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Offering a re-evaluation of all the available evidence, including passages from Aristotle's Rhetoric, Poetics and Sophistici Elenchi, Diogenes Laertius' biographical sketch as well as the grammar scene in Aristophanes' Clouds, this article argues that Protagoras' engagement with grammatical questions must have been more sophisticated and thorough than is often assumed. In Protagoras' discovery of grammatical gender, formal considerations – most likely inspired by the analysis of personal names – played a more fundamental role than semantic ones, and his typology of πυθμένες λόγων equally presupposes the formal recognition of at least verbal mood, if not also tense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author replies to comments on his book "Sophistry & Political Philosophy: Protagoras' Challenge to Socrates." Topics discussed include Greek philosopher Plato's perception of fellow philosopher Protagoras, the hedonism of Protagoras and his challenge to Socrates, and the relations between Plato's dialogues "Protagoras" and "Theaetetus."

This article seeks to present a detailed textual analysis of Protagoras’ Great Speech in Plato's Protagoras (320c–328d). I will argue that the concept of ἀρετή (‘excellence’ or ‘virtue’) as it appears in the Great Speech is whittled down to a vague notion of civic duty. In this respect, Protagoras is bringing himself in line with the democracy, but in doing so the ἀρετή he claims to teach loses much of its initial appeal, particularly in the eyes of his aristocratic clientele. Nevertheless, if the content of Protagoras’ Great Speech overlooks the abilities required to rise to political prominence, the form most assuredly does not. As one would expect from Plato's Protagoras, his speech is replete with just that oratorical prowess his students might expect to acquire from him. This, in turn, has a number of interesting and important implications in the broader context of the Protagoras, in particular regarding the contrast or conflict between long speeches and short-answer dialectic. Moreover, although it has long been noticed that Protagoras neglects rhetoric and personal pre-eminence in his account, as far as I know there has not been any serious attempt to analyse the stylistic aspects of this masterful speech. Accordingly, both this and (to a large extent) my attempt to interpret it within the economy of the dialogue are original. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Protagoras and his pupil Euthalos argued against one another in paradoxical fashion regarding the fulfilment of a contract. Protagoras was a Sophist, the first European inventors of logical puzzles who also argued that there cannot be false thinking. A paradox, however, does not say anything, and there is no solution to the question as to who is right in the exchange between Protagoras and Euthalos. On the other hand there is a real question as to how it is that a false proposition makes sense, and the Sophists were right in as much as a false proposition, while it does say something does not, being believed, tell its believer anything. The exclusion of paradoxical propositions is not to be achieved, as Russell supposed, by applying some general principle; rather matters need arguing through in particular cases as they arise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For Socrates, the virtues are a kind of knowledge, and the virtues form a unity. Sometimes, Socrates suggests that the virtues are all ‘one and the same’ thing. Other times, he suggests they are ‘parts of a single whole.’ I argue that (i) the ‘what is x?’ question is sophisticated, it gives rise to two distinct kinds of investigations into virtue, a conceptual investigation into theousiaand a psychological investigation into thedunamis, (ii) Plato recognized the difference between definitional accounts of theousiaand a psychological accounts of thedunamis, and (iii) the distinction between these two investigations can effectively resolve various interpretive puzzles regarding the unity of the virtues. It is argued that the virtues are ‘one and the same’ psychologically, while they are ‘parts of a single whole’ conceptually. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article interprets courage and knowledge at "Protagoras 349E1-351B2." Socrates argued for the identity of courage and knowledge and Protagoras objects to Socrates' argument. Protagoras suggests a good reason to believe that Socrates' argument fails to identify courage and knowledge. This also explains Socrates' development of a second argument for the identity of courage and knowledge.

Examines verses 173b17 to 22 of "Sophistici Elenchi" be Aristotle, which has become a well-known and bewildering statement of Protagoras about solecism. Grammatical point made by Protagoras and explanation on his statement on gender; Argument by Aristotle in his description of tactics employed in argumentation that causing one to commit solecism entails making his speak grammatically.

Argues whether or not Protagoras contradicts himself in his beliefs. Protagoras' three alternatives; Further analysis of Protagoras' beliefs.