The "risk-society hypothesis" consists of two related parts. In its first part, the hypothesis views modem societies as being in a transition from "class societies" to "risk societies." In its second part, it states that modem societies undergo a process of "individualization." Essentially, Ulrich Beck and others elaborate both parts of the hypothesis with respect to industrial societies in general and to German society in particular. Critics argue that the hypothesis misjudges the relation between societal risk distribution, conflict, and social inequality. It fails to understand the main reasons for risk-related conflicts in society when it supposes that the basic conflicts characterizing risk societies arc different from the basic conflicts in class societies. It fails mainly because it ignores the possibility of causal attributions and risk perceptions directly related to antagonistic (class) positions. As far as the postulated individualization process is concerned, the risk society hypothesis represents a peculiar mixture of supposedly right and wrong assumptions. The hypothesis seems quite right in assuming changing modes of social integration: Not so much traditional ties as market and competitive mechanisms determine social life, often advancing to its most private corners. The hypothesis fails, however, in its structural implications. In particular, the view that the postulated trends question the "hierarchy model of social inequality" is neither theoretically convincing nor empirically tenable. Instead, neither exposition to global risks nor individualization is likely to make society more egalitarian. Furthermore, instead of assuming that risk-societies overcome class conflicts, the paper envisions the emergence of a new risk-related cleavage in society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]