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Modern accounts of color appearance differ in whether they assume that the perceptual primaries (e.g., white and the unique hues of red, green, blue, and yellow) correspond to unique states determined by the spectral sensitivities of the observer or by the spectral statistics of the environment. We examined the interaction between observers and their environments by asking how color perception should vary if appearance depends on fixed responses in a set of color channels, when the sensitivities of these channels are adapted in plausible ways to different environments. Adaptation was modeled as gain changes in the cones and in multiple postreceptoral channels tuned to different directions in color–luminance space. Gains were adjusted so that the average channel responses were equated across two environments or for the same environment during different seasons, based on sets of natural outdoor scenes (Webster et al., 2007). Because of adaptation, even observers with a shared underlying physiology should perceive color in significantly and systematically different ways when they are exposed to and thus adapted by different contexts. These include differences in achromatic settings (owing to variations in the average chromaticity of locations) and differences in perceived hue (because of differences in scene contrasts). Modeling these changes provides a way of simulating how colors might be experienced by individuals in different color environments and provides a measure of how much color appearance might be modulated for a given observer by variations in the environment.

Assigning a basic color name to an object and rating the amount of a particular hue is a fundamental visual capability. Traditional color scaling studies have used increment flashes or isoluminant stimuli of a homogeneous color. Natural objects, however, do not contain a single color but are characterized by a distribution of different chromatic hues. Here we study color scaling using photographs of natural fruit objects. Stimuli were either homogeneous spots, digital photographs of fruit objects (e.g., banana), or outline shapes of the fruit objects. Stimuli were displayed on a CRT monitor on a homogeneous white background; its luminance was varied above and below the medium gray. The chromaticity of the stimuli was varied in 36 equally spaced chromatic directions in the isoluminant plane of the Derrington-Krauskopf-Lennie (DKL) color space. For each stimuli, subjects rated the amount of red, green, blue, and yellow in the stimulus on a scale from 0–8. In agreement with earlier studies we found that the positions of the peak ratings for each color do not coincide with the cardinal axis of DKL color space and are largely invariant under changes of the background luminance. For the average rating we found a dependence on background luminance for all colors: yellow ratings increase with darker backgrounds, whereas ratings for the other colors, in particular green, decrease. For the fruit objects, we found a selective increase in the average color rating for the natural fruit color. For example, the average rating for yellow was 1.7 times higher for the banana images compared to disc stimuli. No such selective increase was found for outline shapes. We conclude that the distribution of hues in natural objects with a characteristic object color can have a profound effect on color scaling and color appearance.

Green, blue and short-wavelength-red rod hue biases are strongest and most reliable with large, dimly-mesopic, extra-foveal stimuli but tend to diminish when stimuli are confined to a small area of the central fovea. This study explores how the stimulation of foveal and extra-foveal areas interact in determining rod hue biases, and whether large stimuli are as effective for revealing rod hue biases when foveally centered as when eccentrically centered. We assessed rod influence by measuring wavelengths of unique green and unique yellow (with 1-s duration, 1 log scot td stimuli and a staircase procedure) under bleached and dark-adapted conditions. We measured unique hues with foveally centered 2 degrees - and 7.4 degrees -diameter disks, a 7.4 degrees (outer) x 2 degrees (inner) diameter annulus, and a 7 degrees -eccentric, 7.4 degrees -diameter disk. The rod green bias (shift of unique yellow locus) was typically10 nm and remained fairly constant across spatial configurations, indicating no special foveal influence. The rod blue bias (shift of unique green) varied more among observers and spatial configurations, reaching up to 47 nm. However, stimuli covering the fovea typically produced no rod blue bias. Thus, the present results add differences in spatial dependence (i.e., foveal/extra-foveal interaction) between green and blue rod biases to previously demonstrated differences (e.g., differences in amount of light level dependence, in time course and in the spectral range influenced by each bias).

In 1789, when neither the physical basis of hue nor the retinal basis of color perception was established, the mathematician Gaspard Monte stated firmly that our color perceptions do not depend on the absolute value of the physical variable, but are influenced by the context and in particular by our estimate of the illuminant. He used this insight to explain color contrast effects and the Paradox of Monge (the desaturation of red objects seen through a red filter). He proposed that we can estimate the chromaticity of the illuminant in any scene because all surfaces reflect to us varying mixtures of (i) the body color and (ii) a specular component that represents the illuminant. He also realized that white objects have a special property: Provided that they are illuminated by a single illuminant, such objects exhibit no variation in chromaticity across their surface. Thus at least one of the unique hues exists as an external reference on which observers can agree. It is suggested that other unique hues may also have a basis in the external world.

This study tests the generality of previously demonstrated rod hue biases (red and blue biases at shorter wavelengths and a green bias at longer wavelengths) that cause the loci of the three spectral unique hues to shift to longer wavelengths. We found rod hue biases for 2-deg targets to be generally similar in magnitude and light-level dependence to those observed for 7.4-deg targets (the size most often studied) when measured at 7-deg eccentricity. The largest effects for both test sizes occurred at the lowest light levels tested, 1 log scotopic troland. All three rod hue biases were found with 0.6-deg targets, but were not reliably measurable at the lowest light levels and were reduced in magnitude and consistency across observers. The largest rod hue biases all occurred at the same scotopic light level, which corresponds to different photopic light levels for the three hue biases, because of differences in photopic and scotopic spectral sensitivity. This suggests that no single photopic light level will produce such large effects for all three rod hue biases. Finally, when the rod influence on a specific unique-hue locus was measured using photopically (rather than scotopically) constant stimuli, rod hue biases were still found but were more variable in magnitude and incidence across observers. We conclude that the rod hue biases we have previously described can be found with smaller stimuli, at somewhat higher light levels, and under photopically constant conditions, although our prior conditions tend to produce larger, more reliable rod hue biases.

According to the dominant view in cognitive science, in particular in its more popularised versions, colour sensings or perceptions are located in a 'quality space'. This space has three dimensions: hue (the chromatic aspect of colour), saturation (the 'intensity' of hue), and brightness. This space is structured further via a small number of primitive hues or landmark colours, usually four (red, yellow, green, blue) or six (if white and black are included). It has also been suggested that there are eleven semantic universals - the six colours previously mentioned plus orange, pink, brown, purple, and grey. Scientific evidence for these widely accepted theories is at best minimal, based on sloppy methodology and at worst non-existent. Against the standard view, it is argued that colour might better be regarded as the outcome of a social-historical developmental trajectory in which there is mutual shaping of philosophical presuppositions, scientific theories, experimental practices, technological tools, industrial products, rhetorical frameworks, and their intercalated and recursive interactions with the practices of daily life. That is: colour, the domain of colour, is the outcome of interactive processes of scientific, instrumental, industrial, and everyday lifeworlds. That is: colour might better be called an exosomatic organ, a second nature. ispartof: pages:162-176 ispartof: COLOR IMAGING: DEVICE-INDEPENDENT COLOR, COLOR HARDCOPY, AND APPLICATIONS VII vol:4663 pages:162-176 ispartof: Color Imaging: Device-Independent Color, Color Hard Copy, and Applications VII Conference location:CA, SAN JOSE date:22 Jan - 25 Jan 2002 status: published

In this target article the following hypotheses are discussed: (1) Colour is autonomous: a perceptuolinguistic and behavioural universal. (2) It is completely described by three independent attributes: hue, brightness, and saturation: (3) Phenomenologically and psychophysically there are four unique hues: red, green, blue, and yellow; (4) The unique hues are underpinned by two opponent psychophysical and/or neuronal channels: red/green, blue/yellow. The relevant literature is reviewed. We conclude: (i) Psychophysics and neurophysiology fail to set nontrivial constraints on colour categorization. (ii) Linguistic evidence provides no grounds for the universality of basic colour categories. (iii) Neither the opponent hues red/green, blue/yellow nor hue, brightness, and saturation are intrinsic to a universal concept of colour. (iv) Colour is not autonomous.

Johnson and Wright (hereafter J&W) claim, in their brief communication entitled “Reply to Philipona and O'Regan” that there are various difficulties in the reasoning in Philipona and O'Regan's (2006) paper entitled “Color naming, unique hues and hue cancellation predicted from singularities in reflection properties,” which was published in this journal in 2006. These difficulties supposedly prevent our paper's conclusions from being accepted.

Reflectance and spectral power functions are poor predictors of color experiences. Only in completely relativized conditions (single observer, non-metameric set of stimuli, and single set of viewing conditions) is the relationship close. Variation in reflectance of Munsell chips experienced by color-normal observers as having a unique green hue encompasses approximately sixty percent of the complete range of hues falling under the category “green”; and in recent determinations of unique hues, ranges of yellow and green as well as green and blue unique hues overlap.

The logic of the basic taste concept is discussed in relation to the physiology and psychophysics of color vision. An alternative version of the basic taste model, analogous to opponent-process theory is introduced. The logic of quality naming experiments is clarified.

Contrary to argument that unique hues are undemonstrated, the World Color Survey shows that speakers of more than 100 minor and tribal languages focus color categories predominantly on 4 of the 40 hue columns of the ethnographic Munsell array. The pattern is not conditioned by saturation levels or other arbitrary structures among the color chips, nor is Western influence likely to be the cause. Moreover, all evidence suggests that color cognition is autonomous despite the connotations and polysemies of color terms.

Saunders and van Brakel question whether the special status of red, green, yellow, and blue in our perceptual organization is anything more than a shadow cast by the English language. I suggest that it is more than this. We can hardly imagine treating lime, purple, orange, and teal as unique hues, and the reason does not lie in special training. To settle the issue, I suggest some lines for psychological experiment and anthropological investigation.