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As a counterpoint to demonstrative proofs in metaphysics, Robert Nozick presented the case for God's existence based on the value of personal experiences. Personal experiences shape one's life, but this is even more evident with extraordinary experiences, such can be religious ones. In the next step, says the argument, if those experiences can be explained only by invoking the concept of the Supreme Being, then God exists. The second step mirrors scientific explanation constituting what Nozick calls the "argument to the best explanation." The argument is set against the background of Nozick's methodology which rejects demonstrative proofs in metaphysics. Its purpose is threefold. It aims to establish a certain sort of experience (religious/spiritual) as a legitimate basis for the argumentation; it aims to show that it is not philosophically blasphemous to explain such experiences by introducing a concept of divinity. Finally, it seeks to showcase the non-dogmatic, investigative nature of the argument. By exploring the merits of Nozick's proposal, I will try to elucidate all three components, which should pave the way for a broader discussion on the role of non-demonstrative arguments in metaphysics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can the immense amount of suffering and waste inherent in the evolutionary process be reconciled with the existence of a perfectly good and omnipotent God? A widely embraced proposal in the area of "evolutionary theodicy" is the so-called "Only Way"-argument. This argument contends that certain valuable goods – in particular, creaturely independence and human freedom – can only come about through a genuinely indeterministic and partly uncontrolled process of evolution. In a previous article, I have argued that the "Only Way"-argument can be defeated by a "Twin Earth"-thought experiment: If God is omnipotent, he could have created – directly, without evolution – creatures that are molecule-for-molecule identical to those that he actually created through evolution. If the creatures that he actually created have freedom and independence, there is no valid reason to deny that the non-evolved "twin creatures" would also be free and independent. Recently, Eikrem and Søvik (ES) have suggested a way of blocking my Twin Earth-argument by appealing to the distinction between type-values and token-values (or type-goods and token-goods). While ES admit that the Twin Earth-argument shows the non-necessity of evolution for the existence of certain type-goods, they argue that an evolutionary creation can be justified by appeal to valuable token-goods (unique particulars) that could not have existed without evolution. In this article, I respond to ES's token-goods argument by showing that it is incompatible with a basic presupposition of "Only Way" evolutionary theodicies, namely the claim that the evolutionary process is genuinely indeterministic and partly uncontrolled. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I introduce the implantation argument, a new argument for the existence of God. Spatiotemporal extensions believed to exist outside of the mind, composing an external physical reality, cannot be composed of either atomlessness (infinite divisibility, atomless gunk), or of Democritean atoms (extended simples), and therefore the inner experience of an external reality containing spatiotemporal extensions believed to exist outside of the mind does not represent the external reality (inner mind does not represent external, mind-independent, reality), the mind is a mere cinematic-like mindscreen (a mindscreen simulation), implanted into the mind by a creator-God. It will be shown that only a creator-God can be the implanting creator of the mindscreen simulation (the creator of reality), and other simulation theories, such as Bostrom's famous account, that do not involve a creator-God as the mindscreen simulation creator, involve a reification fallacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With substance dualism and the existence of God, Swinburne (2004, The Existence of God, Oxford University Press, Oxford) and Moreland (2010, Consciousness and the Existence of God, Routledge, New York) have argued for a very powerful explanatory mechanism that can readily explain several philosophical problems related to consciousness. However, their positions come with presuppositions and ontological commitments which many are not prepared to share. The aim of this paper is to improve on the Swinburne-Moreland argument from consciousness by developing an argument for the existence of God from consciousness without being committed to substance dualism. The argument proceeds by suggesting a solution to the exceptional-point-of-view problem, i.e., the question how it can be explained that there is a conscious being lucky enough to experience the point of view of a relatively tiny brain amidst a giant universe that is indifferent about which physical entities it brings about according to the laws of physics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is usually supposed that biological design arguments (where biological complex order is seen as evidence of a Creator) are made obsolete by Darwinian evolutionary theory. However, philosopher Alvin Plantinga and others have defended the continued possibility of a rational “design discourse”, in which biological order is taken as a sign of God’s purposeful action. In this article, I consider two objections to design discourse: (1) a theological objection to biological design based on the problem of natural evil, and (2) the evolutionary objection, according to which evolutionary theory removes the justification for any biological design perception. Whereas Plantinga’s own response utilizes the arguments of the Intelligent Design movement, I argue in favor of utilizing “design discourse” as part of a theistic evolutionist view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a reconstruction and discussion of Holm Tetens' new moral argument for theistic belief. The argument is a pragmatic one in that it intends to show that believing in God is rational because it has some morally desirable consequences. It asserts that the suffering of countless victims of evil in this world causes in atheists who try to be moral some morally questionable states of mind. By contrast, theists who have certain beliefs about the afterlife, judgment, and reconciliation are not subject to these bad states of mind. Therefore, Tetens argues, theistic belief is more rational than disbelief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whether the past or future can be infinite is an interesting question for theologians working on the relationship between God and Time as well as Eschatology. In a recent exchange, Wes Morriston concluded that if William Lane Craig's familiar line of argument against the possibility of a beginningless series of events worked, it would work just as well against the possibility of an endless series of predetermined events. He argued that neither Craig's claim that an endless series of events is potential infinite nor the claim that future events don't exist is successful in blocking this conclusion. I argue that a proponent of the Kalam Argument does not have to follow Craig's denial of an actual infinite number of propositions, and I show how Morriston's conclusion can be blocked. In particular, I argue that an asymmetric treatment of past and future is justified on a dynamic theory of time, while the distinction between abstract and concrete infinities is helpful for responding to Morriston's counter-argument based on the number of angelic praises yet-to-be-said. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]