endogenous and exogenous variables will have different impacts at different stages of this process. The results of the statistical tests yield two important insights. Firstly, the initial decision to privatize is primarily shaped by international factors, in particular, international diffusion, while variation in the level of state divestiture across the region can primarily be explained by domestic economic and political conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Even after the Russo-Japanese War, Manchuria remained the powder keg of East Asia. In the war’s aftermath, three empires, the Qing, the Russian and the Japanese, stationed their troops in Manchuria, in a struggle for military supremacy there. There has already been a considerable amount of research on these military activities. However, previous works have not discussed them from a triangular relationship. This paper contends that the history of modern East Asia cannot be understood until one examines the shift in the military balance in Manchuria from a triangular comparative point of view. The results of such examination show that, in Manchuria, each empire was unable to establish military domination alone, and therefore needed an alliance partner. During the Xinhai Revolution, the Russia-Japan ‘alliance’ wielded overwhelming military power against China. However, after the Russian Revolution in 1917, Japan renounced cooperation with a weakened Russia and built a new partnership with China to advance the Siberian intervention. The military triangle of Russia, China and Japan was unable to create a comprehensive regional security system in Manchuria because what was established was based on mutual distrust and fear. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article represents the first attempt to examine the Chinese elite's threat perception of Japan using statistics to analyse what, if any, differences exist among the People's Liberation Army, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chinese economic institutes. It seeks to answer two questions that have not previously been addressed in the literature. First, has there been a change in perception of the Japanese threat in these three sectors over time? And if so, what can we deduce about the causes of this change? This study finds that there have indeed been two major shifts in China's threat perception of Japan since the 1980s, one in the late 1980s and the other in the mid-1990s. It also finds that there were no differences between sectors as to the direction and timing of these shifts. It suggests that Japan's military build-up in the late 1980s and the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance from 1996 onwards are what prompted these shifts in China's threat perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper draws on the recent experience of Kenya and Zimbabwe to demonstrate how power-sharing has played out in Africa. Although the two cases share some superficial similarities, variation in the strength and disposition of key veto players generated radically different contexts that shaped the feasibility and impact of unity government. Explaining the number and attitude of veto players requires a comparative analysis of the evolution of civil-military and intra-elite relations. In Zimbabwe, the exclusionary use of violence and rhetoric, together with the militarisation of politics, created far greater barriers to genuine power-sharing, resulting in the politics of continuity. These veto players were less significant in the Kenyan case, giving rise to a more cohesive outcome in the form of the politics of collusion. However, we find that neither mode of power-sharing creates the conditions for effective reform, which leads to a more general conclusion: unity government serves to postpone conflict, rather than to resolve it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The influx of Vietnamese refugees, "boat people," and immigrants into the United States after April 1975 has led to the establishment of a significant Vietnamese-American community. There is a body of literature written for children and young adults that creates and delineates this new community within the topography of a welcoming and immigrant-friendly USA. This paper will examine the meanings and implications of the appellation "Vietnamese-American" as defined within a body of nonfiction children's literature. It will highlight how these texts negotiate questions related to refugee status, immigration, identity and belonging, contributing in many instances to a bland re-creation of a formerly oppressed but now coherent and increasingly prosperous and Americanized people. The children's literature plays an important role in defining the relatively new community to itself and to mainstream America. In its dissemination of truisms about Confucian heritages and stereotypes of "model minorities" the literature reveals as much about American ideological desires as it does about "the new Americans." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historical studies of Burma-China relations have emphasised warfare, seen from the perspective of Chinese sources. One commonly studied event is the thirteenth-century Mongol invasion of Bagan. Burmese sources describe the flight of King Narathihapate (1257-87) from the Mongols, thus earning the Burmese epithet 'Taruppye'. 'Tarup' now refers to the Chinese, but the identities of the people and region to which the term applies have not been constant. This paper discusses the question of the identity of ' Tarup' in the Burmese chronicles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Benefit sharing as envisaged by the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is a relatively new idea in international law. Within the context of non-human biological resources, it aims to guarantee the conservation of biodiversity and its sustainable use by ensuring that its custodians are adequately rewarded for its preservation. Prior to the adoption of the CBD, access to biological resources was frequently regarded as a free-for-all. Bioprospectors were able to take resources out of their natural habitat and develop commercial products without sharing benefits with states or local communities. This paper asks how CBD-style benefit-sharing fits into debates of justice. It is argued that the CBD is an example of a set of social rules designed to increase social utility. It is also argued that a common heritage of humankind principle with inbuilt benefit-sharing mechanisms would be preferable to assigning bureaucratic property rights to non-human biological resources. However, as long as the international economic order is characterized by serious distributive injustices, as reflected in the enormous poverty-related death toll in developing countries, any morally acceptable means toward redressing the balance in favor of the disadvantaged has to be welcomed. By legislating for a system of justice-in-exchange covering nonhuman biological resources in preference to a free-for-all situation, the CBD provides a small step forward in redressing the distributive justice balance. It therefore presents just legislation sensitive to the international relations context in the 21st century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on powerful third parties whose interests in a conflict are closely aligned with a single disputant's interests. I show that such third-party bias reveals private information about an intervener's willingness to secure an agreement using force. When a highly biased power intervenes in a crisis, a peaceful settlement is likely because warring parties are certain the third party will enforce an agreement by military means. When an intervener shows less favoritism, negotiations tend to fail because the disputants doubt that it is committed to use force. Peace is again more likely when the third party is unbiased because such a party behaves as a mediator, seeking agreements both adversaries find acceptable. These findings, coupled with evidence from U.S. and British interventions in the Balkans, suggest a possible explanation for why major power intervention can bring about drastically different outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of China is seen by some observers as a precursor of inevitable hegemonic competition in East Asia. At the very least, it seems likely that China's influence in East Asia will grow at the expense of the United States. Whether this will eventually amount to a form of hegemonic transition is far less clear. It is, therefore, an opportune moment to consider the relative strengths and weaknesses of China and the US in East Asia. This paper suggests that the nature of hegemonic competition and transition is more uncertain and complex than some of the most influential theoretical understandings of hegemony would have us believe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 31 December 1989, a few weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall, President François Mitterrand of France called for the creation of a European confederation designed to associate all states of [the] continent in a common and permanent organisation for exchanges, peace and security. Yet less than eighteen months later the Confederation project, a major initiative for post-Yalta Europe, had collapsed. What were Mitterrand's objectives? What were the modalities of the project, and how was it conducted? And why did it fail in the end, after having raised much hope? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores when and why private communication works in crisis diplomacy. Conventional audience-cost models suggest that state leaders must go public with their threats in international crises because leaders cannot tie their hands if signals are issued privately. I present a crisis bargaining game where both the sender and the receiver of signals have a domestic audience. The equilibrium analysis demonstrates that a private threat, albeit of limited credibility, can be equally compelling as a fully credible public threat. The analysis suggests that secrecy works in crisis diplomacy despite its informational inefficacy. Secrecy insulates leaders from domestic political consequences when they capitulate to a challenge to avoid risking unwarranted war. The logic of efficient secrecy helps shed light on the unaccounted history of private diplomacy in international crises. The Alaska Boundary Dispute illustrates this logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article comments on the history of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service which led to the modernization of China. John King Fairbank guided research teams that co-edited two volumes of Robert Hart's letters from China to his London-based secretary James Campbell and the two volumes of Hart's journals. Hart was the Inspector General of the Maritime Customs Service. Hart was British and was the only non-Chinese director of a Chinese bureaucracy.

The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) annual Article IV consultation meetings and ensuing reports arc external assessments of member states' economics by highly regarded international economists, designed to ensure that member states conform to IMF-prescribed liberal economic standards. For non-borrowing advanced industrialized countries, like Canada, what is the perceived utility of these annual Article IV consultations? Constructivists suggest that the adept staff of international organizations (IO) teach state civil servants and officials how to better formulate sound policies. However, constructivists need to engage in further empirical study to back up their theoretical assumptions about IO teaching and state learning. Based on personal interviews with Department of Finance staff involved in Article IV consultations and on content analysis of IMF reports on Canada, this paper contributes an empirical study on whether the Fund staff "teaches" and Canada's finance department staff "learns" from the annual surveillance exercises. The findings of this paper suggest that although involved Canadian Finance personnel appreciate meeting with the Fund staff as an academic and intellectual exchange, the policy advice they receive in the Article IV consultations rarely, if ever, changes their economic analyses, because the Fund's advice tends to not be practical. Based on suggestions from Department of Finance staff, as well as IMF evaluations of its bilateral surveillance, this paper concludes with recommendations from the finance staff on how to improve on the utility of Article IV consultations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the implications of future predictions on security studies in Northeast Asia. A broad spectrum of possible futures has been identified for both the global political, economic and security order. A liberal modernist hypotheses was considered. The focus is on the virtuous triangle of democracy, economic interdependence and international organization as a source of peace.

This paper analyzes the conditions in which the governments of Argentina and Brazil founded security institutions in the early 1990s, while they were democratizing. It advances the hypothesis that international cooperation in the security field is often linked to the evolution of civil-military relations. Civilian leaders in both countries established institutions and sought international participation deliberately to achieve civilian control and gain leverage over the military establishment, which they sorely distrusted. The need to stabilize civil-military relations at home was therefore the prime motivating force behind the emergence of security institutions in the Southern Cone. Three mechanisms were at work: omnibalancing, policy handling, and managing uncertainty. These mechanisms are derived from three different schools of thought: realism, organizational-bureaucratic models, and theories of domestic political institutions. Besides explaining the sources of nuclear bilateral cooperation, this argument also serves as a critique of two prominent theories in international relations that attempt to explain cooperation and peaceful relations among democracies: neoliberal institutionalism and democratic peace theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent work across a wide range of issues in political economy as well as in American, comparative, and international politics tries to explain the inefficient use of power--revolution, civil wars, high levels of public debt, international conflict, and costly policy insulation--in terms of commitment problems. This paper shows that a common mechanism is at work in a number of these diverse studies. This common mechanism provides a more general formulation of a type of commitment problem that can arise in many different substantive settings. The present analysis then formalizes this mechanism as an "inefficiency condition" that ensures that all of the equilibria of a stochastic game are inefficient. This condition has a natural substantive interpretation: Large, rapid changes in the actors' relative power (measured in terms of their minmax payoffs) may cause inefficiency [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Provides information on the articles discussed in the periodical "The China Quarterly" from October-December 2003. Foreign relations; China's European Union policy paper; Economic affairs; Military affairs; Party and political affairs.

Over the past decade, the English School of International Relations (IR) has made a remarkable resurgence. Countless articles and papers have been written on the School. Some of these works have been critical, but most have applauded the School's efforts to provide a fruitful ‘middle way’ for IR theory, one that avoids the extremes of either an unnecessarily pessimistic realism or a naively optimistic idealism. At the heart of this via media is the idea that, in many periods of history, states exist within an international society of shared rules and norms that conditions their behaviour in ways that could not be predicted by looking at material power structures alone. I f the English School (ES) is correct that states often follow these rules and norms even when their power positions and security interests dictate alternative policies, then American realist theory – a theory that focuses on power and security drives as primary causal forces in global politics – has been dealt a potentially serious blow. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The J. David Greenstone Book Prize for the best book in politics and history published in 1998 was presented to Peter Trubowitz of the University of Texas for his book, [...]

Examines China's foreign policy towards Indochina during the second world war and its implications on its emergence as a superpower in Asia. Adoption of a wartime diplomacy; Exploration of post-war commercial and political opportunities in Indochina; Questions on the post-war role of China in world politics.

Increasingly, International Relations (IR) theorists are drawing inspiration from a broad range of theorists outside the discipline. One thinks of the introduction of Antonio Gramsci's writings to IR theorists by Robert Cox, for example, and the 'school' that has developed in its wake. Similarly, the works of Anthony Giddens, Michel Foucault, and Jurgen Habermas are all relatively familiar to most IR theorists not because of their writings on world politics per se, but because they were imported into the field by roving theorists. Many others of varying success could be cited as well. Such cross-disciplinary excursions are important because they inject vitality into a field that--in the opinion of some at least--is in need of rejuvenation in the face of contemporary changes. In this paper, I elaborate on the work of the Canadian communications theorist Harold Innis, situating his work within contemporary IR theory while underlining his historicism, holism, and attention to time-space biases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Four recent books, taken together, offer a wealth of important insights on how we might effectively tackle corruption. All of the books’ authors agree that there is something akin to a universal understanding of what corruption is, and all dispute the idea that corruption may simply be in the eye of the beholder. However, there are also sharp disagreements—for example over whether corruption is best eliminated from the top down, or whether bottom-up approaches are more effective. If the books share one weakness, it is that they do not sufficiently emphasize the importance of getting people to believe and feel that they have fair opportunities for good lives, even after institutional and legal reforms are made. Tackling corruption involves taking seriously the substantive link between actual fair treatment and the belief that fair treatment prevails. This will require further research examining how to shift and update people’s deeply held sentiments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the relationship between statehood and the international system, with particular reference to the states of sub-Saharan Africa. It suggests, as the title implies, that statehood should be regarded as a relative concept; and that rather than distinguish sharply between entities that are, and are not, states, we should regard different entities as meeting the criteria for international statehood to a greater or lesser degree. Entities which we have been accustomed to regard as states, at least for the purposes of studying them in international relations, sometimes fail to exercise even the minimal responsibilities associated with state power, while those who control them do not behave in the way that is normally ascribed to the 'rulers' of states. Entities that are not accorded the status of states, such as guerrilla insurgencies or even voluntary organizations, may take on attributes that have customarily been associated with sovereign statehood. This conclusion carries at least a salutary warning against too readily ascribing the supposedly universal characteristics of states to peripheral areas of the modern global system,; in which the categories in which we are accustomed to regard international politics have become blurred. More broadly, given the peculiar and privileged position of states in the conventional analysis of international relations, it may carry significant implications for the idea of international relations itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the Sino-Japanese relationship, which is one of the keys to understanding contemporary changes in international relations. Highlights reviews by Nish and Iriye of the pre- and post-Second World War relations; The economic dimensions of the relationship as explored by Yokoi and Howe.

The article focuses on the changes surrounding the Great Britain Foreign Office. Sir Edward Grey replaced Lord Lansdowne as head of the Foreign Office in December 1905. One member of a Liberal cabinet headed by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was appointed as new foreign secretary of the office. According to the author, the new government and the new foreign secretary provide an opportunity of distinguishing the making and administration of foreign policy under two successive heads.

Discusses the aftermath of the speech delivered by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt on October 5, 1937 which called for a quarantine of aggressor nations. Opposition of isolationists on the international policy declared by the president; Determination of Roosevelt to implement his policy according to Jules Henry, the French Chargé d'Affaires in Washington; Intention of the president to persuade the world to support his quarantine speech as reflected from the instruction he gave to Norman Davis, the U.S. delegate to the Nine Power Conference in Brussels, Belgium.

Malicious cyber activities are on the rise. States and other relevant actors need to constantly adapt to the evolving cyber threat landscape, including by setting up effective deterrence mechanisms. This is what the European Union (EU) has done through the adoption of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Decision 2019/797, which allows it to impose targeted sanctions to deter and respond to cyberattacks that constitute an external threat to the EU or its member states. However, in contrast to other horizontal regimes of restrictive measures in force within the EU, foreign governments are not included as potential targets of cyber sanctions. Moreover, the recital of the Decision specifies that the adoption of restrictive measures does not involve attribution of international responsibility for cyber-attacks to a third State. This article aims at identifying the rationale behind the inclusion of these distinctive features. It starts by considering the legal uncertainty that surrounds attribution of international responsibility for cyber operations. Next, it explains why the EU is not well placed to invoke third-State responsibility, and the reasons behind its reluctance to do so. It will then illustrate the risks inherent in the lack of a clear legal framework to attribute the responsibility of cyber-attacks to third countries. This may have serious consequences in terms of legal certainty when a cyber-attack amounts to a breach of the prohibition on the use of force in international relations. Then, we explore recent developments in EU legislation in the area of cyber security and the possibility to strenghten the powers of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). We draw two conclusions: first, the Union might develop the capacity to attribute cyber attacks to specific actors and there is an interest to do so. However, Member States are probably still reticent to take this step. Two, despite the advantages of establishing a reliable attribution mechanisms, it is submitted that the majority of States prefers to take advantage of a regulative gap that allows them to react to cyber incidents as they see fit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scott Sagan asked me to revisit Nuclear Ethics , a book I published in 1986, in light of current developments in world affairs. In doing so, I found that much had changed but the basic usability paradox of nuclear deterrence remains the same. As do the ethical dilemmas. To deter, there must be some prospect of use, but easy usability could produce highly immoral consequences. Some risk is unavoidable and the moral task is how best to lower it. Nuclear weapons pose moral problems but nuclear use is the greater evil. Abolition may be a worthy long-term goal, but it is unlikely in the short-term relations among the nine states now possessing nuclear weapons. Drawing on just war theory, I examine the three dimensions of intentions, means, and consequences to outline a ten-point agenda for just deterrence that seeks to lower risks of nuclear war. The world has changed since the book was published but the basic moral dilemmas remain the same. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]