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In this paper I will discuss different senses of Kant's notion of life and the types of self-consciousness associated with them. I will point out that this association is a key element to consider when assessing the Kantian theory of self-consciousness as a whole and in this context I will specially emphasize the role played by the feeling of life described by Kant in the Critique of Judgment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to analyze the phenomenon of happiness according to Scheler in three steps. Firstly, as a spiritual feeling within the framework of the classification of the strata of feelings, revealing itself, above all, as an act rather than as a state. Secondly, this character of act is analyzed more deeply as a source of meaning. Finally, happiness is proposed as sign of the person's essential identity, and the opposite feeling, desperation, is briefly discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The understanding of love as a movement towards higher values is inspired in the central case of love: love between personal beings. Despite its undeniable merits, Scheler's account of this kind of love does not sufficiently explain how the uniqueness of the beloved is given to the person who loves. Moreover his view wrongly interprets spiritual love as love of the sacred and considers the omor amicitiae as a straightforward case of psychic love. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mandeville proposed a magnified version of Hobbes' self-interest theory. Mandeville expresses provocatively that in spite of the traditional censure of egoism, it is fruitful for social development. Hume and Adam Smith reacted against this position and presented alternatives to it from the theory of moral sentiments and the necessity of considering ethics from a detached point of view. Some moral sentiments such as sympathy are completely different from self-interest. Furthermore, reason and experience show us the convenience of creating a sort of impartial judge to evaluate actions without getting involved in them. Even if Smith approaches the traditional idea of moral conscience, his and Hume's proposal do not fulfill the requirements of the real moral agent as they remain as abstract models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]