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The maritime shipping industry will increasingly switch to low carbon fuels and adopt energy saving technologies (ESTs) to achieve the industry target of decarbonization. Among ESTs, deck equipment, including those based on wind propulsion technologies (WPTs), represents the largest potential fuel savings and a source of increasing innovation initiatives by industry actors. Previous contributions to WPT innovation have addressed barriers and drivers for increased adoption in the industry but failed to consider the specific aspects of the fleet retrofitting market. Through an agent-based simulation model, this work studies the effects of different policy and market scenarios (subsidies, fuel prices, and networking) on the adoption of WPT retrofitting solutions. The proposed model incorporates two decision steps for each vessel to adopt the technology (acquiring awareness of the technology, and a utility decision process to determine the WPT option). The study also expands on previous knowledge by modeling three WPT options and by integrating real world data of technology costs and their fuel savings as well as vessel features. Insights from simulations allow to identify the most convenient policies as well as the potential of alternative models to reduce introduction barriers (e.g., product-service business models)., Interreg North Sea Region project WASP: Wind Assisted Ship Propulsion, "Run Wind Propulsion Technology real life trials on sea going ships in operation, showcase proven concepts, market adaptation, green sea transport" 38-2-6-19, Spanish Ministry of Science, Andalusian Government, European Commission RYC-2016-19800, ERDF under CONFIA PID2021-122916NB-I00, ERDF under SIMARK P18-TP-4475

M.C. was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science, Andalusian Government, University of Granada, and ERDF under grants SIMARK (P18-TP-4475) , RYC-2016-19800, and PPJIA2020-09 (TURCOMPLEX) . J.H. was supported by the University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, under grant COVID-19 04. M.P. was supported by the Slovenian Research Agency (Grant Nos. P1-0403 and J1-2457) . Funding for open access charge: Universidad de Granada/CBUA., Many countries worldwide rely on tourism for their economic well-being and development. But with issues such as over-tourism and environmental degradation looming large, there is a pressing need to determine a way forward in a sustainable and mutually rewarding manner. With this motivation, we here propose an asymmetric evolutionary game with mobility where local stakeholders and tourists can either cooperate or defect in a spatially structured setting. Our study reflects that sustainable tourism is primarily determined by an optimal trade-off between economic benefits of the stakeholders and their costs related to the application of sustainability policies. In contrast, the specific benefits and costs of the tourists are comparatively less relevant. The reader can also observe that allowing for greater tourist mobility decreases cooperation and leads to faster polarization among local stakeholders. In agreement with observations worldwide, we identify decreasing population densities in tourist areas in terms of both, stakeholders and tourists, to be a key aid to greater cooperation and overall sustainability of tourism. These results are rooted in spatial formations and complex alliances that manifest spontaneously through the evolutionary dynamics in a structured population., Spanish Ministry of Science, Andalusian Government, University of Granada, European Commission P18-TP-4475 RYC-2016-19800 PPJIA2020-09, University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria COVID-19 04, Slovenian Research Agency - Slovenia P1-0403 J1-2457, Universidad de Granada/CBUA

We investigate the effects of update rules on the dynamics of an evolutionary game-theoretic model – the N-player evolutionary trust game – consisting of three types of players: investors (trusters), trustworthy trustees, and untrustworthy trustees. Interactions among players are constrained by local neighborhoods predefined by spatial or social network topologies. We compare different evolutionary update rules with behaviors that rely on the level of payoffs obtained by neighbors. In particular, we study the dynamics resulting from players using a deterministic rule (i.e., unconditional imitation with and without using a noise process induced by a voter model), a stochastic pairwise payoff-based strategy (i.e., proportional imitation), and stochastic local Wright-Fisher processes. We study these dynamics with different social network structures and varying levels of game difficulty. We see that there are significant differences on the level of promoted trust and global net wealth depending on the update rule. Under ‘harder’ game settings, rules based on unconditional imitation achieve the highest global net wealth in the population. We observe that there are key spatio-temporal correlations in the system for all rules. The update rules lead to the formation of fractal structures on a lattice, and low frequencies in the output signal of the system (i.e., long-term memory) when the rules are stochastic., This work is jointly supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities, the National Agency for Research Funding AEI, and ERDF (EU) under grants EXASOCO (PGC2018-101216-B-I00) and PACSS (RTI2018-093732-B-C22), and incentive funds from the School of Electrical Engineering and Computing, The University of Newcastle, Australia. M. Chica is supported through the Ramón y Cajal program (RYC-2016-19800). J. J. Ramasco acknowledges partial funding from the Maria de Maeztu program of the AEI for Units of Excellence in R&D (MDM-2017-0711).