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Normative theories provide essential tools for understanding behaviour, not just for reasoning, judgement, and decision-making, but many other areas of cognition as well; and their utility extends to the development of process theories. Furthermore, the way these tools are used has nothing to do with the is-ought fallacy. There therefore seems no basis for the claim that research would be better off without them.

One of the most striking features of “Bayesian rationality” is the detail with which behavior on logical reasoning tasks can now be predicted and explained. This detail is surprising, given the state of the field 10 to 15 years ago, and it has been brought about by a theoretical program that largely ignores consideration of cognitive processes, that is, any kind of internal behavior that generates overt responding. It seems that an increase in explanatory power can be achieved by restricting a psychological theory.

the term “moral heuristic” as used by sunstein seeks to bring together various traditions. however, there are significant differences between uses of the term “heuristic” in the cognitive and the social psychological research, and these differences are accompanied by very distinct evidential criteria. we suggest the term “moral heuristic” should refer to processes, which means that further evidence is required.

Shanker & King (S&K) fail to provide substantive reasons for a paradigm shift in the study of communication because nonstandard and equivocal use of terminology obscures and undercuts their arguments.

Van Gelder's specification of the dynamical hypothesis does not improve on previous notions. All three key attributes of dynamical systems apply to Turing machines and are hence too general. However, when a more restricted definition of a dynamical system is adopted, it becomes clear that the dynamical hypothesis is too underspecified to constitute an interesting cognitive claim.