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This paper argues not only that Schelling, Novalis, and Friedrich Schlegelare reacting directly to Kant (rather than simply to each other and to other post-Kantian figures), but also that they are responding in complex ways to one particularly prominent and distinctive line of thought in Kant, namely his account of reason, conditions, and the unconditioned. Though Kant argues that we cannot have cognition of unconditioned objects, he none the less thinks that reason demands that we accept the existence of such objects. The paper argues that the German Romantics take over this general line of thought, though they do so in different contexts and to different ends. Specifically, focusing on this dimension of Kant's thought allows us to see both how the logic of conditioning relations can be seen to be driving their arguments for the Absolute, and how Kant's particular conception of conditioning relations gives rise to important differences from the views of the German Romantics. For whereas he distinguishes different kinds of real conditioning relations, they operate with a generic conception of conditioning that leads to their distinctive Romantic views. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the theoretical philosophy of Kant regarding the law of nature and metaphysics. Topics discussed include the concept of law focusing on necessity and legislation, articulation of laws of nature and moral law, and the practices of natural science in the early modern period. Also provided is the practical philosophy of Spanish theologian Francisco Suarez regarding the views of intellectualist on the basis of nature laws and God's will.

A literary criticism of a chapter from the book “Phänomenologie des Geistes” by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, titled "Kraft und Verstand," is presented. It outlines the three distinctive features of various models of consciousness, specifically those of force and law, and the different problems that consciousness experiences with each, including an illustration of the complex models discussed in "Kraft und Verstand" in relation to Newtonian mechanics.

I shall not discuss her provocative and sub tle claims in regard to this topic here, given that Ginsborg may not maintain that these claims are essential to Kant's resolution of the antinomy as they might simply be further claims to which Kant could be committed on inde pendent grounds. Though Ginsborg is right to note the importance of Kant's idea that mechanism is in some sense subordinate to teleology in Kant's resolu tion of the antinomy, her interpretation still faces two significant prob lems. For one, it contradicts §69, whose main point is to show that the antinomy pertains specifically to reflecting judgment, and Kant re iterates this point immediately after stating the two pairs of contradic tions when he notes that if Thesis c and Antithesis c represented the an tinomy, then it would be an antinomy of reason, not judgment. Ginsborg, Hannah (2001): Kant on Understanding Organisms as Natural Purpos es, in: E. Watkins (ed.): Kant and the Sciences, New York/Oxford, pp. 231-258. [Extracted from the article]