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The early part of the twenty-first century saw a revolution in the field of Homeland Security. The 9/11 attacks, shortly followed thereafter by the Anthrax Attacks, served as a wakeup call to the United States and showed the inadequacy of the current state of the nation's Homeland Security operations.Biodefense, and as a direct result Biosurveillance, changed dramatically after these tragedies, planting the seeds of fear in the minds of Americans.They were shown that not only could the United States be attacked at any time, but the weapon could be an invisible disease-causing agent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this world, there are many potential hazards that could lead to a nationwide biosecurity threat. On the one hand, there are the unintended perils that result from natural outbreaks, such as with domestic food contamination. On the other hand, there are the intentional actions that lead to incidents of agroterrorism, which can reap significant economic loss, widespread destruction of crops and livestock, as well as increased human illness and death. For these reasons, the United States government has implemented various mechanisms over time in order to combat the food-borne threats imposed by both intentional and unintentional biosecurity hazards. For the purpose of this paper, these mechanisms will be referred to as the "food safety fence." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An attack on America's food supply could come in many forms such as: poisoning imported food, burning crop fields, or a conventional terrorist attacks on food centers; however, one of the most frightening and potentially disastrous scenarios for an attack is a coordinated, biological agroterrorism attack released on the nation's livestock or crops. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foreign animal diseases (FADs) are recognized as a threat to agriculture, with potential devastating effects on our nation's livestock and poultry industries. As weapons of bioterrorism, FADs also represent a threat to our nation's homeland security. Veterinarians play a vital role in protecting our nation's agricultural resources through their ability to identify and promptly respond to FADs, some of which are of public health concern. Veterinarians working in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania were surveyed to assess their awareness of FADs and their preparedness to recognize and respond to potential cases. Two hundred thirty-seven veterinary practitioners completed an online questionnaire which included demographic and practice characteristics, federal accreditation status, awareness of FAD history in the United States, awareness of current FAD threats, training, and professional experiences with FADs. In the analysis, we identified topics respondents were most familiar, and those which they feel pose the greatest disease threat. We also assessed respondents' interest in receiving supplemental training on FADs. Results of this survey indicate that most participating Pennsylvania veterinarians are familiar with FADs and have had educational exposure to FADs either during their formal veterinary education or through the United States Department of Agriculture veterinary accreditation program. However, the majority feels unprepared to recognize FADs. Most survey respondents expressed an interest in receiving supplemental training on FADs, and were willing to travel to receive the training. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Agroterrorism and food terrorism have been identified as important homeland security issues by officials in the public health, government, and food industry sectors of the U.S. Intentional contamination of food has already occurred both abroad and in North America. Outbreak investigation and control measures in response to intentional contamination differ from those employed in cases of naturally occurring contamination. Operations-based exercise efforts specific to bioterrorism events are essential to train public health personnel and first responders to consider the possibility of deliberate contamination during an outbreak investigation. A recent search of the Rand Corporation's Public Health Preparedness database identified no operations-based (functional or full-scale) exercises involving foodborne contamination with a biological or chemical agent. This manuscript describes a functional exercise developed and conducted by the University of Illinois, College of Veterinary Medicine, Section of Community Health and Preventive Medicine. The functional exercise simulated a food-borne terrorism event and was designed to evaluate the efficacy of the Food Emergency Response Plan (FERP) of the Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH), Division of Food, Drugs and Dairies (DFDD). The exercise was held on November 18th and 19th, 2008 at the College of Veterinary Medicine, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL. Based on this and previous exercises and training programs developed and conducted by CHPM, it is apparent that the more exercise designers, evaluators and public health and support agency participants move away from discussion based exercises and towards operations based exercises, the more strengths and deficiencies in preparation and response of participating agencies are revealed. Although public health agencies have begun training personnel and partner agencies to consider intentional contamination of food during an outbreak investigation, the relative lack of widespread operations-based exercises to assess preparedness in response to an intentional incident of foodborne contamination seems to be an important deficiency in homeland security. Additional funding to create opportunities for public health and first responder personnel to participate in operations-based bioterrorism response exercises is needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented which discusses several reports within the issue of the periodical on topics including threats of agroterrorism; vaccine requirements for those in the health-care profession; and biosecurity.