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In his early novels, the Icelandic Nobel laureate Halldór Laxness portrayed troubled individuals beset by familial, societal and economic challenges within an unpredictable and often unforgiving landscape; his later work addressed humanistic concerns regarding a well-lived life and the harmony of individual and environment. His 1957 novel The Fish Can Sing lies at the cusp of these preoccupations. Laxness contrasts the economic privations experienced by hard-pressed Icelanders with the ostentatious displays of their Danish colonial overloads; he also portrays individuals afflicted by psychosis, alcohol use disorders and medically unexplained physical symptoms, and delineates the path towards a 'celebrity' suicide. The novel warns against self-deceptive vanity and community-endorsed illusions, and celebrates the persistent benefits of nurturing relationships, all within a lyric contemplation of individual adaptive resilience and quotidian domestic pleasures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses governmental interference with the people's freedom of association. It is said that people have the freedom to enter into relationships with whom they prefer, as well as the freedom to refuse to associate. However, the government may abridge this freedom by preventing them from associating with whom they choose to associate, or by forcing them to associate with whom they would rather not associate. These reasons include the implementation of antidiscrimination laws, paternalism or forcing associations which will be beneficial to flourishing and preventing those which will be destructive; and legal moralism.

SummaryIn recent years, sex differences in mortality have followed diverse patterns of change in developed countries. As there is no analogous evidence from Poland, the aim of this study was to describe the pattern of change in excess male mortality among Polish inhabitants aged 35?64 during 1995?2002, when the major socioeconomic transformation occurred, and compare it with sex differences in mortality observed in the late 1980s. During the study period, excess male mortality decreased significantly, independently of age and educational level. The reduction in mortality was observed in both sexes, but its magnitude was greater in men. These changes resulted mainly from a reduction in mortality rates due to cardiovascular disease and lung cancer in males and a concomitant increase in mortality rates due to lung cancer and suicides in females. Although, in general, excess male mortality decreased, social gradients related to this phenomenon increased. Subjects (in particularly men) who had graduated from university benefited the most, their magnitude of reduction in mortality rates being the greatest. Changes in social environment during the transformation period in Poland are suggested as major determinants of these changes, but further studies are needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

American social scientists rarely ever use evolutionary concepts to explain behavior, despite the potential of such concepts to elucidate major social problems. I argue that this observation can be understood as the product of three influences: an ideologically narrowed political liberalism; a fear of ‘Social Darwinism’ as a scientific idea, rather than a scientific apostasy; and a widely believed criticism of evolutionary thinking as deterministic, reductionistic, and Panglossian. I ask what is to be done to encourage social scientists to learn and to apply evolutionary lessons. I answer with four solutions. First, evolutionary social scientists should more effectively educate their non-evolutionary students and colleagues. Second, they should publicize, even popularize, accessible refutations of perennially misleading criticisms. Third, they should more credibly assure skeptics that evolutionary theory not only keeps the ‘social’ in social science but better explains social behavior than can any individual-level theory, such as rational-choice theory. Fourth, they should recall that biology took generations to become Darwinian, and they must understand that the social sciences may take as long to become evolutionary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theme of strong and weak states has recently figured largely in comparative political economy. However, significant variation across sectors in single countries in the degree to which the state is able and willing to intervene in the economy has led to calls for a disaggregated view of the state, with more attention devoted to the different levels - micro, meso, macro - at which the state confronts the economy. The concepts of strength and weakness must pay much greater attention to specific bureaucratic arrangements and the relationships with key societal actors which, in company with bureaucratic agencies, form the core of 'policy networks' at the sectoral level. The article uses the concepts of state capacity and societal mobilization to identify six ideal typical policy networks at the sectoral level. It elaborates on the organizational logic associated with these policy networks by examining them in conjunction with industrial policy. After distinguishing between two approaches to industrial policy - anticipatory and reactive - it shows how different policy networks emerge to support alternative approaches and how a disjunction between networks and approaches can produce policy failure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an analysis of progress in American history on the point of view of a realist. In stating the realistic ratings of the past the pragmatist confuses progress with the person who makes progress. Man himself has been constant throughout the known history of his material progress and has been returned due to the temporary unfitness to keep spiritual progress equal to the mechanical improvement.

A 121-nation study of societal collectivism and a 174-nation study of political autocracy show that parasitic stress does not account for any variation in these components of culture once the interactive impacts of climatic demands and income resources have been accounted for. Climato-economic livability is a viable rival explanation for the reported effects of parasitic stress on culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The hypothesis that high levels of religiosity are partly caused by high disease loads is in accord with studies showing that societal dysfunction promotes mass supernaturalism. However, some cultures suffering from high rates of disease and other socioeconomic dysfunction exhibit low levels of popular religiosity. At this point, it appears that religion is hard pressed to thrive in healthy societies, but poor conditions do not always make religion popular, either. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]