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The goal of this thesis is to improve Department of Defense (DOD) policy and guidance to help program managers and product support managers effectively employ Performance Based Logistics (PBL) as a product support strategy. If properly utilized, a PBL approach can reduce a weapon systems life cycle cost, increase its availability to the warfighter, and reduce the logistics footprint traditionally required to sustain it. This thesis contains a thorough analysis of the most current and relevant DOD policies and guidance to determine if it adequately supports implementation of PBL. A model is presented to aid readers through the analysis of the selected documentation to identify areas where policy refinement and additional guidance may improve understanding and awareness of PBL. This thesis makes recommendations on closing the identified information gaps with the aim to strengthen PBL policies and procedures. Major findings that trend across the reviewed documents or pose significant problems for implementing PBL are addressed with recommendations. The desired result of this research is to improve existing PBL policy and guidance in order to ultimately provide affordable and effective weapons systems in the defense of our nation.

In this research, we examine the Naval Sea Logistics Command's Continuous Integrated Logistics Support-Targeted Allowancing Technique (CILS-TAT) and the feasibility of program re-implementation. We conduct an analysis of this allowancing method's effectiveness onboard U.S. Navy Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) ships, measure the costs associated with performing a CILS-TAT, and provide recommendations concerning possible improvements to the existing CILS-TAT model. In this project, we study the impact of CILS-TAT on allowance effectiveness and identify any correlations between allowance effectiveness rates, percentage of time free from casualty reports, and CILS-TAT costs. In addition, the report addresses the impact of the brownout period of allowancing processes due to the implementation of the U.S. Navy Enterprise Resource Planning program. Our research concludes that CILS-TAT was directly responsible for improved allowance effectiveness for more than one third of our sample during two separate analysis windows. We also noted that the process behind CILS-TAT could be improved through the addition of mission criticality codes to the existing model.

The 2004 Department of Defense Logistics Transformation Strategy identified the need for the development of an organizational structure to provide oversight of joint logistics for deployed forces. U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) proposed four overarching functions that joint logistics must accomplish to truly enable the Joint Force Commander (JFC): joint logistics command and control (C2); logistics collaboration; joint support planning; and joint support execution and tracking. USJFCOM has also identified fifteen joint logistics seams and gaps which recur without fail in exercises and operations alike. This study analyzes four proposed logistics C2 organizational constructs to determine the optimal design to perform these four functions while mitigating the seams and gaps. The Joint Force Commander can tailor the recommended solution to meet the needs of -- and to leverage the logistics formation assigned to -- his command.

This report describes an Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) cost-benefit analysis of a project to improve the Navy's Integrated Logistics Support (ILS). The project involves integrating, or "bridging," the management of technical information for producing Navy technical manuals and training courses. The Bridge project achieved the integration by designing new software and proposing new technical and business procedures for managing the technical information. The project was part of the Reduction in Total Ownership Cost (RTOC) program conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The study conducted separate cost-benefit analyses for two perspectives. The OSD perspective recognizes OSD's broad interest in seeing whether the new software and technical and business processes that constitute the Bridge would lead to cost savings if implemented by the Navy. This analysis found that the Bridge would achieve net benefits-cost savings for producing technical manuals and training courses that exceed the costs of implementing the Bridge. The Program Office perspective focuses on their individual systems of interest and concentrates exclusively on the benefit side- whether the Bridge would save money in producing future technical manuals and training courses for their systems of interest. The benefits proved positive.

The purpose of this research is to identify the maintenance and logistics support structure needed to support the P-8A's Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW), Anti-surface Warfare (ASUW), and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions, while operating away from Permanent Deployment Sites (PDS) in austere operating areas, and to provide a set of possible support recommendations for these missions. This study will focus on the existing maintenance and logistics support structures currently being utilized for missions being performed by the P-3 Orion, and to propose organizational and operational recommendations to better support the agile, flexible, and responsive missions requirement of the P-8A. The result will provide feasible alternatives for decision makers regarding organizational design as well as logistics and maintenance requirements to support overseas deployments to remote, forward operating locations (FOL).

The Strategic Mobility 21 (SM21) Joint Deployment and Distribution Process Technology Demonstration program was mandated by Congress to research, develop, and demonstrate advanced multi-modal logistics technology. The program resulted in the development of an advanced logistics concept known as the Joint Deployment and Distribution Support Platform (JDDSP). The JDDSP combines the physical elements and capabilities of an agile port system (APS) with an information technology enabling architecture that includes business process reengineering and decision support prototype. The concept was initially developed to support dual-use, military and commercial, goods movement in Southern California utilizing a selected inland multi-modal freight hub, or Integrated Logistics Center (ILC), located at Southern California Logistics Airport (SCLA) in Victorville, California as the prototype platform. The JDDSP is designed to provide dual-use load consolidation, cross-dock transshipment support, a logistics buffer, and joint logistics education and training capabilities

Design of a resource strategy for logistics support requires decision-makers to choose to use contracted, blended, or organic support, or a combination thereof, for acquisition products. Non-cost issues have received much less attention than cost in resource strategy design?even though policy requires the incorporation of many non-cost issues. This lack of attention is partially due to the large number of issues that can impact strategy design, the diversity of issue features and impacts, and the diversity of characteristics of programs, their environments, and potential strategies. Although many issues that should be included in logistic planning have been identified, little guidance is provided for how program management teams can incorporate them into logistics support resource strategy design. Tools that facilitate describing logistics requirements and the impacts of resource strategies on program success can potentially improve resource strategy design, assessment, and documentation for review. The structure and use of the Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map for helping program management teams consider a broad range of logistics support resource strategy design issues are described. An example application illustrates the Map's use. Implications for practice and potential future developments tool are discussed.

The purpose of this planned project is to devise a method to evaluate H-1 components as possible candidates for Performance Based Logistics contracts. The objectives of this project are: (1) provide an overview of the H-1 program; (2) provide an overview of Performance Based Logistics contracts for component support; and (3) explore methods of identifying components as PBL candidates specifically for the H-1 community, through an analysis of readiness data, interviews with subject matter experts and use of Crystal Ball as a forecasting mechanism.

This Technical Report establishes the initial Strategic Mobility 21 Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan. The plan is designed to support the deployment of the initial operating capability of the Joint Deployment and Distribution Support Platform (JDDSP). This initial plan is considered a living document that will be updated periodically during the program development effort. For long term experimentation planning, SM21 is following the general guidance provided by the Office of Force Transformation and US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). Additionally, the guidance provided by the Focused Logistics - Joint Operations Concept (JOC); Joint Logistics (Distribution) Joint Integrating Concept (JIC); the Joint Sea Basing JIC; and the Sense and Respond Logistics JIC have been incorporated as appropriate.

Vehicle readiness and availability are critical to supporting our logistics mission, both in peacetime and while we fight the Global War on Terrorism. While heavy and depot-level maintenance, troubleshooting, and diagnostics can be, at least in part, addressed with the use of off-board test sets, operator maintenance requires the insertion of some level of sensing and wireless communications technologies into the vehicle platforms. This helps to accomplish the dissemination of diagnostics data to the mechanic to allow him or her to perform the desired maintenance functions. While many of these solutions are being explored and even used in the Service branches, many more may be available for transition from technology developed by globally influential companies such as International Truck and Engine Corporation. Maintenance technologies developed for the commercial market with process efficiency in mind may have impact on operator-level maintenance practices and procedures in both maintenance hours and platform downtime. These technologies potentially allow for repair activities to commence as soon as the vehicle reaches the depot, rather than having to go through a diagnostics check with off-board test equipment. This study aims to investigate Army maintenance practices and the impacts on maintenance turnaround time of using maintenance technologies developed to service the global marketplace. The main method for data collection on Army systems is utilization of the extensive reports generated from the Army's Integrated Logistics Analysis Program (ILAP). Maintenance turnaround time was analyzed for the Army's M915 series line haul truck in Iraq and at Fort Hood, TX. The M915 was selected based on its close kinship to platforms in commercial long-haul trucking.

The U.S. military logistics management process has a difficult challenge in supporting the war fighter in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment. In response to this challenge, each Service has created a diverse and intricate logistical system that meets the specific Services obligation to support the fight and the war fighter. Service-centric requirements for logistical support have led to multiple variations and some commonalities in logistics management procedures. In a Joint environment, these logistics management processes must converge to allow for common support for the fighting force. This paper will show that the U.S. military must take a joint approach to establish a focused logistics process that provides for the varied Service logistical functions.

This paper will use the Iraqi War as a case study and examine the current logistics capabilities of the ISF, identify important changes and requirements for the successful logistical support of the ISF operations, and propose ways to improve actions in future conflicts. The research reveals definite issues and challenges in planning for the reconstruction and transfer of authority from coalition forces to a stable Iraqi government following the overthrow. Even with the lack of planning, the development of the ISF was rapid, forces were brought on and trained to perform some of the duties required to protect the country, people and property, but their ability to establish a sustainable capability so the coalition forces could hand over responsibility took an extremely long time. Building capabilities and requirements, and training combat service support functions, including medical, transportation, supply management and requisition, and maintenance were all shortcomings the ISF needed to have addressed to achieve the U.S.'s strategic goals in Iraq.

This paper analyzes the strategic implications of leveraging the commercial capabilities already in place across the globe to facilitate logistics/sustainment support for regional joint operations. The paper will provide a review of current joint doctrine on logistics sustainment and the use of commercial industry to satisfy warfighting sustainment requirements. Additionally, it reviews existing vehicles used by the various Services and/or the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) along with other initiatives underway to expand the practice. In assessing strategic implications, the paper examines the impact to both U.S. domestic and international policy when pursuing commercial logistics contracts with non-U.S. commercial entities as a tool for the Combatant Commander's Theater Security Cooperation Strategy.

Shipboard Supply Officers training focuses on maintaining accountability and very little on operational logistics, which is only presented at predeployment briefs that last one or two days. Many Supply Officers suffer information overload during these briefs, thus making the effectiveness of the briefs questionable. On the other hand, there is insufficient information on port services and lessons learned for effective planning. This project proposes the implementation of a Web-Based Logistics Information System to act as a single platform for Naval supply chain and shipboard customers for effective logistics planning and execution, and as an information system for corporate knowledge management. The capability of a Web-based system will optimize Naval supply chain operations, significantly reduce man-hours, provide a mechanism for continuous process improvement, and enable the Naval supply system to become a learning organization.

In 2003, the Department of Defense directed that Evolutionary Acquisition (EA), often referred to as spiral development, become the preferred approach for the acquisition of major weapon systems. Under EA, development, testing, production and fielding of a system take place in increments, once the system reaches a certain stage of maturity. We contend that EA was adopted without consideration of the impact of this approach on logistics support of the system. The result could be degradation of support to each increment of the system and of operational availability. We recommend policy changes that could mitigate the effect of EA on logistics support by elevating the role that logistics play in the testing and milestone approval process for systems acquired using this approach.

This research examines the total life cycle logistics system and performance based logistics (PBL) implementation. This report looks into the application of Defense Acquisition University's 12-step PBL implementation model defined in Performance Based Logistics: A Program Manager's Product Support Guide(March 2005) for the Stryker Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) support. The research consists of a literature review of the Total Life Cycle System Management, Supply Chain Management concepts and performance based logistics. It is followed by a comparative analysis of PBL application between Stryker Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) Program and Turkish Army's advanced Armored Combat Vehicle (ACV) program support practices. This research provides recommendations to improve Turkish Army s weapon system support, and maintainability based on findings and introduces potentials through implementation of PBL practices for the Turkish Army.

Strategy, like politics, is said to be the art of the possible; but surely what is possible is determined not merely by numerical strengths, doctrine, intelligence, arms and tactics, but, in the first place by the hardest facts of all: those concerning requirements, supplies available and expected, organization and administration, transportation and arteries of communication.

The DoD acquisition framework has been the subject of intense scrutiny and reform for almost two decades. Performance based logistics links acquisition and supply chain management in the Total Life Cycle Systems Management and thus may provide the opportunity for true reform resulting in increased weapons system availability and reliability with a smaller and more responsive logistics footprint, all cost effectively. This research project provides an overview of past reform initiatives; assesses the causes of failure or limited success of those reforms; examines the ability of the Department of the Army to implement PBL; and projects PBL's potential benefit to effective Total Life Cycle Systems Management. Finally the paper identifies the major barriers to fully implementing PBL and proposes recommendations on how to move forward to achieve long-term success and lasting DoD acquisition reform.

Logistics modernization, end-to-end logistics, logistics transformation, and just-in-time logistics -- whichever name it is being called today, it is coming and it will change how Marines receive logistical support in the future. Many service members continue to ask "why the need for change?," and why is the Marine Corps placing this transformation so high on the priority list, side by side with the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV)? For years "just-in-case" logistics has been the Marine Corps' primary supply practice, but with better processes and systems, and more education and demonstrations as to what these systems will do for the end user, consumer confidence will increase and "just-in-time" logistics will lead to a lighter and leaner combat logistics support.

Creating Agile Combat Support (ACS) requires real time integrated information systems to support human decision making. Real time sensing technologies are being investigated to improve logistics support. The purpose of this study was to investigate integrated Radio Frequency Identification/Real Time Location System (RFID/RTLS) technology with flightline information for improved decision making for flightline maintenance operations. A simulation was developed that integrated information related to the flightline with RFID location information (Smart Systems). A simulated field test was conducted to compare the Smart Systems integrated condition with an off-the- shelf RFID technology and a baseline condition for providing support for the fix or swap decision.

Logistics constitutes a very complex reality that requires a high level of coordination among many different entities. In the military coalition logistics planning environment this problem is amplified because of the differences in command and control (C2) of the participating coalition members. This project develops a decision Support model for the military coalition logistics problem. As a short-term goal, this project result can be used to provide a proof-of-concept decision model for shared logistics asset deployment and allocation to achieve a single mission. As a long-term goal, the thesis will demonstrate the capability to use a decision support system (DSS) for logistics process management through a simplified constructive simulation. The proposed model is constructive in that it is parameter driven, reflecting the user's perception of the logistics needs and the likelihood that the resource contribution (input) to the system will lead to the intended goal. The DSS developed is known as COLOPS - an acronym for Coalition Logistics Planning System. The COLOPS model can model the costs associated with the coalition effort. The cost can be the tangible and intangibles logistics costs that are often considered in military transportation and logistics. In the present COLOPS version, we concentrate on planning of coalition resource donations, due dates, cost of late delivery, resource reliability as accounted for by attrition, and coalition readiness and nervous metrics. Future extensions should consider optimizing the logistics throughput by considering maintenance costs and the possibility that coalition members can withdraw their support during a mission.

The joint nature of 21st Century warfighting mandates changes in the command and control structure overseeing logistics functions. While there is no debate as to the importance of logistics, there is considerable discussion and disagreement as to command and control issues. Without a truly joint logistic C2 structure, services will continue to rely on existing stove piped capabilities that too often result in ineffective workarounds and disjointed logistics efforts. One approach to resolving this problem is the establishment of a subunified logistics command that would ride the backbone of emerging technology in closing gaps that exist between inter-service logistics capabilities, including control of and use of prepositioned assets. This logical "next step" in logistics command and control is essential in order to exploit past hard lessons learned and to improve the effectiveness of operational logistics.

The focus of this research project is the transformation of defense contracting activities associated with supporting logistics organizations. For purposes of this research paper logistics contracting support is defined as being those contracting activities associated with supporting the organizations providing logistics support to the services to include base operating support services for deployed elements in a combat theatre. It does not include logistics contracting support for post camp or station in the continental United States or permanently deployed units overseas (i.e. - Europe Korea or Japan). In particular this paper will look at the logistics support contracting activities within the Department of Defense the Department of the Air Force the Department of the Navy (including the Marine Corps) and the Department of the Army and make recommendations for providing more efficient contracting support to the service logistics organizations through a joint logistics contracting support organization. This will eliminate redundancies improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the contracting support activities and save operating and procurement costs which can be reprogrammed to support equipment modernization.

Performance-based logistics (PBL) is the DoD-preferred approach for implementing product support. PBL is a strategy for weapon system product support that employs the purchase of support as an integrated performance package designed to bring increased levels of system readiness. PBL describes performance goals for weapon system readiness and encourages the creation of incentives for attaining those goals through clear lines of authority and responsibility. PBL delineates outcome performance goals of weapon systems, ensures that responsibilities are assigned and provides incentives for attaining those goals for the overall life-cycle management of system reliability, supportability, and total ownership cost. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USDAT&L) assigned the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics Plans and Programs) the responsibility to provide oversight or the implementation of PBL within DoD. In September 2001, the "Quadrennial Defense Review" mandated implementation of PBL and modern business systems with appropriate metrics to compress the supply chain, eliminate steps that were "non-value-added" steps, and improve readiness for major weapon systems. In Department of Defense Inspector General Report No. D-2004-110, "The Military Departments" Implementation of Performance-Based Logistics in Support of Weapon Systems," August 23, 2004, we reported that the Military Departments had 257 systems, sub-systems, or components reported as having implemented PBL.

In response to Army experiences in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army Science Board was tasked to investigate: 1) Forces for Theater opening and initial logistics operations; 2) The proposed Deployment Distribution Operations Center; 3) Asset in-transit visibility and management; and 4) Water production, storage, transport, and chilling on the battlefield. Each of these four major topics included numerous subtaskings. The study generated many specific recommendations for improving in-theater logistics distribution, with the major recommendations including: 1a) Revise doctrine to codify the distinction between Joint theater-level and Army/Land Component logistic responsibilities, recognizing the need for a Joint theater-level Logistics commander to direct and execute the theater-level logistics tasks; 1b) Develop a Joint Theater Sustainment Command for assignment to Combatant Commands; 2) Implement useful practices of other services; 3) Complete a thorough business-based cost/benefit analysis of RFID before spending any more money on it; 4) Fix the chlorination problem of ROWPU (Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit) produced water. The study proposed specific force structures for both Joint theater-level and Army/Land Component logistics forces, identified specific practices of other Services that the Army should consider adopting, and identified promising water production technologies for further development.

The objective of this study was to investigate the viability of implementing Integrated Diagnostics incorporating Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM) for Ground Equipment used by the U.S. Marine Corps. The study reviewed the sources of Autonomic Logistics data, the data requirements, the timeliness or required "pull" of such data, its transmission means (in garrison and the field, afloat and ashore), the availability of current or planned logistic systems to receive the data, the Decision Support Tools (DSTs) to transform data into necessary information by which timely and long term support decisions can be made as part of Total Ownership Cost (TOC), and recommended standards for the Corps to apply across existing and planned end items regarding diagnostic sensor integration. The results of the study are presented in the final version of this report as a collection of templates that Program Managers for different items may use for initiating Autonomic Logistics and CBM for the platforms that they are responsible for.

Logistics support to Combatant Commanders has improved significantly since DESERT SHIELD/STORM. DOD logistics has benefited from investments in afloat prepositioning, newer and more capable airlift and sealift platforms, and improvements to mobility infrastructure. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) demonstrated that many logistical challenges still remain. Support units had difficulty keeping pace with a highly mobile combat force. Logistics planners encountered difficulties in meeting unit sustainment demands due to problems with in-transit and total asset visibility (ITV/TAV), which impacted their ability to identify shortages and availability of theater stocks, and pass and track requisitions for critical parts. These impediments prompted decisions to push materiel into and throughout the theater preempting the normal requisitioning process. Overall, OIF demonstrated logistics success; however, it also showed that logistics transformation is needed to adapt to future warfare requirements. Transformation of DOD logistics must occur with emphasis on linkage of sustainment with operations. Logistics planners need battlefield awareness to enable them to respond to warfighter needs as they occur. Future maneuver warfare will have to rely on a transformed logistics system that can effectively push all classes of supply to units in a timely and highly synchronized fashion. This paper will propose a push system of supply as part of a migration to a Sense and Respond logistics model, which represents the type of transformation that is needed to support 21st century maneuver warfare.

The Department of Defense is moving away from a logistics system that relies on moving large quantities of equipment and supplies to the theater just in case it is needed to reduce risk to a much leaner system that will move equipment as needed on a time definite basis. The Joint Staff Director of Logistics Focused Logistics Campaign Plan for a joint deployment and rapid distribution system is to provide the combatant commander with ." . .a system to optimize rapid projection delivery and handoff of joint forces and sustainment worldwide." The Air Force specifically is reducing its deployment footprint by reducing spares and relying on reach back to the CONUS. The Logistics Campaign Plan and Joint Doctrine list five options for management of Joint Theater Logistics. Current doctrine relies on expanding the capabilities of the J-4 or delegating responsibility to a JTF commander. However with the change in focus to rapid moving equipment as needed and with the increased risk inherent in this type of system it may be time to establish a Joint Forces Logistics Component Commander (JFLogCC) in doctrine to manage the new logistics systems envisioned in the Focused Logistics Campaign Plan. I will argue that it is time and that the JFLogCC should be similar to the JFACC. The JFLogCC should come from the Service with the preponderance of logistics requirements and the ability to control logistics.

The Office of Naval Research (ONR) has a requirement to develop and evaluate supportability alternatives and to develop a support plan for the LSC (X) project. The LSC (X), commonly known as X-Craft, is a high-speed littoral vessel that is being built for the purpose of experimentation and testing. The X-Craft is under construction and is expected to be delivered to ONR approximately October 2004. A support plan is necessary to ensure the X-Craft is properly configured and supported for operational employment. During the early stage after vessel delivery, there is a requirement to manage this plan through a transition period until the designated support manager is under contract and/or provided with the resources to execute the plan.

The concept of Marine Corps Integrated Logistic Capability (ILC) Logistic Modernization (LM) as currently planned needs to consider the practical of the Ground Combat Element (CGE) in order to become a fully mature concept. The three principle ILC and LM initiatives concerning the GCE are the Information Technology (IT) Operational Architecture (OA), Realignment Of Supply (ROS) with supply consolidation at the intermediate Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) and the Realignment Of Maintenance (ROM) with collapsing the Echelons Of Maintenance (EOM) from five Echelons to three. The three initiatives have a history of development since the ILC initiative was first presented in FY 1998/1999. All three ILC initiatives have created various reactions within the GCE, mostly negative up to this point. However, now the logistics community is moving past ILC and is evolving toward a mature logistics concept for the future with Logistics Modernization which still encompasses all three initiatives. The three initiatives each have areas of concern for the GCE. The principle concern for the OA initiative is the lack of communications infrastructure that will support the key stone of the new logistics system, the Global Combat Service Support-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC) system. The lack of adequate communications systems at the battalion level and below will create serious problems for a system that requires connectivity at all levels to work well. The principle concern for the ROS is the consolidation of the supply functions at the CSSE level with potentially inadequate distribution assets to support units across the future battle space. The principle concern for the ROM is the potential loss of personnel from the GCE and migrated to the CSSE. In addition, the question of which commander, GCE or CSSE, will determine logistics priorities for the GCE is also an area of concern.

In order for the Marine Aviation Logistic Support Program to remain effective, meet current needs, and future warfighting doctrine, the component programs must be analyzed in relation to each other, and modern business practices applied to develop a more effective aviation logistics system. As the military services transform into a more responsive force to meet current needs and developing threats our current aviation logistic support programs must evolve. Our ever-changing military with the focus towards seabasing compels us to break our assumptions, apply simple methodologies to improve, and work smarter. The proven methods of businesses that transitioned from "good to great" and the Theory of Constraints (TOC) provide a line of attack that encourages common sense instead of common practice. Current practices in aviation logistics are failing to adequately support the warfighter and the current metrics in Marine Aviation do not accurately display how to effect positive change in performance. Aviation logistics requires a paradigm shift in its procedures in order to improve aircraft readiness. Courageous leaders effect change by not accepting the status quo, and seek to revolutionize the aviation logistics business. A process of ongoing improvement demands never being satisfied with the system's capability, and application of proven business practices will enable continuous improvement. The improve our support capability, our leadership must institutionalize the goal to optimize effectiveness across all levels of support to keep airplanes flying, which requires a change of approach to leadership and management.

The purpose of the Reduction of Total Ownership Costs (R-TOC) program is to achieve readiness improvements in weapon systems by improving the reliability of the systems or the efficiency of the processes used to support them. New technologies and management practices may provide significant opportunities to improve readiness and reduce ownership costs. In recent years, world-class suppliers have achieved cost reductions while making major improvements in customer support. Some Department of Defense (DoD) programs have achieved similar successes in adopting private sector improvements in logistics and supply chain management. A May 1999 memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD/AT&L) stressed that the purpose of R-TOC was to maintain or improve current readiness while reducing operations and support (O&S) costs. The memorandum instructed the Services to focus on three general R-TOC approaches. * Reliability and maintainability (R&M) improvements * Reduction of supply chain response time and reduction of logistics footprint * Competitive product support

The transforming Army must reduce its logistical demands and footprint to enable the force to be strategically responsive and dominant in the XXI century. To be strategically responsive and dominant, the Army's Transformation Campaign Plan has established three principal goals for Logistics Transformation: (1) Enhanced strategic responsiveness: (2) Reduced logistics footprint: (3) Reduced cost of logistics support without reducing readiness or war fighting capabilities. These goals provide the measure of success for ensuring the Army forces in the future can rapidly deploy and effectively sustain full spectrum operations.

As the Department of Defense (DoD) continues to transform into a more efficient and coordinated fighting force, the elements of logistics support will continue to become more complex and will require more efficient ways of communication. The component Services currently have a myriad of logistics systems available to support their individual Service members. Many of these systems are not interoperable even within the same Service. The DoD has initiated the development of the Global Combat Support System (GCSS) to expand logistical information to operational levels. In recent years, private industry has been using the extensible Mark-up Language (XML) to promote interoperability among related industry partners via common or standard XML-based data exchanges. The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) also has recently selected the XML registry for the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) Common Operating Environment (COE). The development of this registry provides a platform for enabling the standardization of DoD logistics data elements. If the DoD could develop a standard XML-based data exchange for logistics support, all of those systems that are currently in use could be mapped to the new standard exchange to provide an exchange of information between computer systems that currently do not have that capability. The standard logistics data definitions within GCSS could be used as a starting point to augment existing data element definitions in the DISA XML registry. By cross-referencing and augmenting the existing logistics data definitions in the DISA XML registry with the standard definitions within GCSS, the DoD could begin to manage the myriad of logistics data definitions and move forward in developing a standard joint logistics data exchange. (3 figures, 24 refs.)

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) promulgated a broad transformational road map in "Power and Access... From the Sea". The road map presents Sea Basing as a new concept in staging, supporting, and reconstituting joint land forces from a sea base. Sea Basing will depend heavily on new, innovative approaches to logistics to both enable and support it. This paper reviews relevant cutting-edge logistics efforts (e.g., performance based logistics, material-in-transit tracking, forward positioning, just-in-time delivery, standardized COSAL, etc.) and presents necessary logistics transformations in order to realize the CNO's goal.

The Air Force Global Engagement vision and Expeditionary Air Force (EAF) strategy focus on the Agile Combat Support (ACS) core competency as the foundation for the rapid projection of light, lean, and lethal aerospace power forces. This research examines the evolution of Air Force logistics doctrine, the linkage between doctrine, strategy, tactics, and training programs, and the corresponding application of logistics employment and sustainment functions in a deployed environment. To do so, this research analyzes the USAF's diverse logistics officer training programs to determine if there is a deficiency in interdisciplinary logistics employment and sustainment training. It ascertains if that training shortfall reveals a gap between Air Force logistics doctrine and EAF combat strategy. It also investigates the Air Force transition to the Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) operational employment concept as the force projection mechanism for the EAF and the reliance on ACS has the primary enabler to identify specific areas where the absence of integrated logistics training impacts or potentially degrades mission success. After these factors have been adequately analyzed and interpreted, this research highlights the Army logistics officer-training philosophy as a benchmark to gauge the effectiveness of integrated logistics training on expeditionary strategy and logistics officer professional career development. The origins, course development, and utility of the USAF Weapons School are presented as an historical reference for creating congruency between doctrine, tactics, and training. The Red Flag training exercises are offered as a model for operational requirements driven training and as an example of the opportunity to integrate logistics employment training in existing combat exercises.

As the current review of DOD structures, capabilities, and plans are coming to completion and moving into implementation phases, a focus to maintain is the delivery of mission capabilities for the front line war fighters. The mission capabilities packages are supported by the material, and also by the materiel support process, which includes not only the hardware, but more importantly the people, training, maintenance and support, and the doctrine, concepts of operations, tactics, techniques, and procedures for the material. Following an updated discussion on Operational Engineering, this paper expands the authors concept of Operational Engineering, to several applied logistics options and discussions in support of rapid decisive operations. It finishes with an introduction discussion of a Logistics Commander Operational Planning Tool, which potentially can support and enable generation of rapid decisive operations. This tool could assist Combatant Commanders and their war fighters to operate inside the decision cycle of opponents on the front lines.

Since the demise of the Soviet Union, NATO has expanded its original mission from collective defense to collective security. Part of this transition includes undertaking out-of-area peace support operations with multinational rapid reaction forces. These new missions have serious implications for logistics. NATO logistics, which traditionally have been exclusively a national responsibility, can no longer be successfully executed in this manner as stovepiped logistics do not achieve an acceptable level of unity of effort to make the best use of limited resources or maximize logistics power. To effectively undertake out-of-area operations with multinational forces in the future, the Alliance requires improved capabilities in mobility, logistical integration and sustainability, and logistics command and control. Furthermore, to make the most effective use of these new capabilities and to efficiently manage the unique logistics requirements of a rapid reaction force operating outside Alliance territory, NATO should establish a standing multinational logistics command.

It has been widely recognized and long known that logistics is vital to any army; however, it is equally understood that logistics has always been one of the limiting factors of military operations. Today, the U.S. Army stands at a point in time when both the technology and the opportunity to transform are present for consideration in designing a new force. Army leaders envision a highly effective objective force that is capable of being rapidly deployed anywhere on the globe to fight in any environment. This objective force must be designed and fielded in such a manner as to require a minimum amount of logistics support. This paper addresses the charter requirement to reduce the combat zone combat support (CS) and combat service support (OSS) footprint, or stated another way, this paper addresses the charter to shrink the logistics tail. This paper posits several ways in which such a reduction may be achieved. Areas for potential methods of achieving this charter are described, and include: modifying doctrine, reducing consumption requirements, and inserting CS/CSS enablers.

The CSA has stated "the transformation objective is to field a force that is strategically responsive and dominant every point on the spectrum of operations." To support this vision, Army logistics requires a quantum leap in strategic responsiveness. This change is called "Revolution in Military Logistics," to know what the customer, the Warfighter, needs before he requests it. This study examines proposed improvements in automation, communications, and business practices; reshaping command and control relationships; and development of distribution technologies that will facilitate rapid throughput and follow-on sustainment to support the CSA's vision. This study evaluates all components of RML and discusses the strategies that should be adopted by the logistics community as part of the Army's Revolution in Military Logistics.

Logistics doctrine, methods, skills, force structure and procedures must be analyzed and potentially radically modified to reduce the Logistics Footprint. This paper will examine current logistics doctrine, method, and procedures, organizational relationships and infrastructure. The author examines how reduction of the Logistics Footprint will impact the direction of the current transformation, and the path to focused logistics as the transformation endstate. The reduction of the Logistics Footprint will be facilitated through a systems effort and review. Enablers such as mobility, real-time IT links, forward positioning and redistribution will be reviewed for value and applicability toward down sizing the Logistics Footprint.

Joint Vision 2020 calls for a transformation in military capabilities to support U.S. global interests. The fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of terrorism accent the need to reshape our forces for maximum flexibility in an uncertain environment. Focused Logistics is one of the four primary capabilities that must be developed to meet the challenges of the future. An evolution in logistics processes, Focused Logistics will provide the resource management backbone for future military operational planning. In order to develop this capability, the following challenges must be addressed: joint deployment and rapid distribution, information fusion, multinational logistics, agile infrastructure, and joint theater logistics management. The development and integration of information technology is the key to addressing these challenges and creating a final Focused Logistics solution that enhances the operational commander's ability to successfully direct the joint force of the future.

Since the earliest days of the U.S. Armed Forces, civilians in some form or fashion have assisted or facilitated our mission. A level of private sector involvement has varied based upon the tempo of operations, historical events and various reform initiatives. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and its spin off, the Department of Defense Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA) is a classic example of the door widening to further privatize military functions. This is all based upon the premise of fair, competitive outsourcing and finding private corporations that perform the same function but with more efficiency and less cost. The desired end state is an agile DoD infrastructure that has a reduced logistics foot print and a shared reliance with the commercial industry for innovation, technology insertion and systems support. One way of reducing the logistics footprint of the U.S. Army has been through the introduction of Theater Contractor Logistics Support (CLS). There is a growing reliance on CLS battlefield contractors, which accordingly can enhance or degrade military effectiveness. The underlying problems with this contractual arrangement are manifested within the details of the contracts and the laws that support them. The intent of this research will be to review this process over time and uncover the good and the bad of these business relationships. Furthermore, to examine the risks and benefits associated with them and prove that shedding some aspects of the logistics footprint to the private sector not only makes sense but also provides a gateway to transformation.

This report documents the results of research activities associated with the development of a framework for the Logistics Decision Support Tool (LDST). The specific research activities conducted as part of this effort included: 1) identifying deficiencies and shortfalls associated with current processes used to develop logistics support concepts for space systems, 2) specifying LDST functional requirements to help address these deficiencies and shortfalls, 3) performing a survey of current logistics support tools and software technologies that can be leveraged-on to address LDST requirements, 4) estimating a return on investment for LDST, and 5) development of design concepts to demonstrate the core functions of the LDST.

The Revolution in Military Logistics (RML) and Focused Logistics requires us to view sustainment needs and requirements in a new perspective. Gone are the days when brute force and the sheer mass of materiel and numbers of soldiers can be counted on to overcome any mobilization, deployment, sustainment, or maintenance situation. Army logistics has changed and is changing through a series of established and emerging operational concepts that, for the most part, have been on divergent paths. This has been the prevailing theme until the recent introduction of Focused Logistics. Focused logistics has taken the tenets of Force XXI, Battlefield Distribution, Velocity Management, Army After Next, and the Revolution In Military Logistics and fused them to an overall organizational process. These capabilities coupled with redesigned organizational structures and doctrine should improve the overall management of systems and reduce the current stovepipe logistics system. The bottom line is that Focused Logistics provides the desired ideal endstate for sustaining the force as envisioned by the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA). The author looks at this evolutionary process and discusses the major muscle movements that have guided the Army's path to the point where we are today.

This strategy research project analyzes the logistics automation initiatives planned by the Army and provides an assessment of their ability to support Joint Vision 2020 and Army transformation efforts. Department of Defense Reform Initiative Directive (DRID) #54 - Logistics Transformation Plans provides the central guidance necessary to direct required changes in logistics automation. DRID #54 directs the services to develop a total asset visibility capability and field a web-based shared data environment for logistics data by FY 2004. Developing these capabilities faces notable management, funding, communication and contractor challenges.

Doctrinally, Joint Vision 2020 and Focused Logistics, as well as the Air Force's Vision for Global Engagement and Agile Combat Support, chart a course for the future of logistics as a foundation to operations support. These visions place great demands on the logistician and logistics infrastructure to provide rapid, scaled, and agile logistics to the operator worldwide. To meet those demands, the Logistician requires enhanced information support for logistics command and control issues. Early evidence suggests that one of the major constraints in achieving Agile Combat Support and short-notice expeditionary operations is our Logistics Command and Control (Log C2) infrastructure. The AF requires an infrastructure that facilitates force support planning, execution, and monitoring across all operational phases of all missions. The purpose of this task is to develop a cluster society based on DARPA's Advanced Logistics Project (ALP) infrastructure. This is a continuation of the GSA contract titled ALP AEF Initiative (F41624-99-F-0003). The primary focus of this delivery order is to add additional functionality that was developed under the previous effort. This effort will focus on adding functionality for supporting multiple concurrent operations plans (OPLANS).

Combatant commanders need well-trained and responsive theater logistics capabilities beginning in the earliest days of any operation. While employment of a deployable joint task force augmentation cell (DJTFAC) provides overall joint staff expertise, a DJTFAC-modeled logistics augmentation cell (LOGAC) can provide the commander's J-4 staff the joint perspective and cohesion needed in a rapidly developing theater. Historically, examples abound of how overwhelming US logistical capability rose to meet the challenges of the past. The US may not have this luxury in the future. Joint Vision 2020 and those charged with reshaping the DoD's future have articulated anticipated future demands upon logistics systems. Logisticians must offer the CINC enhanced unity of effort, insist on a smaller logistics footprint, avoid duplication of effort, and do all this in an increasingly complex technological environment. Enhanced J-4 staffs, separate logistics commands, and the US Army's Theater Support Command represent several of the suggested logistics C2 organizations intended to meet current and future demands. Unfortunately, significant drawbacks and obstacles for each must be overcome. The LOGAC concept provides an effective response to the theater logistics problems encountered in the past and can meet anticipated future challenges. It can enhance the ability of any theater logistics C2 organization and provide the CINC or a designated JTF commander needed logistics expertise and enable combat capability.

Logistics Management under transformation must be revolutionized to insure full compliance is realized and demonstrated in both the Interim and Objective Force concepts. A 'total system' including both combat and logistics must be developed in parallel to maximize efficiencies. Undoubtedly, weapon system enhancements will have major impacts on the current logistics business process. The author examines how the Army transformation strategy will impact the logistics revolution currently in progress. The reduction of the logistical footprint utilizing key enablers such as commonality of systems parts, using reach-back as a critical path for 'focused logistics' and meshing the acquisition process with a combination of logistical concepts. This paper will examine current logistical processes and how the organizations, systems, and business processes must be transformed to meet the Objective Force end-state.

The pressure on DoD to reduce costs will continue and mission accomplishment will depend on a clear vision void of Service parochial altitudes. Joint Vision (JV) 2010 was developed to leverage technology to achieve increased effectiveness as the template to transform DoD into a more effective joint force. Its four operational concepts-dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimension protection, and focused logistics-aim at full-spectrum dominance. Focused Logistics is the fusion of logistics information and transportation technologies for rapid crisis response, deployment, and delivery of tailored logistics packages directly to the warfighter. It requires an end-to-end understanding of the supply chain with integrated information and technology to reduce the logistics footprint for more agile sustainment around the globe. DoD must achieve dramatic improvement to attain focused logistics thus; reengineering of the supply system is required. This paper examines the feasibility of replacing the current inefficient supply system with a commercially available single, seamless, supply chain management system. It looks at some current initiatives and who's in charge of them. The issue -- Can the Services work together to develop an effective distribution based supply system that reduces cost and shrinks the logistics footprint? Or, will DoD nibble around the edges and continue suboptimizing the potential improvements available through effective use of technology so adroitly called for in JV 2010?