Search

The Mosque of Rome, designed by Paolo Portoghesi, Sami Mousawi, and Vittorio Gigliotti, was built in 1995 to serve Rome's Muslim community and is the largest mosque in the Western world. Despite Mousawi's significant role in its design, his contributions have been overshadowed by Portoghesi's prominence. Research conducted at the British School at Rome aimed to rectify this oversight by highlighting Mousawi's importance and advocating for recognition within architectural discourse. The project involved documenting the mosque's architecture, engaging with the local community, and challenging biases that favor well-known architects over lesser-known contributors, ultimately contributing to a more inclusive narrative of architectural heritage. [Extracted from the article]

In the last few years, a wave of Islamist-related terrorist attacks took place in Western Europe, mainly in France and Belgium but with relevant episodes also in the United Kingdom whereas so far Italy did not suffer any attack of this kind. Each of these countries hosts a large number of Muslim immigrants and communities, participated in military missions in the Middle East, and has been repeatedly threatened by ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) or other Islamist-related radical groups. What then explains the difference in the number and intensity of Islamist-related terrorist attacks in Western European countries? Using qualitative cross-case comparison case studies and relying on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the Association of Religion Data Archive (ARDA), I argue that countries directly discriminating toward Islamic communities are more likely to suffer these kinds of attacks because this discrimination causes grievances against the host state within the discriminated minority. This effect is higher in the presence of religious and cultural networks where these grievances can be brought at the center of the public debate and be connected together because of the presence of large audiences, resulting in the possible development of more radicalized positions of small portions of the discriminated community. This is particularly true for highly secular states like France, where the interpretation of secularism makes accommodation for religious minorities extremely challenging, also resulting in laws that regulate religious behavior of minorities, therefore increasing outrage and frustration of the minority group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The discussion of Sunnism is somewhat unsatisfactory, an inadequacy that reflects the state of the field more than it does Gaiser's scholarship (which has mostly concerned the Khawarij and Iba iyya). I Irja i is something of an exception among the trends analysed by Gaiser, as it is a sectarian story that lacks a founding narrative (p. 135), and Murji i tendencies were largely adopted by emergent Sunnism. To hold that the intense contestation of Sunnism in later centuries undermines this thesis, as Gaiser presumably would, is an example of the continuum fallacy: i.e. insofar as Sunnism is contested, it does not exist. [Extracted from the article]

This contribution proposes an interpretation of a newly attested divine title of the ancient Arabian deity Ruḍaw, mkśd '(the one) from Chaldea'. It explores what sense this title could have had and its implications on our understanding of Ruḍaw's position in the ancient Arabian pantheon, especially in relation to Allāt. It also examines mentions of Ruḍaw in Islamic-period narrative sources and concludes that his cult likely disappeared by Islamic times; tales of the destruction of his cult site reflect the use of the 'smashing idols' topos to narrativize the passage from pre-Islam to Islam. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that concerns for the government appointment of qazis, officers for the administration of Muslim law, and the greater application of shari'at critically shaped Muslim community formation in later nineteenth century Punjab. Between 1865 and 1885, Punjabi Muslim elites attested the necessity of qazis being appointed by government and Muslim law being administered in the colonial judicial system. With the support of Gottlieb Leitner, registrar of the Punjab University College, Muslim parties used the emergent associations of Punjab civil society, including the Anjuman-i-Punjab (Lahore) and Anjuman-i-Islam (Lahore), to assert the indispensability of religious law. In doing so, they challenged the Anglo-Indian decision to prioritize customary law in the Punjab and advanced the religious group as the basic social unit of Punjab society. In Punjab public spaces, the relevance of Islam was proclaimed, challenging the professed Anglo-Indian distinction between private and public, religious and secular spheres. However, demands for qazi appointment and the administration of shari'at problematize well-rehearsed arguments about the relationships between family, community, state and religion in colonial Punjab. Only through an enquiry into the two decades after 1865 may later political campaigns for the application of shari'at be understood. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Taking the example of the Ismaʻilis in colonial South Asia and East Africa, this article examines some aspects of the complexities involved in the identity formation of communities seeking gradual redefinitions in a deterritorialised global context, reformulating notions of community membership in the process. The Ismaʻili case illustrates an intertwined history of the development of community identity, and a language of social service that became the hallmark of the community under a religious leadership that virtually redefined its position through a vigorous and increasing emphasis on the idiom of social commitment. At one level, this thrust marks a passage from the translocal to the global context, intelligible in terms of the conceptual rubric of global assemblages. At another level, the article also seeks to evaluate the nature of the community's diasporic experience in Africa. It suggests that the ideational framework and praxis of social service — and in more recent times grander developmental endeavours addressing the needs of both Ismaʻilis and non-Ismaʻilis across the world — both reflect, and are mutually constitutive of, more fundamental experiments with identity and repositioning of religious authority that the Ismaʻilis first witnessed in colonial South Asia and East Africa. This article is thus an effort to retrieve some of the continuities and ruptures in the historical process. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Tablighi Jama’at is one of the most popular Islamic purist movements in the world. Although it has a growing presence in Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim country, little research has thus far been done on its activities in that country. To gain access to Indonesian society, the Tablighi Jama’at has been particularly original in choosing a uniquely Indonesian institution as its entry point: the pesantren (Islamic boarding schools). The role of pesantren for the Tablighis in Indonesia is not confined to spreading Islamic knowledge, they also serve as a hub of Tablighi activities. This paper focuses on examining the role of the Tablighi pesantren in shaping and transmitting religious knowledge to its Indonesian followers, and in particular to female followers, as there is to date no scholarship on this topic. It analyses the life experiences of female Tablighis inside and outside the pesantren and their passion to belong to a global imagined Tablighi community. Transnational travel of female Tablighis from diverse neighbouring countries is a central part of the pesantren experience. For Indonesian Tablighi women, the presence of these female guests and foreign students who are enrolled in the pesantren play a significant role in strengthening their passionate desire to be part of the global Tablighi Jama’at umma. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

There are approximately six million Muslims in the United States. They come from a great variety of backgrounds. Among the few things they have in common are Islam as a religion and their American experience. The latter produces some previously unencountered consequences, including the rise of English as the language of Muslim ummah (community) and the reality of being a “minority” in a non-Muslim society. The American experience also raises questions of citizenship, identity, and integration. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Studies of student politics in Pakistan often focus on the competition between ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ student groups—for example, the leftward-leaning National Students Federation, regional parties with a broadly secular orientation like the Pakhtun Students Federation, the Islami Jamiat-e-Tuleba (Islamic Students Association), and sectarian groups like the (Shi'a) Imamia Students Organization. This paper describes the emergence of an increasingly violent stalemate between and amongst these groups since the 1960s. It then argues that for a growing number of students this stalemate produced a certain disenchantment with exclusionary efforts to control the ‘state-based Muslim nationalism’ that lay behind the formation of Pakistan itself. Seeking alternatives, these disenchanted students developed an interest in non-state-based forms of Muslim solidarity—forms that rejected the constraints of territorial Muslim nationalism in favour of transnational movements focused on the revitalization of Muslim solidarity on a truly global scale—movements like the (Deobandi) Tablighi Jama'at and the (Barelwi) Da'wat-e-Islami. Tracing this development, this paper takes up one application of Talal Asad's argument that alternative expressions of religion (and religious solidarity) are ‘produced’ by specific political circumstances. It also examines this formulation in the light of other theories that take an interest in the effects—indeed the potentially ‘democratizing’ effects—of protracted political stalemates. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]