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We investigate the impact of a 2005 policy that provided more generous terms for delaying state pensions in the United Kingdom. First, we find that the policy reduced the fraction of males and possibly females receiving pensions at the earliest eligibility age and shortly thereafter. This shift affected cohorts who became eligible for state pensions at or after the policy change. Second, the policy is associated with increases in male and female labor supply around the earliest pension eligibility age, consistent with some individuals working longer to finance pension delay. However, further analysis suggests that these labor supply changes are more likely to reflect longer-term trends across birth cohorts rather than a causal effect of the policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the role of self-employment in retirement transitions using a panel of administrative tax data. We find that the hazard of self-employment increases at popular retirement ages associated with Social Security eligibility, particularly for those with greater retirement wealth. Late-career transitions to self-employment are associated with a larger drop in income than similar mid-career transitions. Data from the Health and Retirement Study suggest that hours worked also fall upon switching to self-employment. These results suggest that self-employment at older ages may serve as a 'bridge job,' allowing workers to gradually reduce hours and earnings along the pathway to retirement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper compares the relative strengths of working longer vs. saving more in terms of increasing a household's affordable, sustainable standard of living in retirement. Both stylized households and actual households from the Health and Retirement Study are examined. We assume that workers commence Social Security benefits when they retire. The basic result is that delaying retirement by 3–6 months has the same impact on the retirement standard of living as saving an additional one-percentage point of labor earnings for 30 years. The relative power of saving more is even lower if the decision to increase saving is made later in the work life. For instance, increasing retirement saving by one percentage point 10 years before retirement has the same impact on the sustainable retirement standard of living as working between 1 and 2 months longer. The calculations of the relative power of working longer and saving more are done for a wide range of realized rates of returns on saving, for households with different income levels, and for singles as well as married couples. The results are quite invariant to these circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the connection between taxes paid and benefits accrued under the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program on both the intensive and extensive margins. We perform these calculations for stylized workers given the existing benefit structure and disability hazard rates. On the intensive margin, we examine the effect of an additional dollar of earnings on the marginal payroll taxes contributed and future benefits earned. We find that the present discounted value of disability benefits received from an additional dollar of earnings, net of the SSDI payroll tax, generally declines with age, becoming negative around age 40 and reaching almost zero at age 63. On the extensive margin, we determine the effect of working an additional year on the additional payroll taxes and future benefits as a percentage of income. The return to working an additional year at an income level just large enough to earn Social Security credits for the year is large and positive through age 60. However, the return to working an additional full year is substantially smaller and becomes negative at approximately age 57. Thus, older workers face strong incentives to earn enough to obtain creditable coverage through age 60, but they face disincentives for additional earnings. In addition, workers aged 61 and older face work disincentives at any level of earnings. We repeat this analysis for stylized workers at different levels of earnings and find that, while the program transfers resources from high earners to low earners, the workers experience similar patterns in the returns to working. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the large and growing returns to deferring Social Security benefits, most individuals claim Social Security before the full retirement age. In this paper, we use a panel of administrative tax data on individuals likely to financially benefit from delaying Social Security claiming to explore the relationship between Social Security claiming and distributions from tax-advantaged retirement savings accounts. We find that the majority of our sample claim Social Security prior to taking distributions from Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). We also find that a third of our sample have IRA balances equivalent to at least two additional years of Social Security benefits, and a quarter have IRA balances equivalent to at least 4 years of Social Security benefits. We complement our analysis with data from the Health and Retirement Study and find that these percentages are considerably higher when other financial assets are taken into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social Security benefits may be commenced at any time between ages 62 and 70. As individuals who claim later can, on average, expect to receive benefits for a shorter period, an actuarial adjustment is made to the monthly benefit to reflect the age at which benefits are claimed. We investigate the actuarial fairness of that adjustment in light of recent improvements in mortality and historically low interest rates. We show that delaying is actuarially advantageous for a large number of people, even for individuals with mortality rates that are twice the average. At real interest rates closer to their historical average, singles with mortality that is substantially greater than average do not benefit from delay, although primary earners with high mortality can still improve the present value of the household's benefits through delay. We also investigate the extent to which the actuarial advantage of delay has grown since the early 1960s, when the choice of when to claim first became available, and we decompose this growth into three effects: (1) the effect of changes in Social Security's rules, (2) the effect of changes in the real interest rate, and (3) the effect of changes in life expectancy. Finally, we quantify the extent to which the gains from delay can be expected to increase in the future as a result of mortality improvements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]