Search

This article introduces a theoretical model of truth and honesty from a psychological perspective. We examine its application in political discourse and discuss empirical findings distinguishing between conceptions of honesty and their influence on public perception, misinformation dissemination, and the integrity of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2008.04.004 Byline: Stephan Lewandowsky (a), Sonja M. Geiger (a), Klaus Oberauer (b) Keywords: Short-term memory; Computational models of memory; Forgetting Abstract: This article presents four experiments that tested predictions of SOB (Serial Order in a Box), an interference-based theory of short-term memory. Central to SOB is the concept of novelty-sensitive encoding, which holds that items are encoded to the extent that they differ from already-encoded information. On the additional assumption that distractors are encoded into memory in the same manner as list items, the theory predicts differential effects of interfering activity based on the similarity structure of distractors. Consistent with predictions, three experiments showed that overt articulation of distractors in between recalls of list items did not affect forgetting when the same distractor was repeated multiple times, whereas forgetting was observed if several different distractors were articulated within the same time span. A fourth experiment showed that the absence of forgetting with repeated articulations of the same item was not due to compensatory attentional refreshing of memory traces. The data support the notion that forgetting from short-term memory arises from interference and are difficult to reconcile with temporal decay. Author Affiliation: (a) School of Psychology, University of Western Australia, Crawley, WA 6009, Australia (b) Department of Experimental Psychology, 12a Priory Road, Bristol BS8 ITU, UK Article History: Received 20 January 2008; Revised 10 April 2008

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2006.11.003 Byline: Stephan Lewandowsky (a), Lisa M. Nimmo (a), Gordon D.A. Brown (a)(b) Keywords: Short-term memory; Temporal isolation; Serial recall; Reconstruction task Abstract: According to temporal distinctiveness models, items that are temporally isolated from their neighbors during list presentation are more distinct and thus should be recalled better. Contrary to that expectation of distinctiveness views, much recent evidence has shown that forward short-term serial recall is unaffected by temporal isolation. We report two experiments using reconstruction of order tasks that confirmed that when report order is strictly forward, temporal isolation does not benefit performance. However, both experiments also showed that when report order is unconstrained, temporal isolation does benefit performance. The differences between forward and unconstrained report were found to be independent of whether or not people can anticipate the type of test at encoding. The presence and absence of isolation effects under two different conditions, both requiring memory for order, challenges many existing theories of memory but is compatible with the idea that multiple differentially weighted types of information contribute to memory retrieval. Author Affiliation: (a) School of Psychology, University of Western Australia, Crawley, WA 6009, Australia (b) University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK Article History: Received 31 August 2006; Revised 6 November 2006

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2007.01.005 Byline: Stephan Lewandowsky (a), Simon Farrell (b) Keywords: Serial recall; Short-term memory; Computational modeling; Phonological similarity Abstract: In short-term serial recall, similar-sounding items are remembered more poorly than items that do not sound alike. When lists mix similar and dissimilar items, performance on the dissimilar items is of considerable theoretical interest. Farrell and Lewandowsky [Farrell, S., & Lewandowsky, S. (2003). Dissimilar items benefit from phonological similarity in serial recall. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29, 838-849.] recently showed that if guessing strategies are controlled, dissimilar items on mixed lists are recalled more accurately than on pure dissimilar lists, a finding that challenges several current theories of serial recall. This article presents two experiments that extend the generality of the mixed-list advantage for dissimilar items and then applies three theories of memory -- the primacy model, SIMPLE, and SOB -- to the data. The simulations show that the data are best explained by the SOB theory [Farrell, S. (2006). Mixed-list phonological similarity effects in delayed serial recall. Journal of Memory and Language, 55, 587-600; Farrell, S., & Lewandowsky, S. (2002). An endogenous distributed model of ordering in serial recall. Psychonomic Bulletin &Review, 9, 59-79.] which, unlike most other current theories, posits that similarity has an effect at the time of encoding. Author Affiliation: (a) School of Psychology, University of Western Australia, Crawley, WA 6009, Australia (b) Department of Psychology, University of Bristol, 12A Priory Road, Clifton, Bristol BS8 1TU, UK Article History: Received 23 September 2006; Revised 12 January 2007 Article Note: (footnote) [star] Preparation of this paper was facilitated by a Large Grant, a Discovery Grant, and a Linkage International Grant from the Australian Research Council to the first author. During writing, the second author was partly supported by NIMH Grant HD MH44640 and NIA Grant AG17083-01. We gratefully acknowledge assistance from Leo Roberts at all stages of manuscript preparation.

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2006.08.006 Byline: Stephan Lewandowsky (a), Evan Heit (b) Abstract: This introductory article to the Journal of Memory and Language special issue on memory models discusses the progress made in the field of memory modeling during the last few decades in terms of a number of previously suggested criteria, using the articles in this issue as examples. There has been considerable progress, both at a technical level (e.g., concerning model comparison and model analysis techniques) and at a psychological level (as evidenced by the increasingly tight interplay between theory and data on human memory). The article concludes by proposing a few generic targets for future modeling work. Author Affiliation: (a) School of Psychology, University of Western Australia, 35 Stirling Highway, Mail Bag M304, Crawley, W.A. 6009, Australia (b) University of California, Merced, USA Article History: Received 9 August 2006 Article Note: (footnote) [star] The authors are grateful to Kay Bock, Bob Greene, and Dave Plaut for comments on this article. Preparation of this article was facilitated by a Large Grant and by a Discovery Grant from the Australian Research Council to the first author.

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2005.08.004 Byline: Stephan Lewandowsky (a), Gordon D.A. Brown (b), Tarryn Wright (a), Lisa M. Nimmo (a) Keywords: Short-term memory; Serial recall; Time and memory; Computational modeling Abstract: According to temporal distinctiveness models, items that are temporally isolated from their neighbors during list presentation are more distinct and thus should be recalled better. Event-based theories, by contrast, deny that time plays a role at encoding and predict no beneficial effect of temporal isolation, although they acknowledge that a pause after item presentation may afford extra opportunity for a consolidation process such as rehearsal or grouping. We report two experiments aimed at differentiating between the two classes of theories. The results show that neither serial recall nor probed recall benefit from temporal isolation, unless participants use pauses to group a list. Simulations of the SIMPLE model provide convergent evidence that short-term memory for serial order need not involve temporal representations. Author Affiliation: (a) University of Western Australia, Australia (b) University of Warwick and University of Western Australia, Australia Article History: Received 21 December 2004; Revised 8 August 2005 Article Note: (footnote) [star] Preparation of this paper was facilitated by a Large Grant and by a Discovery Grant from the Australian Research Council to the first author, and by a Linkage International Grant from the Australian Research Council to the first and second author. We gratefully acknowledge assistance from Leo Roberts at all stages of manuscript preparation and Daniel Little for assistance during data collection.

The error latency predictions of four alternative mechanisms for the representation of serial order memory were tested in three different experiments. The data supports the theory that the serial order is represented by a primacy gradient that is accompanied by the suppression of recalled items.

Although virtually all experts agree that CO 2 emissions are causing anthropogenic global warming, public discourse is replete with contrarian claims that either deny that global warming is happening or dispute a human influence. Although the rejection of climate science is known to be driven by ideological, psychological, and political factors rather than scientific disagreement, contrarian views have considerable prominence in the media. A better understanding of contrarian discourse is therefore called for. We report a blind expert test of contrarian claims about climatological variables. Expert economists and statisticians were presented with representative contrarian statements (e.g., “Arctic ice is recovering”) translated into an economic or demographic context. In that blind test, contrarian claims were found to be misleading. By contrast, mainstream scientific interpretations of the data were judged to be accurate and policy relevant. The results imply that media inclusion of contrarian statements may increase bias rather than balance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two types of misinformation effects are discussed in the literature—the post-event misinformation effect and the continued influence effect . The former refers to the distorting memorial effects of misleading information that is presented after valid event encoding; the latter refers to information that is initially presented as true but subsequently turns out to be false and continues to affect memory and reasoning despite the correction. In two experiments, using a paradigm that merges elements from both traditions, we investigated the role of presentation order and recency when two competing causal explanations for an event are presented and one is subsequently retracted. Theoretical accounts of misinformation effects make diverging predictions regarding the roles of presentation order and recency. A recency account—derived from time-based models of memory and reading comprehension research suggesting efficient situation model updating—predicts that the more recently presented cause should have a stronger influence on memory and reasoning. By contrast, a primacy account—derived from primacy effects in impression formation and story recall as well as findings of inadequate memory updating—predicts that the initially presented cause should be dominant irrespective of temporal factors. Results indicated that (1) a cause’s recency, rather than its position (i.e., whether it was presented first or last) determined the emphasis that people place on it in their later reasoning, with more recent explanations being preferred; and (2) a retraction was equally effective whether it invalidated the first or the second cause, as long as the cause’s recency was held constant. This provides evidence against the primacy account and supports time-based models of memory such as temporal distinctiveness theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vested interests and political agents have long opposed political or regulatory action in response to climate change by appealing to scientific uncertainty. Here we examine the effect of such contrarian talking points on the scientific community itself. We show that although scientists are trained in dealing with uncertainty, there are several psychological reasons why scientists may nevertheless be susceptible to uncertainty-based argumentation, even when scientists recognize those arguments as false and are actively rebutting them. Specifically, we show that prolonged stereotype threat, pluralistic ignorance, and a form of projection (the third-person effect) may cause scientists to take positions that they would be less likely to take in the absence of outspoken public opposition. We illustrate the consequences of seepage from public debate into the scientific process with a case study involving the interpretation of temperature trends from the last 15 years. We offer ways in which the scientific community can detect and avoid such inadvertent seepage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A major reason why some people oppose the COVID-19 vaccine is the influence of misinformation. This study suggests that the cognitive paradox of simultaneously believing known facts less and new, "alternative facts" more is the outcome of a distrust mindset, characterized by spontaneous consideration of alternatives, including misinformation. We captured this paradox and its correlates in a scale that measures individuals' ability to distinguish between the truth value of well-established facts ("Earth rotates eastward around its own axis, completing a full rotation once in about 24 h") and baseless "alternative facts" ("Earth can change its rotation direction and flip its axis, and we will never notice it"). Assuming that an anti-COVID-19 vaccine attitude arises from a chronically distrusting mindset, we sampled participants on Prolific who were pre-screened for their COVID-19 vaccine attitude based on earlier responses. We found that people who rejected COVID-19 vaccines believed well-established facts less, and "alternative facts" more, compared to supporters of the vaccine. Less discernment between truths and falsehoods was correlated with less intellectual humility, more distrust and greater reliance on one's intuition. This observed thought pattern offers insights into theoretical understanding of the antecedents of belief in "alternative facts" and conspiracy theories. • We tested a cognitive paradox that could precede acceptance of misinformation. • The paradox is skepticism of known claims but gullibility for "alternative facts". • We find the paradox in opposers of the COVID-19 vaccine, but not in supporters of it. • The vaccine attitude was pre-screened by Prolific, ruling out motivational biases. • Correlated traits are distrust, reliance on intuition and less intellectual humility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights: [•] We introduce a method for isolating a process unique to working memory updating. [•] Removal of outdated information is an active working memory updating process. [•] Removal speed can be measured reliably. [•] Removal speed is independent of working memory capacity. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Highlights: [•] Derives new prediction from decay-rehearsal model. [•] Provides evidence against the prediction. [•] Results incompatible with decay, support interference model. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Many models of short-term memory (STM) ascribe an important role to temporal decay and forgetting because of the passage of time alone. We argue against decay as the primary form of forgetting from STM, and suggest that new experimental methodologies and recent models provide new perspectives on the old issue of the causes of forgetting. We show that several classic sources of evidence for time-based forgetting can be re-interpreted in terms of an interference-based view, and that new experiments provide compelling evidence against decay. We conclude that progress requires moving beyond demonstrations of qualitative effects and focusing instead on testing quantitative predictions of models. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Highlights: [•] We propose an active removal process that operates in an item-specific fashion. [•] Removal serves WM updating and general WM functioning by preventing interference. [•] WM updating involves switching between maintenance and updating modes of WM. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The behavioral immune system is considered to be a psychological adaptation that decreases the risk of infection. Research suggests that, in the current environment, this system can produce attitudes with negative health consequences, such as increased vaccine hesitancy. In three studies, we investigated whether two facets of the behavioral immune system—germ aversion (i.e., aversion to potential pathogen transmission) and perceived infectability (i.e., perceived susceptibility to disease)—predicted intentions to accept COVID-19 and influenza vaccination during the pandemic. The behavioral immune system mechanisms were measured before the COVID-19 pandemic in one study, and during the pandemic in two. In contrast to previous research, those with higher germ aversion during the pandemic perceived vaccines to be safer and had higher intentions to accept vaccination. Germ aversion before the pandemic was not associated with vaccination intentions. Individuals who perceived themselves as more susceptible to disease were slightly more willing to accept vaccination. We conjecture that high disease threat reverses the relationship between the behavioral immune system response and vaccination. As the associations were weak, individual differences in germ aversion and perceived infectability are of little practical relevance for vaccine uptake. • Behavioral immune system mechanisms are related to COVID-19 vaccination intentions. • Higher mid-pandemic germ aversion is related to higher vaccination intentions. • Higher perceived infectability is related to higher vaccination intentions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As studies indicate that people perceive COVID-19 as a threatening disease, the demand for a vaccine against the disease could be expected to be high. Vaccine safety concerns might nevertheless outweigh the perceived disease risks when an individual decides whether or not to accept the vaccine. We investigated the role of perceived risk of COVID-19 (i.e., perceived likelihood of infection, perceived disease severity, and disease-related worry) and perceived safety of a prospective vaccine against COVID-19 in predicting intentions to accept a COVID-19 vaccine. Three Finnish samples were surveyed: 825 parents of small children, 205 individuals living in an area with suboptimal vaccination coverage, and 1325 Facebook users nationwide. As points of reference, we compared the perceptions of COVID-19 to those of influenza and measles. COVID-19 was perceived as a threatening disease—more so than influenza and measles. The strongest predictor of COVID-19 vaccination intentions was trusting the safety of the potential vaccine. Those perceiving COVID-19 as a severe disease were also slightly more intent on taking a COVID-19 vaccine. Informing the public about the safety of a forthcoming COVID-19 vaccine should be the focus for health authorities aiming to achieve a high vaccine uptake. • COVID-19 is perceived as a threatening disease. • The perceived risks of COVID-19 play a minor role for vaccination intentions. • COVID-19 vaccination intentions are strongly related to perceived vaccine safety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• A reversal of narrative polarity results in a reverse-CIE. • Negation-only conditions may be more relevant than control conditions for the CIE. • In general, attitudes do not interact with the effectiveness of corrections. Misinformation – information that is false or inaccurate – can continue to influence people's memory and reasoning even after it has been corrected. Researchers have termed this the continued influence effect (CIE). However, to date, research has focused exclusively on examining the CIE in a single polarity, namely the ongoing effect of initially affirmed material that is later negated. No research has yet examined how reliance on outdated information may be affected if this polarity is reversed, that is, if initially-negated information is reinstated. It also remains unclear how participants' pre-existing beliefs may impact the acceptance of a correction, with prior evidence showing conflicting results. To investigate these questions, across two experiments we presented participants scoring high versus low on measures of relevant attitudes with fictional news reports that contained a piece of critical attitude-relevant information. This information was either true throughout, false throughout, initially-affirmed then retracted, or initially-negated then reinstated. Participants' reliance on the critical information was subsequently measured with the use of inferential-reasoning items. Reinstatement of initially-negated information was insufficient to bring reliance on that information to a baseline level – that is, reliance on information presented as true throughout was greater than reliance on negated and then reinstated information. This result was symmetrical with the conventional CIE observed with a reversed polarity. The effect of participants' pre-existing attitudes on continued reliance was equivocal. The results therefore suggest that the CIE is not contingent on polarity, raising questions about the cognitive mechanisms underlying the effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is well known that information that is initially thought to be correct but then revealed to be false, often continues to influence human judgement and decision making despite people being aware of the retraction. Yet little research has examined the underlying neural substrates of this phenomenon, which is known as the ‘continued influence effect of misinformation’ (CIEM). It remains unclear how the human brain processes critical information that retracts prior claims. To address this question in further detail, 26 healthy adults underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while listening to brief narratives which either involved a retraction of prior information or not. Following each narrative, subjects’ comprehension of the narrative, including their inclination to rely on retracted information, was probed. As expected, it was found that retracted information continued to affect participants’ narrative-related reasoning. In addition, the fMRI data indicated that the continued influence of retracted information may be due to a breakdown of narrative-level integration and coherence-building mechanisms implemented by the precuneus and posterior cingulate gyrus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We tested two competing explanations of the effect of processing on working memory. According to decay models, memory representations decay during processing and can be rehearsed or refreshed in the free time between processing steps. Alternatively, one interference-based model assumes that processing involves encoding of distractor representations in working memory, and free time is used to remove distractors. In several experiments the demand from distractor processing was varied within lists, such that one burst of processing following an item on the list was either particularly demanding or particularly undemanding. The exceptional distractor burst had its greatest effect on the list item that immediately preceded it (a local effect), and it affected items that had not yet been presented as well as preceding items. Both findings are predicted by a computational interference model of working memory, and together are problematic for the viewpoint that refreshing offsets decay. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]