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Abstract: This article is about the relationship between Dependency Phonology and Government Phonology in general, and the more specific question how exactly a dependency relation may incarnate. The latter issue is raised by the genuine contribution of Government Phonology to phonological theory, i.e. lateral relations among syllabic constituents. Government and licensing describe a dependency relationship between a head and a dependent, but are non-arboreal. Their application therefore mechanically leads to the elimination of trees (deforestation). Arboreal syllable structure, however, is the spine of Structural Analogy, since it parallels syntactic arboreal structure. The question is thus whether arboreal and lateral descriptions of syllable structure are just notational variants (in which case Structural Analogy with syntactic trees can be maintained), or whether they are really different. It is shown that the latter is the case, and that the different expression of dependency relations in syntax and phonology is due to two things: a design property of syntax, concatenation (which is absent from phonology), and an input condition to phonological computation, linearity (which is absent from syntax). Hierarchical structure is thus implemented in module-specific ways: concatenation in syntax (the minimalist device Merge) produces trees (while invalidating the lateral option). It is therefore argued that the arboreal means of expressing dependency relations is the result of concatenation, and of nothing else: no concatenation, no trees. It thus follows from the fact that phonology does not concatenate anything that there cannot be any tree-building device in this module. An appreciable side-effect of this perspective is an explanation of a long-standing observation, i.e. the absence of recursion in phonology: no trees, no recursion. On the other hand, linearity in phonology produces lateral relations (and makes trees unworkable). A related issue discussed is what kinds of third factor explanation are desirable, given that everybody is after “more general, language-unspecific” motivations for the workings of grammar: Chomskian minimalism/biolinguistics as much as anti-chomskian “Cognitive” Grammar and the work by John Anderson. Candidates are global notions such as cognitive salience on the one hand, or more concrete things such as linearity and concatenation on the other. It appears that the current striving for the former is an attempt at turning back the clocks: the evolution of Cognitive Science since Franz-Joseph Gall’s 19th century phrenology was in the opposite direction. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Chomskyan generative grammar has long been committed to the ‘double-interface’ assumption that the faculty of language (FL) serves two interfaces, PF and LF, and correlatively that expressions have phonological and semantic properties. The paper argues this gives rise to (a) a grounding problem for syntax – i.e. for the interpretable content of syntax – and (b) a problem for the assumption that FL is a generative computation. It is argued these problems are resolved if we think of syntax as grounded exclusively in semantic/conceptual properties. Since this implies that FL is phonology-free, it is argued that FL should not be distinguished from a generative computation describable as ‘the language of thought’ (LOT). The paper explores to what extent this (FL=LOT) thesis is consistent with Chomsky''s thinking. Chomsky''s recent work can be seen as pointing in that direction but it is not consistent with the double-interface assumption, which he continues to regard as conceptually necessary. In the light of discussion of the issues, the paper concludes with a speculation on the role of phonology in human cognition and its evolution. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]