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Differentiated integration has become ubiquitous in the European Union today. However, the evaluation of differentiated integration by the academic community is much contested: While some see it as a remedy to political gridlock, others think of it as the beginning of the end of the EU (i.e., disintegration). Our article sheds light on the relationship between differentiated integration and disintegration from the viewpoint of subnational members of Parliament. Assuming that at least some scenarios of differentiated integration are related to disintegration, we report on data from a survey of seven EU member states about subnational members of Parliament's preferences regarding future scenarios for the EU. Our results find that a preference for a Europe with a singular focus on "nothing but the single market" is related to a functionalist approach towards European integration and the perceived disintegration of the EU. This preference is especially prevalent among subnational MPs in the Czech Republic and Poland, both known for having opt-out solutions. While the Czech Republic constantly shows high levels of Euroscepticism in public surveys, the reverse is true in Poland. Obviously, a general commitment to the EU should not be equated with a shared common goal of further European integration. If such differences become permanent, European integration may genuinely be endangered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to investigate the character of transatlantic security relations in Africa: How can it be characterized? Have they become weaker or stronger over the past decade? How can this development be explained? As NATO has not yet been heavily engaged on the African continent, it is prudent to study the relations between the EU and the US. Africa has been of concern to the EU (and its member states) for decades due to its geographical closeness and historic bonds. Since 2001, for both Europe and the US, Africa has become a region of increasing security concern due to the threat of international terrorism—for Europe, we can also add the migration concern. The European side of this relationship has also been largely dominated by France, making the transatlantic security cooperation in Africa essentially about French‐American relations. But as France has taken the lead regarding Europe’s security and defense engagement in Africa, increasingly with the sup‐ port of other EU member states and associated non‐members, this bilateral relationship is more than simply cooperation between two states. By applying a framework that understands EU security and defense policy as a process increasingly characterized as a differentiated and flexible integration under French leadership, the development of the Franco‐US secu‐ rity relations in Africa must be understood as an expression of the transatlantic security relations in this region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Semester is a challenge for national parliaments but also an opportunity to reform domestic oversight institutions. Drawing on data from all member states, this study examines the conditions under which national parliaments use this opportunity. Is Euro area membership a prerequisite for parliamentary adaptation to the European Semester and, if so, which further combinations of conditions account for variation among Euro area countries? The analysis suggests that membership in or close ties with the Euro area and institutional strength constitute necessary conditions for parliamentary adaptation. Combined with other factors--in particular, public debt exceeding the Maastricht criteria--these conditions explain reform in many cases. National parliamentary adaptation to the European Semester thus follows existing institutional divisions constituted by differentiated integration in the Euro area and uneven national parliamentary strength. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A decade ago, Nordic cooperation on security and defence matters gained momentum, having been largely absent from the map of Nordic cooperation during the Cold War and its aftermath. This article analyses developments along three dimensions of Nordic cooperation: military defence (focusing on the Nordic Defence Cooperation), civil security (in the form of the ‘Haga’ process), and political cooperation (through the implementation of the Stoltenberg report). Three observations stand out as a result: First, that the three dimensions are intimately related against the background of a common Nordic conceptualization of security; second, that there is simultaneously variation in significant respects (such as driving forces, scope, and degree of institutionalization); and third, that Nordic security and defence cooperation has developed in the context of European and transatlantic security dynamics and cooperation. The second part of the analysis seeks to interpret this picture from the analytical perspective of differentiated integration. The article ends with a set of reflections on the future of Nordic security and defence cooperation in light of the Coronavirus pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines whether Nordic administrative collaboration is still ‘alive and kicking,’ or whether it has been marginalized by increased integration into Europe and strong international reform trajectories. We analyse the scope and intensity of Nordic administrative collaboration from a structural perspective based on the perceptions of civil servants in the Norwegian central government. We also address the implications of Nordic collaboration for policy design and reform measures. The main conclusion is that Nordic administrative collaboration can best be described as differentiated integration. The scope of Nordic administrative collaboration is rather broad, and its internal structural features vary significantly. Nordic collaboration is perceived to have more of an effect on policy design than on specific administrative reform means and measures. However, structural features also matter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]