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Adolescents' sense of self has important implications for their mental health. Despite more than two decades of work, scholars have yet to amass evidence across studies to elucidate the role of selfhood in the mental health of adolescents. Underpinned by the conceptual model of selfhood, this meta-analytic review investigated the strength of associations of different facets of selfhood and their associated traits with depression and anxiety, moderating factors that attenuate or exacerbate these associations, and their causal influences. Using mixed-effects modeling, which included 558 effect sizes from 298 studies and 274 370 adolescents from 39 countries, our findings revealed that adolescents' self-esteem/self-concept [ r = −0.518, p < 0.0001; (95% CI −0.49 to −0.547)] and self-compassion [ r = −0.455, p < 0.0001; (95% CI −0.568 to −0.343)] demonstrating largest effect sizes in their associations with depression. Self-esteem/self-concept, self-compassion, self-awareness, self-efficacy, and self-regulation had similar moderate negative associations with anxiety. Meta-regressions revealed that adolescent age and type of informants (parents v. adolescents) were important moderators. Findings on causal influences indicated bidirectional causations, particularly low self-esteem/self-concept, self-awareness and self-efficacy drive higher depression and vice-versa. In contrast, the different self traits did not demonstrate specific causal direction with anxiety. These results pinpoint self traits that are pivotal in relating to adolescent mental health functioning. We discussed the theoretical implications of our findings in terms of how they advance theory of selfhood for adolescent mental health, and the practical implications of building selfhood as cultivating psychological skills for mental health. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social psychology findings have fared poorly in multi-site replication attempts. This article considers and evaluates multiple factors that may contribute to such failures, other than the "crisis" assumption that most of the field's published research is so badly flawed that it should be dismissed wholesale. Low engagement by participants may reduce replicability of some findings (while not affecting certain others). Incentives differ between original researchers and replicators. If multi-site replications are indeed biased toward failure, this may have a damaging effect on the field's ability to build correct theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thought uses meaning but not necessarily language. Meaning, in the form of a set of possible concepts and ideas, is a nonphysical reality that lay waiting for brains to become smart enough to represent these ideas. Thus, the brain evolved, whereas meaning was discovered, and language was invented--collectively--as a tool to help file brain use meaning.

Self-protection can have psychological and behavioral implications. We contrast them with the implications of a self-enhancement strategy. Both self-enhancement and self-protection have costs and benefits as survival strategies, and we identify some of the emotional, cognitive, and behavioral tradeoffs associated with the differential preferences for each strategy. New analyses on a large existing data set confirm the target article's hypothesis that women are more attuned than men to potential negative consequences of innovations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can self-deception avoid intention and conscious recognition? Nine processes of self-deception seem to involve biased links between plausible ideas. These processes allow self-deceivers to regard individual conclusions as fair and reasonable. Bias is only detected by comparing broad patterns, which individual self-deceivers will not do.

Transcendence, defined as the capacity to perceive the immediate stimulus environment in relation to long-range or abstract concerns, is a key aspect of self-control, and indeed self-regulation often breaks down because attention becomes focused exclusively on the immediate stimuli (i.e., transcendence fails). Factors that restrict attention to the here and now will weaken self-control, whereas factors that promote transcendence wild enhance it. Guilt may be one example of the latter.

Tomasello argues that humans' sense of moral obligation emerges early in development, relies on a shared "we," and serves as the foundation of cooperation. This perspective complements our theoretical view of the human self as information agent. The shared "we" promotes not only proximal cooperative goals but also distal ones via the construction of shared understanding – it promotes culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The selfish goal, at some point in evolution, gave rise to a selfish self. In humans, this selfish self might exert influence over goals, deciding upon which to execute and which to inhibit. This, in fact, may be one of the chief functions of the self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Psychologists debate whether consciousness or unconsciousness is most central to human behavior. Our goal, instead, is to figure out how they work together. Conscious processes are partly produced by unconscious processes, and much information processing occurs outside of awareness. Yet, consciousness has advantages that the unconscious does not. We discuss how consciousness causes behavior, drawing conclusions from large-scale literature reviews. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Any evolved disposition for fairness and cooperation would not replace but merely compete widr selfish and other antisocial impulses. Therefore, we propose that human cooperation and fairness depend on self-regulation. Evidence shows reductions in fairness and other prosocial tendencies when self-regulation fails. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As Norenzayan et al. cogently argue, religions that proliferated most successfully did so because they facilitated prosociality and cooperation in large-scale, anonymous groups. One important way that religion promotes cooperation may be through improving self-control. In this comment, we cover some potential obstacles to implementing self-control and how religion can overcome them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Van de Vliert's findings fit nicely with our recent arguments implying that (1) differentiated selfhood is partly motivated by requirements of cultural groups, and (2) free will mainly exists within culture. Some cultural groups promote individual freedom, whereas others constrict it so as to maintain elites' power and privilege. Thus, freedom is, to a great extent, a creation of culture. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Our recent work suggests that (1) the purpose of human conscious thought is participation in social and cultural groups, and (2) logical reasoning depends on conscious thought. These mesh well with the argument theory of reasoning. In broader context, the distinctively human traits are adaptations for culture and inner processes serve interpersonal functions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]