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Clean energy is an important source to mitigate the pressure of resources shortage and environmental effects. While multiattribute reverse auction is frequently adopted for the procurement efficiency of clean energy devices, the associated winner determination problem is explicitly studied for a utility company/buyer to select the most appropriate supplier in the clean energy market. Considering the buyer's loss-averse behavior with incomplete information and suppliers' conflicting attributes in different types evaluated by multiple experts, we incorporate an I U L O W A f (induced uncertain linguistic ordered weighted averaging) operator and a revised TODIM (an acronym in Portuguese of Interactive and Multi-attribute Decision Making) measure that is consistent with prospect theory into the "benefits, opportunities, costs and risks" (BOCR) framework to develop a novel BOCR-uRTODIM solution method for multi-attribute decision making. Numerical experiments illustrate the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed method by comparing it with some known methods. An interesting result indicates that the risk aversion degree of the buyer increases as the variance of suppliers' attributes expands. The BOCR-uRTODIM could be a useful tool for utility companies to avoid losses and for associated suppliers to improve their attributes for a win in the clean energy industry. • Reverse auction for the clear energy device procurement is studied. • Utility companies' loss-averse behavior and incomplete information are considered. • Prospect theory is integrated into analytic hierarchy process for decision making. • A novel, effective, and robust method is proposed for determining the winner. • Managerial insights are drawn for utility companies in the clean energy industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates a new winner determination problem with sustainable and responsive concerns under disruption risks for transportation service procurement auctions. In such an auction, a fourth party logistics (4PL) provider purchases transportation services from multiple third party logistics (3PL) providers. We develop a two-stage stochastic mixed-integer programming model that incorporates two features, including (i) a sustainable–responsive constraint to quantitatively describe the sustainability and responsiveness performance, and (ii) an effective hybrid mitigation strategy that combines the fortification policy with the temporary outsourcing service policy to mitigate disruptions. To determine winning 3PLs, a reduced scenario-based approximation approach is developed to solve the model and obtain a nearly optimal solution very quickly. Numerical experiments are conducted to illustrate the effectiveness and applicability of our model and method by using randomly generated instances as well as real data of a Chinese 4PL firm. Compared with existing studies, sensitivity analysis indicates that our proposed model can significantly reduce the 4PL's expected cost and improve the long-term competitive advantages. Managerial implications are also drawn for 4PLs to run a sustainable–responsive logistics system under disruptions in a cost-effective way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Disruption risks and quantity discounts have not been explicitly studied in traditional winner determination problems. This paper investigates an innovative winner determination problem with accidental disruptions and quantity discounts for a fourth party logistics provider in a logistics service procurement auction. An effective hybrid strategy that integrates a fortification policy with an outside option policy is developed to mitigate possible disruptions. Integrating the hybrid strategy with a piecewise-linear discount function, a stochastic nonlinear winner determination model is constructed. Utilizing a linearization technique, such a nonlinear winner determination model can be reformulated as a mixed integer linear program. To obtain nearly optimal solutions, a scenario-based approximation method is developed, including a reduced scenario technique and a dual decomposition Lagrangian relaxation technique. Numerical experiments are conducted to illustrate the effectiveness and applicability of the proposed model and method. When the discount parameter decreases or the disruption probability increases, the fortification policy becomes more important for the logistics system. An interesting result indicates that both the auctioneer and bidders may benefit from considering the discount policy. Managerial implications are drawn for fourth party logistics providers to run a reliable logistics system in a cost-effective way. • A nonlinear winner determination (WD) with disruptions and discounts is studied. • Fortification and outside option policies are integrated to address disruptions. • The nonlinear WD is reformulated as a linear one by a superior expression method. • An effective approximation method is developed to obtain near-optimal solutions. • Managerial implications are drawn for 4PLs and 3PLs in the logistics industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the growing level of public environmental consciousness, sustainability has become an important issue in the area of supply chain management. This paper focuses on a channel coordination problem in a two-echelon sustainable supply chain involving one socially responsible manufacturer and one fair-minded retailer. Constructing mathematical models to characterize the problem, four particular contracts are developed to investigate the environmental performance and channel profit under the framework of two non-cooperative contracts: wholesale price and two-part tariff, and two cooperative contracts: Nash bargaining and Rubinstein bargaining. Theoretical analysis verified by numerical experiments shows that the wholesale price contract performs worse than the other three in terms of the carbon emission per unit product and channel profit. In addition, the two-part tariff contract can partially coordinate the supply chain, whereas both bargaining contracts can achieve perfect coordination to provide outcomes of the centralized decision. Comparing with the fair-neutral scenarios, we find that the fairness behavior promotes the retailer's profit, but reduces the manufacturer's profit under different contracts. Sensitivity analysis reveals that with intensified fairness concerns, the sustainability level and channel profit diminish under non-cooperative contracts, but remain the same under cooperative contracts. The Nash bargaining and Rubinstein bargaining contracts are robust to the degree of the retailer's fairness behavior and could be the best choice for the socially responsible manufacturer. • A channel coordination issue in a two-echelon sustainable supply chain is studied. • Four contracts are developed to examine the impact of retailer's fairness behavior. • Fairness behavior worsens wholesale price contract compared to two-part tariff one. • Nash and Rubinstein bargaining contracts are robust to levels of fairness concerns. • Both bargaining contracts achieve perfect coordination in reducing carbon emission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]