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The founder of the first independent and non-state-funded research institute for prehistory and early history in Germany in 1921, the UFI in Tübingen, Robert Rudolf Schmidt, deserves to be looked at again for a key phase of his life after his dismissal from university service in the spring of 1934 that has received little attention to date. And this despite the fact that his person has already been assessed several times from an academic perspective. New documents from private archives supplement his researcher CV and are suitable for re-examining narratives about his person that have already been presented from a different perspective. This applies in particular to the excavation he carried out in the Palaeolithic caves of Mauern near Rennertshofen in Bavaria, which had previously eluded closer scrutiny. During his scientific work in the 20th century, he was active in five political systems. In the German Empire (until 1918), in the Weimar Republic (until 1933), in National Socialism (until 1945), in the Allied period (until 1949) and in the last months of his life in the Federal Republic of Germany (from 1949), whose demands he faced and whose leeway he tried to utilise for his prehistoric research, but which he failed at several times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In the aftermath of the First World War, the Weimar Republic found itself in financial disarray. Originally put forward by the antirepublican right, the idea of a forced loan emerged. The idea triggered harsh controversies regarding the shortfalls in the new state's sovereignty and its lack of fiscal power within the framework of an international order. The conflicting images of the Weimar state effected the decisions finally taken. This article argues that a rhetoric of emergency was combined with notions of the expert as an apolitical figure in order to legitimize compulsory lending. Yet, contrary to contemporary perceptions, the Weimar forced loan was not a result of governmental impotence or an exceptional incident within the history of public finance. As a political tool, it helped to solve conflicts on the national as well as the international level, if only for a short period of time. As an instrument of state finance, it was not an act of failure to still fiscal needs the ‚normal way' but a conscious claim for the autonomy of the Weimar state. But the conviction that compulsory loans might be a legitimate element of fiscal politics under the auspices of a strong and well-informed state emerged only with the Second World War – in Germany as well as on an international level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On September 12, 1949, the liberal politician Theodor Heuss, party leader of the „Freie Demokratische Partei" (FDP), was elected by the Bundesversammlung (Federal Convention) as the first Bundespräsident, i. e. head of state, of the newly founded Bundesrepublik Deutschland. As a young man Heuss had been a close friend and political ally of Friedrich Naumann, the protestant pastor and left wing liberal politician, supported by Ernst Troeltsch. Heuss then working as a political journalist for liberal newspapers and Naumann's weekly journal Die Hilfe, was an admirer of Troeltsch, and since 1910 they often met in Heidelberg, at Villa Fallenstein, Ziegelhäuser Landstraße 17, where Max and Marianne Weber as well als the Troeltschs lived; Heuss frequently visited Max Weber's Sunday jour fixe. When in 1915 Troeltsch became a professor at the Philosophical Faculty of Berlin University Heuss regularly kept in contact with him especially through Hans Delbrück's „Mittwochabend", a weekly gathering of liberal intellectuals, professors, politicians and journalists discussing political reforms and the ongoing war. Both Troeltsch and Heuss, 19 years younger, demanded the democratization of the Deutsches Reich, and after the end of the war and the revolution of 1918/19 they became members of the newly founded left wing liberal party „Deutsche Demokratische Partei" (DDP). After Troeltsch's sudden death on February 1st, 1923, Heuss wrote an obituary, and, together with his wife Elly Heuss-Knapp, attended the funeral service conducted by Adolf von Harnack. Heuss was a member of the „Demokratischer Klub Berlin", founded in 1919 by liberal politicians, bankers and academics to regularly discuss the political situation of the new democratic state, the Weimar Republic. Unknown until now, seven weeks after Troeltsch's death the „Demokratische Klub" invited its members (the club only had male mebers!) to a memorial act for Troeltsch. On this occasion Heuss delivered a speech „Zu Ernst Troeltschs Gedächtnis" („To the Memory of Ernst Troeltsch") which is published here for the first time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines two aspects of the Reichsbank's discount business in the years 1924 to 1932: First, the granting of Reichsbank discount loans to commercial banks in their function as lenders of last resort. Second, the direct granting of discount loans by the Reichsbank to non-banks to finance the short-term assets of industry and trade. From 1931 onwards, the Reichsbank increasingly granted financial discount loans to alleviate the liquidity crisis of the commercial banks. I trace this in detail for the Reichsbank branch in Leipzig. With regard to the granting of loans by the Reichsbank to trade and industry, I find indications of relatively high credit risks in the Reichsbank's portfolio, especially in the granting of small loans. The extensive efforts in loan selection and loan monitoring documented here could not remedy the situation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For more than 30 years bank-industry relations have been one of the most important subjects of financial research and history. Despite all research we are still lacking results on this topic for several branches of German industry, e. g. shipbuilding and shipping. Therefore, the article tries to analyze the relations between financial institutions and some of the prominent enterprises of maritime industry in Hamburg – in the 19th and 20th century the most important financial center in Northern Germany as well as place for shipping and shipbuilding. Finally, the article compares the results to those of other studies on bank-industry-relations in Germany in order to show whether there were specific characteristics in financing shipbuilding and shipping. Additionally, the article wants to stimulate further intensive research on this subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article documents widespread connections between stock companies and active or retired politicians in Germany during two distinct political regimes: constitutional monarchy and democracy. These differed largely regarding possible channels of influence, along with the power of the parliament. Despite the theoretical differences, the overall share of connected firms is approximately the same, implying that linking up with the Reichstag was already attractive in Imperial times. Moreover, the prevalence of political connections varied largely between sectors and political parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Historische Zeitschrift is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)