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In a recent paper Winsberg (2021) argued in favor of research into geoengineering by relying on Good's theorem, which states that conducting research maximizes one's expected utility. However, this result sometimes fails for risk-avoidant agents (Buchak 2010). Since risk avoidance captures some of the "precautionary" intuitions that critics of geoengineering share, it is important to see if geoengineering research would maximize one's utility if risk avoidance is taken into account. I show that under some conditions conducting geoengineering research would not maximize risk-weighted expected utility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Risk attitudes implied by valuations of risk-increasing assets depart markedly from those implied by valuations of riskreducing assets. For instance, many are unwilling to pay the expected value for a risky asset or for its perfect hedge. Although nearly every theory of risk preference (and logic) demands a negative correlation between valuations of bets and hedges, we observe positive correlations. This inconsistency is difficult to expunge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The body of literature on the relationship between risk aversion and wealth is extensive. However, little attention has been given to examining how future realizations of wealth might affect (current) risk decisions. Using paired lottery choice experiments and exposing subjects experimentally to imagined future wealth frames, I find that individuals are more risk-seeking if they are asked to imagine that they will be wealthy in the future. Yet I find that individuals are not significantly more risk-averse if they are asked to imagine that they will be poor in the future. I discuss theoretical and policy implications of these findings, including why savings rates are so low in the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The expected utility framework developed in The War Trap is revised to correct several deficiencies. Risk-taking orientations are now treated as an integral part of the model by introducing concavity or convexity into the utility functions. The zero-sum properties of the theory are largely eliminated, and the tendency toward interpersonal comparisons of utility is removed. Several earlier results are replicated with the new model, and with annual capabilities data. New propositions are deduced that identify important limitations on conflict initiation, and relationships resulting from differences in perceptions are tested. Support is found for the contention that the revised version of the theory, of which the original model is a special case, is a powerful tool for integrating many extant hypotheses about conflict and for explaining a substantial portion of the tendency for some threats to escalate to violence or warfare and for others to be resolved peacefully. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]