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Pre-stimulus alpha (α) activity can influence perception of shortly presented, low-contrast stimuli. The underlying mechanisms are often thought to affect perception exactly at the time of presentation. In addition, it is suggested that α cycles determine temporal windows of integration. However, in everyday situations, stimuli are usually presented for periods longer than ∼100 ms and perception is often an integration of information across space and time. Moving objects are just one example. Hence, the question is whether α activity plays a role also in temporal integration, especially when stimuli are integrated over several α cycles. Using electroencephalography (EEG), we investigated the relationship between pre-stimulus brain activity and long-lasting integration in the sequential metacontrast paradigm (SQM), where two opposite vernier offsets, embedded in a stream of lines, are unconsciously integrated into a single percept. We show that increases in α power, even 300 ms before the stimulus, affected the probability of reporting the first offset, shown at the very beginning of the SQM. This effect was mediated by the systematic slowing of the α rhythm that followed the peak in α power. No phase effects were found. Together, our results demonstrate a cascade of neural changes, following spontaneous bursts of α activity and extending beyond a single moment, which influences the sensory representation of visual features for hundreds of milliseconds. Crucially, as feature integration in the SQM occurs before a conscious percept is elicited, this also provides evidence that α activity is linked to mechanisms regulating unconscious processing.

A recurring idea in psychology is that one is conscious only of the “outputs” of mental operations, but not of the operations themselves. Often, such “entry into consciousness” occurs involuntarily. To investigate involuntary entry, some experimentalists have used the reflexive imagery task (RIT). The RIT has revealed that, under certain conditions, external stimuli (e.g., line drawings) can elicit involuntary entry of high-level cognitions. In the basic version of the task, participants are presented with visual objects and instructed not to subvocalize (i.e., say in one's head) the names of these objects. Participants cannot suppress these subvocalizations on a majority of the trials. It has been proposed that, if RIT effects resemble a reflex, then perhaps they will habituate as reflexes do. In the “habituation” variant of the RIT, the same stimulus object (e.g., CAT) is presented on ten consecutive trials (ten “instantiations”), in order to induce habituation (i.e., a weakened RIT effect). It remains unknown whether such habituation effects arise for stimulus-elicited processes that depend, not on subvocalization, but on more complex processes, such as mental arithmetic. To illuminate this issue, we conducted a conceptual replication of the “habituation” RIT that involves, on each trial, the participant trying not to add two numbers (e.g., 14 and 2). We assessed whether the habituation effects were stimulus-specific or set-specific. Understanding the boundary conditions of the RIT effect and its habituation illuminates the limits of unconscious processes and the role of conscious processing.

Laboratory tasks have revealed that mental representations (e.g., mental imagery) can enter consciousness in a manner that is involuntary, reliable, and insuppressible. These effects illuminate the capacities of involuntary processes as well as the function of voluntary, conscious processing. The Reflexive Imagery Task was developed a decade ago to investigate these involuntary effects systematically. Can refreshing yield such involuntary effects? Refreshing is the reactivating in mind of a mental representation that was activated moments ago. It is associated with mental rehearsal and executive function. We investigated whether a mental representation (subvocalization of an object name) can arise in consciousness involuntarily after a delayed interval, when the relevant stimulus is no longer present, and in response to a cue. In Experiment 1, participants were instructed not to refresh a previously presented (6 s before) stimulus in response to a cue. Involuntary refreshing occurred on a substantive proportion (0.56) of the trials. Experiment 2 replicated and extended this finding (proportion of the trials = 0.53) with a refreshing task that was more challenging than that of Experiment 1. Our findings suggest that mental representations arising from processes such as refreshing can occur involuntarily. We discuss the theoretical implications of this conclusion.

The perception of eye gaze is crucial for social interaction, providing essential information about another person’s goals, intentions, and focus of attention. People with schizophrenia suffer a wide range of social cognitive deficits, including abnormalities in eye gaze perception. For instance, patients have shown an increased bias to misjudge averted gaze as being directed toward them. In this study we probed early unconscious mechanisms of gaze processing in schizophrenia using a technique known as continuous flash suppression. Previous research using this technique to render faces with direct and averted gaze initially invisible reveals that direct eye contact gains privileged access to conscious awareness in healthy adults. We found that patients, as with healthy control subjects, showed the same effect: faces with direct eye gaze became visible significantly faster than faces with averted gaze. This suggests that early unconscious processing of eye gaze is intact in schizophrenia and implies that any misjudgments of gaze direction must manifest at a later conscious stage of gaze processing where deficits and/or biases in attributing mental states to gaze and/or beliefs about being watched may play a role.

Can one have a phenomenal experience to which one does not have access? That is, can you experience something without knowing? The dissociation between phenomenal (P) and access (A) consciousness is widely debated. A major challenge to the supporters of this dissociation is the apparent inability to experimentally demonstrate that P-without-A consciousness exists; once participants report having a P-experience, they already have access to it. Thus, all previous empirical support for this dissociation is indirect. Here, using a novel paradigm, we create a situation where participants (Experiment 1, N = 40) lack online access to the stimulus yet are nevertheless able to retrospectively form judgements on its phenomenal, qualitative aspects. We further show that their performance cannot be fully explained by unconscious processing or by a response to stimulus offset (Experiment 2, N = 40). This suggests that P and A consciousness are not only conceptually distinct, but might also be teased apart empirically. STATEMENT OF RELEVANCE: A critical question in the scientific quest towards solving the problem of consciousness focuses on the ability to isolate conscious experiences at their purity, without any accompanying cognitive processes. This challenge has been augmented by a highly influential - yet controversial - dissociation suggested by the philosopher Ned Block between Phenomenal consciousness, or the "what it is like" to have an experience, and Access consciousness, indexing the ability to report that one has that experience. Critically, these two types of consciousness most typically go together, making it highly difficult - if not impossible - to isolate Phenomenal consciousness. Our work shows that the dissociation between phenomenal and access consciousness is not merely conceptual, but can also be empirically demonstrated. It further opens the gate to future studies pinpointing the neural correlates of the two types of consciousness., Competing Interests: Declaration of Competing Interest The authors declare no competing interests., (Copyright © 2023 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

In continuous flash suppression (CFS), an image presented to one eye is suppressed from awareness by a dynamic image masker presented to the other eye. Previous studies report that face stimuli break out of CFS more readily when they are oriented upright and contain ecologically relevant information such as facial expressions or direct eye gaze, potentially implicating face processing in the mechanisms of interocular competition. It is unknown, however, whether face content helps to drive interocular suppression when incorporated into the dynamic masker itself, either by engaging higher-level visual mechanisms that underlie face detection or due to lower-level image features that the faces happen to contain. To investigate this, we devised a dynamic mask composed of upright faces and tested how well it suppressed detection of face or grating targets presented to the other eye. Relative contributions of higher-level and lower-level features were compared by manipulating the image properties of the mask. Results show that the dynamic face mask is strikingly effective at suppressing sensory input presented to the opposing eye, but its effectiveness is largely attributable to image texture, which can be quantified in terms of image entropy and edge density. This is because strong suppression was still observed following phase-scrambling or spatial inversion of the face elements, and while a target-selective effect was observed for the face mask, inverting the face elements to interfere with configural processing did not significantly diminish this effect. Thus, visual properties of faces, such as their image entropy and complex phase structure, predominate in driving interocular suppression rather than face detection per se., (Copyright © 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Perceiving object viewpoint is important for appropriate action. Here we investigated whether viewpoint information could be represented in the absence of awareness, by measuring viewpoint adaptation aftereffect from visual objects rendered invisible through interocular suppression. Participants adapted to either a visible or an invisible line-drawing cube with unambiguous viewpoint, then viewed an ambiguous Necker cube and reported its perceived viewpoint. In both the visible and invisible adaptation conditions, participants more likely perceived the Necker cube in opposite viewpoint compared to the adapting cube. Interestingly, this viewpoint aftereffect was still observed when the adapting and testing cubes were different in size. However, when the testing Necker cube was in a different location, the viewpoint aftereffect was only observed following visible adapting cube, abolished when the adapting cube was invisible. Thus object viewpoint representation could be established without awareness, and such unconscious viewpoint representation is size-invariant but location-specific. Object viewpoint representation requires conscious awareness to be globally accessible., (Published by Elsevier B.V.)

Background: Conscious perception of external stimuli has been related to recurrent activity in distributed cortical networks, although brain mechanisms controlling unconscious processing and stimuli access to conscious report need to be clarified., Objective: This study aims at investigating modulations in cortical excitability related to conscious perception and unconscious processing of face stimuli with different visibility levels., Methods: We used TMS-EEG over the right occipital face area (rOFA), or the right premotor cortex (rPMC) as control site, to measure cortical excitability during a backward masking paradigm with individually defined stimuli visibility., Results: Event related potentials showed significant differences for faces compared to houses, and detected faces compared to missed ones, 200 ms post target onset. TMS over rOFA, but not over rPMC, triggered a relative positivity starting 150 ms post target when faces with high visibility were consciously reported. Moreover, rOFA TMS evoked differential responses for high versus low visible faces in conscious and unconscious processing at 290-390 and 180-240 ms, respectively., Conclusion: Results unveiled a causal link between rOFA excitability and late responses related to access to conscious perception, suggesting a critical role of recurrent activity, but distinct components, for consciously perceived stimuli and unconscious face processing., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Recent research shows that prior experience and expectations strongly enhance a visual stimulus' access to conscious awareness. However, whether such advance knowledge also influences this stimulus' indirect impact on behavior is poorly understood. The resolution of this question has the potential of providing strong tests between current models of conscious perception because these diverge on whether a factor that affects conscious access by a stimulus necessarily also affects the strength of this stimulus' representation and hence, its indirect impact on behavior. In five experiments we show that three different manipulations of prior experience with a stimulus boosted conscious perception of a similar stimulus (measured using both subjective reports and objective performance) but did not affect its indirect impact on motor action (measured by response priming). In particular, we observed a robust "awareness priming" effect: how clearly a stimulus was subjectively perceived on a recent trial irrespective of its physical strength, strongly affected conscious perception of a similar stimulus on the current trial but did not increase response priming. We discuss the implications of these findings for current models of conscious vision as well as for the study of unconscious processing., (Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Direct gaze is a potent non-verbal signal that establishes a communicative connection between two individuals, setting the course for further interactions. Although consciously perceived faces with direct gaze have been shown to capture attention, it is unknown whether an attentional preference for these socially meaningful stimuli exists even in the absence of awareness. In two experiments, we recorded participants' eye movements while they were exposed to faces with direct and averted gaze rendered invisible by interocular suppression. Participants' inability to correctly guess the occurrence of the faces in a manual forced-choice task demonstrated complete unawareness of the faces. However, eye movements were preferentially directed towards faces with direct compared to averted gaze, indicating a specific sensitivity to others' gaze directions even without awareness. This oculomotor preference suggests that a rapid and automatic establishment of mutual eye contact constitutes a biological advantage, which could be mediated by fast subcortical pathways in the human brain., (Copyright © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Many everyday skills are unconsciously learned through repetitions of the same behaviour by binding independent motor acts into unified sets of actions. However, our ability to be consciously aware of producing newly and highly trained motor skills raises the question of the role played by conscious awareness of action upon skill acquisition. In this study we strengthened conscious awareness of self-produced sequential finger movements by way of asking participants to judge their performance in terms of maximal fluency after each trial. Control conditions in which participants did not make any judgment or performance-unrelated judgments were also included. Findings indicate that conscious awareness of action, enhanced via subjective appraisal of motor efficiency, potentiates sensorimotor learning and skilful motor production in optimising the processing and sequencing of action units, as compared to the control groups. The current work lends support to the claim that the learning and skilful expression of sensorimotor behaviours might be grounded upon our ability to be consciously aware of our own motor capability and efficiency., (Copyright © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Background: Large amount of data concerning the neural mechanisms that mediate unconscious vision come from cortically blind patients who can process stimuli presented in their blind visual field. How well the findings generalize to neurologically healthy humans remains open., Objective: Using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), we studied whether chromatic processing depends on the early visual cortex in healthy participants., Method: We employed a phenomenon called the redundant target effect (RTE): simple reaction times to two stimuli are faster than to one stimulus, even when one of the stimuli is presented outside consciousness., Results: The RTE produced by chromatically defined stimuli disappeared when the contralateral stimulus of two bilateral stimuli was suppressed from consciousness., Conclusions: In contrast to studies on blindsight patients, the results imply that the early visual cortex is necessary for the processing of chromatic information in neurologically healthy humans., (Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)