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In 2017 and 2019, five outbreaks of infections from multiple strains of Salmonella linked to the consumption of whole, fresh Maradol papayas were reported in the United States, resulting in 325 ill persons. Traceback, laboratory, and epidemiologic evidence indicated papayas as the likely vehicle for each of these outbreaks and identified the source of papayas. State and U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) laboratories recovered Salmonella from papaya samples from various points of distribution, including at import entry, and conducted serotyping, pulsed-field gel electrophoresis, and phylogenetic analyses of whole genome sequencing data. Federal and state partners led traceback investigations to determine the source of papayas. Four different suppliers of papayas were linked by traceback and laboratory results to five separate outbreaks of Salmonella infections associated with papayas. In 2017, multiple states tested papaya samples collected at retail, and Maryland and Virginia investigators recovered strains of Salmonella associated with one outbreak. FDA collected 183 papaya samples in 2017, and 11 samples yielded 62 isolates of Salmonella. Eleven serotypes of Salmonella were recovered from FDA papaya samples, and nine serotypes were closely related genetically by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis and whole genome sequencing to clinical isolates of four outbreaks, including the outbreak associated with positive state sample results. Four farms in Mexico were identified, and their names were released to the general public, retailers, and foreign authorities. In 2019, FDA collected 119 papaya samples, three of which yielded Salmonella; none yielded the 2019 outbreak strain. Investigators determined that papayas of interest had been sourced from a single farm in Campeche, Mexico, through traceback. This information was used to protect public health through public guidance, recalls, and import alerts and helped FDA collaborate with Mexican regulatory partners to enhance the food safety requirements for papayas imported from Mexico. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 10 August 2016, the Maricopa County Department of Public Health identified culture-confirmed Salmonella enterica serotype Javiana isolates from two persons who reported eating at a seafood restaurant; seven additional cases were reported by 15 August. We investigated to identify a source and prevent further illness. We interviewed persons with laboratory-reported Salmonella Javiana infection. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) and whole genome sequencing of isolates were performed. A case was defined as diarrheal illness in a person during July to September 2016; confirmed cases had Salmonella Javiana isolate yielding outbreak-related PFGE patterns; probable cases had diarrheal illness and an epidemiologic link to a confirmed case. Case finding was performed (passive surveillance and identification of ill meal companions). A case-control study assessed risk factors for Salmonella Javiana infection among restaurant diners; control subjects were chosen among meal companions. No restaurant workers reported illness. Foods were reportedly cooked according to the Food Code. Food and environmental samples were collected and cultured; Salmonella Javiana with an indistinguishable PFGE pattern was isolated from portioned repackaged raw shrimp, halibut, and a freezer door handle. We identified 50 Salmonella Javiana cases (40 confirmed and 10 probable); illness onset range was from 22 July to 17 September 2016. Isolates from 40 patients had highly related PFGE patterns. Thirty-three (73%) of 45 patients interviewed reported eating at the restaurant. Among 21 case patients and 31 control subjects, unfried cooked shrimp was associated with illness (odds ratio, 6.7; 95% confidence interval, 1.8 to 24.9; P ¼ 0.004). Among restaurant diners, laboratory and case-control evidence indicated shrimp as the possible outbreak source; poor thermal inactivation of Salmonella on shrimp is theorized as a possible cause. Cross-contamination might have prolonged this outbreak; however, the source was not identified and highlights limitations that can arise during these types of investigations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: People who inject drugs (PWID) are disproportionately affected by HIV in the United States, and HIV prevention and care services may be inaccessible to or underutilized by PWID. In 2018, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) investigated an increase in HIV diagnoses primarily among unstably housed PWID in Lawrence and Lowell.Methods: The response team interviewed 34 PWID in Lawrence and Lowell, with and without HIV, to inform effective response strategies. Qualitative interviews were recorded, transcribed, and coded. Interviews were transcribed verbatim and coded using a thematic analysis approach structured around pre-designated research questions related to service engagement (including harm reduction services, substance use disorder treatment, medical services, shelters, and other community services), unmet needs, and knowledge gaps regarding HIV prevention.Results: Participants ranged in age from 20 to 54 years (median: 32); 21 of the 34 participants (62%) were male, and 21 were non-Hispanic white. Fifteen (44%) self-reported being HIV positive. All 34 participants had experienced homelessness in the past 12 months, and 29 (85%) had ever received services at syringe service programs (SSP). We identified five key themes: substance use as a barrier to accessing health and social services; experiences of trauma and mental illness as factors impacting substance use and utilization of services; unstable housing as a barrier to accessing services; negative perceptions of medication for opioid use disorder (MOUD); and the desire to be treated with dignity and respect by others.Conclusions: Findings highlight the need for well-resourced and integrated or linked service provision for PWID, which includes mental health services, housing, MOUD, harm reduction, and infectious disease prevention and care services. Co-locating and integrating low-barrier services at trusted community locations, such as SSPs, could increase service engagement and improve health outcomes for PWID. Further implementation science research may aid the development of effective strategies for services for PWID and build trusting relationships between service providers and PWID. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Respond pillar of the Ending the HIV Epidemic in the U.S. initiative, which consists of activities also known as cluster and outbreak detection and response, offers a framework to guide tailored implementation of proven HIV prevention strategies where transmission is occurring most rapidly. Cluster and outbreak response involves understanding the networks in which rapid transmission is occurring; linking people in the network to essential services; and identifying and addressing gaps in programs and services such as testing, HIV and other medical care, pre-exposure prophylaxis, and syringe services programs. This article reviews the experience gained through 30 HIV cluster and outbreak responses in North America during 2000-2020 to describe approaches for implementing these core response strategies. Numerous jurisdictions that have implemented these response strategies have demonstrated success in improving outcomes related to HIV care and viral suppression, testing, use of prevention services, and reductions in transmission or new diagnoses. Efforts to address important gaps in service delivery revealed by cluster and outbreak detection and response can strengthen prevention efforts broadly through multidisciplinary, multisector collaboration. In this way, the Respond pillar embodies the collaborative, data-guided approach that is critical to the overall success of the Ending the HIV Epidemic in the U.S. initiative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary Background In May, 2013, an outbreak of symptomatic hepatitis A virus infections occurred in the USA. Federal, state, and local public health officials investigated the cause of the outbreak and instituted actions to control its spread. We investigated the source of the outbreak and assessed the public health measures used. Methods We interviewed patients, obtained their shopping information, and did genetic analysis of hepatitis A virus recovered from patients' serum and stool samples. We tested products for the virus and traced supply chains. Findings Of 165 patients identified from ten states, 69 (42%) were admitted to hospital, two developed fulminant hepatitis, and one needed a liver transplant; none died. Illness onset occurred from March 31 to Aug 12, 2013. The median age of patients was 47 years (IQR 35–58) and 91 (55%) were women. 153 patients (93%) reported consuming product B from retailer A. 40 patients (24%) had product B in their freezers, and 113 (68%) bought it according to data from retailer A. Hepatitis A virus genotype IB, uncommon in the Americas, was recovered from specimens from 117 people with hepatitis A virus illness. Pomegranate arils that were imported from Turkey—where genotype IB is common—were identified in product B. No hepatitis A virus was detected in product B. Interpretation Imported frozen pomegranate arils were identified as the vehicle early in the investigation by combining epidemiology—with data from several sources—genetic analysis of patient samples, and product tracing. Product B was removed from store shelves, the public were warned not to eat product B, product recalls took place, and postexposure prophylaxis with both hepatitis A virus vaccine and immunoglobulin was provided. Our findings show that modern public health actions can help rapidly detect and control hepatitis A virus illness caused by imported food. Our findings show that postexposure prophylaxis can successfully prevent hepatitis A illness when a specific product is identified. Imported food products combined with waning immunity in some adult populations might make this type of intervention necessary in the future. Funding US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, US Food and Drug Administration, and US state and local public health departments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]