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The legal evidentiary approach to "solving" statelessness can sometimes lead to the issue being framed in terms of certain groups of people not meeting objective citizenship criteria or lacking required legal documents. Building on critical interdisciplinary scholarship in anthropology, history and legal studies, this article demonstrates the "constructedness" of citizenship and statelessness through the lens of the politics of recognition and documentation. Using Thailand as a case study, I highlight how global economic, political and social contexts play a significant and dynamic role in delineating the legal line of membership. By tracing how Thai nationality has been instrumentalised by the state throughout the twentieth century, this article contextualises statelessness as a legal and social by-product of statemaking. As such, it challenges the framing of nationality as a non-discriminatory mode of recognition founded in legal objectivity and reiterates the politics of statelessness. In emphasising the fragility of citizenship when granted without genuine social, political and moral recognition, I argue that the objective of statelessness advocacy should not simply be about turning stateless persons into citizens, but rather about creating a more equitable society wherein one's rights are upheld regardless of legal status. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Natural language processing (NLP) technologies and applications in legal text processing are gaining momentum. Being one of the most prominent tasks in NLP, named-entity recognition (NER) can substantiate a great convenience for NLP in law due to the variety of named entities in the legal domain and their accentuated importance in legal documents. However, domain-specific NER models in the legal domain are not well studied. We present a NER model for Turkish legal texts with a custom-made corpus as well as several NER architectures based on conditional random fields and bidirectional long-short-term memories (BiLSTMs) to address the task. We also study several combinations of different word embeddings consisting of GloVe, Morph2Vec, and neural network-based character feature extraction techniques either with BiLSTM or convolutional neural networks. We report 92.27% F1 score with a hybrid word representation of GloVe and Morph2Vec with character-level features extracted with BiLSTM. Being an agglutinative language, the morphological structure of Turkish is also considered. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first legal domain-specific NER study in Turkish and also the first study for an agglutinative language in the legal domain. Thus, our work can also have implications beyond the Turkish language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Abkhaz State University (ASU) is internationally isolated, despite its cooperation with universities in Russia. Georgia combines its refusal to recognize Abkhaz statehood with a policy of nonrecognition of its university, which sets the direction for other countries. But the Abkhaz policies of nonrecognition are also to be taken into account. Abkhazia opposes any form of internationalization of the ASU generating closer ties with Georgia. The article examines how the Georgian and Abkhaz policies of nonrecognition hamper the internationalization of the ASU within the European educational space. It explores a conflict on recognition and nonrecognition of status and identity, where status does not refer exclusively to statehood. In the field of higher education, European integration involves a large number of state and nonstate actors in 49 countries and a wide variety of forms of recognition and nonrecognition, ranging from the certification of individual qualifications and the publication of lists of unrecognized universities, to the setting up of joint educational programs. This integration process is largely state driven but based on the principle of the institutional autonomy of universities. Using the ASU as a case study, the way that policies on nonrecognition affect status in the field of higher education is examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human rights instruments are but one of many legal advocacy tools used by trans people. Recent legal scholarship emphasizes that human rights laws are not sufficient to address legal challenges facing trans people, particularly intersectional and systemic barriers. This article looks to Canadian trans case law outside of human rights law to reveal the many instances in which trans people's fight for legal recognition and redress occur outside of the human rights arena. It focuses on trans case law in three areas: family law, the use of name and gender in court, and access to social benefits. Canadian trans jurisprudence illustrates that not only are trans legal strategies outside of human rights plentiful and effective, they are also imperative. An agile and pragmatic approach to trans rights is necessary, particularly when minority rights are under threat, and for trans people on the margins of trans law reforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last decades, various groups seeking international legal recognition of new human rights claims have succeeded in their endeavors. Some movements have crafted such convincing demands that their participation has even become an implicit condition of the legitimacy of the resulting human rights documents. But what are the bases of claims for new human rights, and how do they help to confront the argument that human rights' expansion also entails their dilution? This Article explores narratives based on two different concepts, namely the political-science concept of affectedness and the legal-ethical concept of vulnerability. It does so by drawing on the process for the recognition of peasant human rights at the United Nations. The Article explores what it understands as the peasant critique of existing human rights by looking at the differences and interrelations between affectedness and vulnerability-based argumentation. It argues that an approach premised purely on affectedness, and thus focused on participation, is less empowering than one that includes a regard for vulnerability, which serves as a heuristic device for identifying and challenging inequalities, demands substantive outcomes, and can serve to craft a convincing theoretical account of human rights protections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses how and why Indian groups use law strategically to advocate for U.S. federal recognition in 1977-2012. It discusses the elements of the legal framework governing these groups including the recognition of inherent governmental authority possessed by Indian tribes, federally protected lands for these tribes, and special federal powers over them and their citizens. It also discusses the circumstances in which these groups developed different strategies for recognition.

According to the recognition heuristic (RH), for decision domains where recognition is a valid predictor of a choice criterion, recognition alone is used to make inferences whenever one object is recognized and the other is not, irrespective of further knowledge. Erdfelder, Küpper-Tetzel, and Mattern (2011) questioned whether the recognition judgment itself affects decisions or rather the memory strength underlying it. Specifically, they proposed to extend the RH to the memory state heuristic (MSH), which assumes a third memory state of uncertainty in addition to recognition certainty and rejection certainty. While the MSH already gathered significant support, one of its basic and more counterintuitive predictions has not been tested so far: In guessing pairs (none of the objects recognized), the object more slowly judged as unrecognized should be preferred, since it is more likely to be in a higher memory state. In this paper, we test this prediction along with other recognition latency predictions of the MSH, thereby adding to the body of research supporting the MSH. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article examines the desirability of the universal recognition of the right of public access to legal information as a human right and therefore as part of a legal framework for improving national and global access to legal information. It discusses the right of public access to legal information as a legal right and the importance of its international human rights framework. The Article argues that every person has the right of public access to legal information, which casts a legal and moral duty on every government and every intergovernmental organization (IGO) with judicial and legislative functions to provide adequate and free access to its laws and law-related publications. It argues further that every government can afford the provision of adequate public access to its legal information and that the lack of political will to do so is the preeminent factor responsible for inadequate--and in some cases extremely poor--public access. Additionally, this Article advocates the universal recognition of the right of public access to legal information as a human right and makes a proposal for a UN Convention on the Right of Public Access to Legal Information. It provides the essential contents of the proposed UN Convention which incorporate The Hague Conference Guiding Principles to be Considered in Developing a Future Instrument. These contents provide valuable input for urgent interim national and regional laws and policies on public access to legal information, pending the Convention's entry into force. The proposed UN Convention will significantly enhance global access to official legal information that will promote widespread knowledge of the law. It will also facilitate national and transnational legal research and remedy the chronic injustice from liability under inaccessible laws under the doctrine of "ignorance of the law is no excuse"-- which is similar to liability under ex post facto and nonexistent laws--and promote the proposed doctrine of "ignorance of inaccessible law is an excuse". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Legality Scott Shapiro seeks to provide the motivation for the development of his own elaborate account of law by undertaking a critique of H.L.A. Hart's jurisprudential theory. Hart maintained that every legal system is underlain by a rule of recognition through which officials of the system identify the norms that belong to the system as laws. Shapiro argues that Hart's remarks on the rule of recognition are confused and that his model of law—though commendably more sophisticated than any model propounded by earlier legal positivists—is consequently untenable. Shapiro contends that a new approach is vital for progress in the philosophy of law and, with his lengthy presentation of his own Planning Theory of Law, he aspires to pioneer just such an approach. Except for a very terse observation in the final main section, this article does not directly assess the strengths and shortcomings of Shapiro's piquant planning theory. Instead, I defend Hart against Shapiro's charges and thereby undermine the motivation for the development of the planning theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1980s extra-parliamentary social movements and critical theories of race, class, and gender added a new sociocultural understanding of justice- recognition- to the much older socioeconomic one. The best-known form of the struggle for recognition is the identity politics of disadvantaged groups. I argue that there is still another option to conceptualize their predicament, neglected in recent political philosophy, which understands exclusion not in terms of injustice, more particularly a lack of sociocultural recognition, but in terms of a lack of freedom. I draw my inspiration from Hannah Arendt's model of political action. Arendt diagnoses exclusion not solely as a mode of injustice, but as a lack of participation and public freedom. Consequently, she advocates a struggle for participation, political equality, and freedom as a strategy for emancipation or empowerment. Arendt could help feminists see that collective empowerment is made possible not by a shared identity (the target of poststructuralist critics) but by common action in the service of a particular worldly issue or common end. In other words, feminists would do well to appreciate the revolutionary quality and heritage of the feminist movement better, that is, its character as a set of practices of freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]