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The European Union (EU) increasingly develops and implements policies infused with salient and sometimes conflicting values – for instance, in migration and criminal law cooperation. However, policy implementation studies have not frequently considered how such complex value trade-offs may affect practical implementation within Member States. This article therefore quantitatively and temporally examines the practical implementation of an EU flagship criminal law measure: the simplified extradition system known as the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). Using data on EAWs decided upon by the Dutch Amsterdam District Court, we test the impact of value trade-offs by examining whether (newly introduced) safeguards for the protection of requested persons adversely affect system efficiency (measured through case turnover times). The results suggest that the design of legal tests and adjustments made to the EAW system over time through the Court of Justice of the European Union affect the balance between fundamental rights protection and efficiency in the practical implementation of the EAW. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

No cooperative scheme in EU law has displayed bigger tensions between mutual trust and fundamental rights protection than the EAW system. Despite the requirement developed by the CJEU for national courts to trust each other and recognise each other’s arrest warrants, the reality on the ground has shown high levels of distrust between national courts regarding Member States’ alignment with core EU values. In this contribution, we analyze how the CJEU has managed such tensions in the EAW system. To that effect, we first put the Court’s EAW case law into context by examining the broader language of mutual trust used by the Court in other fields of EU law. In doing so, we point out how the Court has espoused different levels of lawful distrust to be exercised in different circumstances under the scope of application of mutual trust. Given that broader context, it is contradictory for the Court to mainly view mutual trust as a requirement rather than a reality in need of permanent and continuing justification between national authorities. The latter conception of mutual trust is more apt to be the basis of EU horizontal cooperation, which must be value-based and sincere according to the Treaties. Therefore, we propose a bidimensional account of mutual trust as a legal principle, one that accommodates both trust and distrust as tools for managing the uncertainty and dynamic nature of trust-based cooperation. Finally, we explore how such account of mutual (dis)trust can be concretised by the Court and other political institutions.

No cooperative scheme in EU law has displayed bigger tensions between mutual trust and fundamental rights protection than the EAW system. Despite the requirement developed by the CJEU for national courts to trust each other and recognise each other's arrest warrants, the reality on the ground has shown high levels of distrust between national courts regarding Member States' alignment with core EU values. In this contribution, we analyze how the CJEU has managed such tensions in the EAW system. To that effect, we first put the Court's EAW case law into context by examining the broader language of mutual trust used by the Court in other fields of EU law. In doing so, we point out how the Court has espoused different levels of lawful distrust to be exercised in different circumstances under the scope of application of mutual trust. Given that broader context, it is contradictory for the Court to mainly view mutual trust as a requirement rather than a reality in need of permanent and continuing justification between national authorities. The latter conception of mutual trust is more apt to be the basis of EU horizontal cooperation, which must be value-based and sincere according to the Treaties. Therefore, we propose a bidimensional account of mutual trust as a legal principle, one that accommodates both trust and distrust as tools for managing the uncertainty and dynamic nature of trust-based cooperation. Finally, we explore how such account of mutual (dis)trust can be concretised by the Court and other political institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the role for systemic and particular deficiencies in EU criminal law. It does so by analyzing in depth that law as regards the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), but also across measures of EU criminal law that have not yet been explored under this light. While the attention of the literature has been mainly on the EAW and the way those deficiencies can led to refusing the execution of the warrant, a wider assessment reveals the existence of a latent law of the systemic and the particular in this field. The conclusions reveal that the understanding and application of systemic and particular deficiencies in EU criminal law have significant implications in terms of the principle of mutual trust and the complex interaction between different EU values.

The article discusses the role for systemic and particular deficiencies in EU criminal law. It does so by analyzing in depth that law as regards the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), but also across measures of EU criminal law that have not yet been explored under this light. While the attention of the literature has been mainly on the EAW and the way those deficiencies can led to refusing the execution of the warrant, a wider assessment reveals the existence of a latent law of the systemic and the particular in this field. The conclusions reveal that the understanding and application of systemic and particular deficiencies in EU criminal law have significant implications in terms of the principle of mutual trust and the complex interaction between different EU values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The judgment rendered by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on May 27, 2019, deemed Germany's prosecution service (Staatsanwaltschaft) legally incompetent for the purpose of issuing European arrest warrants (EAW) due to its lack of institutional independence. As a consequence, the question of how the German criminal prosecution system differs from the approaches taken by other European countries issuing European arrest warrants arises and raises the question of whether the German prosecution service truly is insufficiently independent in this respect. Debates amongst legal scholars have ensued in the wake of the CJEU's judgment—the Court not yet having proffered any solutions regarding the re-establishment of the institutional independence—and this article shall discuss the lack of independence and acquaint the reader with possible solutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contrast to traditional extradition law, the political offense exemption has been abolished within the framework of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). Notwithstanding its overall success, the EAW does not constitute an adequate instrument with regard to political offenses. In light of the recent case of the former Catalan President, Carles Puigdemont, the abolition has proven to be too hasty and the justificatory force behind the principles of mutual trust and recognition is, with respect hereto, rather limited. The damage caused to these principles by upholding the exemption would be negligible, given the small number of cases—Puigdemont being the first political offender requested under the aegis of the EAW. However, the potential benefits are substantial, given that the exemption provides for a higher level of human rights protection—analogous to the values of European Union (EU). Solely relying on the double criminality requirement in order to properly take into account the specificities of the Member States' legal systems essentially positions the judges at the forefront of where mutual trust and constitutional identity collide. Moreover, the exemption prevents states from intervening in other states' internal political conflicts, through the medium of criminal law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Keywords: EU criminal law; Fundamental rights; European Arrest Warrant; Court of JusticeThe author's name was incorrectly spelled in the article as originally published (Leandro Macano). This has been corrected to Leandro Mancano in the HTML and PDF versions of the article.We apologise to the author for the error and publish this notice for the scholarly record.By Leandro MancanoReported by Author [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses the case referred by the Spanish Constitutional Court on the execution of an European arrest warrant (EAW) to the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ). It says that the EAW focuses on the content of the preliminary reference and its implications for the interaction in the legal systems protecting rights in Europe and between the Spanish Constitutional Court and ECJ. It adds that the case's background will be set out, in which preliminary reference will be examined.