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New results from Popham et al. generate 'semantic maps' from spoken narratives and movies that appear remarkably aligned near visual cortex. We consider whether such findings are consistent with the hub-and-spokes view of semantic representation or whether they require a rethinking of the cortical knowledge system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a case-series comparison of patients with cross-modal semantic impairments consequent on either (a) bilateral anterior temporal lobe atrophy in semantic dementia (SD) or (b) left-hemisphere fronto-parietal and/or posterior temporal stroke in semantic aphasia (SA). Both groups were assessed on a new test battery designed to measure how performance is influenced by concept familiarity, typicality and specificity. In line with previous findings, performance in SD was strongly modulated by all of these factors, with better performance for more familiar items (regardless of typicality), for more typical items (regardless of familiarity) and for tasks that did not require very specific classification, consistent with the gradual degradation of conceptual knowledge in SD. The SA group showed significant impairments on all tasks but their sensitivity to familiarity, typicality and specificity was more variable and governed by task-specific effects of these factors on controlled semantic processing. The results are discussed with reference to theories about the complementary roles of representation and manipulation of semantic knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To investigate how basic aspects of perception are shaped by acquired knowledge about the world, we assessed colour perception and cognition in patients with semantic dementia (SD), a disorder that progressively erodes conceptual knowledge. We observed a previously undocumented pattern of impairment to colour perception and cognition characterized by: (i) a normal ability to discriminate between only subtly different colours but an impaired ability to group different colours into categories, (ii) normal perception and memory for the colours red, green, and blue but impaired perception and memory for colours lying between these regions of a fully-saturated and luminant spectrum, and (iii) normal naming of polar colours in the opponent-process colour system (red, green, blue, yellow, white, and black) but impaired naming of other basic colours (brown, gray, pink, and orange). The results suggest that fundamental aspects of perception can be shaped by acquired knowledge about the world, but only within limits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To investigate how basic aspects of perception are shaped by acquired knowledge about the world, we assessed colour perception and cognition in patients with semantic dementia (SD), a disorder that progressively erodes conceptual knowledge. We observed a previously undocumented pattern of impairment to colour perception and cognition characterized by: (i) a normal ability to discriminate between only subtly different colours but an impaired ability to group different colours into categories, (ii) normal perception and memory for the colours red, green, and blue but impaired perception and memory for colours lying between these regions of a fully-saturated and luminant spectrum, and (iii) normal naming of polar colours in the opponent-process colour system (red, green, blue, yellow, white, and black) but impaired naming of other basic colours (brown, gray, pink, and orange). The results suggest that fundamental aspects of perception can be shaped by acquired knowledge about the world, but only within limits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: For decades, category-specific semantic impairment – i.e., better comprehension of items from one semantic category than another – has been the driving force behind many claims about the organisation of conceptual knowledge in the brain. Double dissociations between patients with category-specific disorders are widely interpreted as showing that different conceptual domains are necessarily supported by functionally independent systems. We show that, to the contrary, even strong or classical dissociations can also arise from individual differences in premorbid expertise. We examined two patients with global and progressive semantic degradation who, unusually, had known areas of premorbid expertise. Patient 1, a former automotive worker, showed selective preservation of car knowledge, whereas Patient 2, a former botanist, showed selective preservation of information about plants. In non-expert domains, these patients showed the typical pattern: i.e., an inability to differentiate between highly similar concepts (e.g., rose and daisy), but retention of broader distinctions (e.g., between rose and cat). Parallel distributed processing (PDP) models of semantic cognition show that expertise in a particular domain increases the differentiation of specific-level concepts, such that the semantic distance between these items resembles non-expert basic-level distinctions. We propose that these structural changes interact with global semantic degradation, particularly when expert knowledge is acquired early and when exposure to expert concepts continues during disease progression. Therefore, category-specific semantic impairment can arise from at least two distinct mechanisms: damage to representations that are critical for a particular category (e.g., knowledge of hand shape and action for the category ‘tools’) and differences in premorbid experience. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Patients with semantic dementia show a specific pattern of impairment on both verbal and non-verbal “pre-semantic” tasks, e.g., reading aloud, past tense generation, spelling to dictation, lexical decision, object decision, colour decision and delayed picture copying. All seven tasks are characterised by poorer performance for items that are atypical of the domain and “regularisation errors” (irregular/atypical items are produced as if they were domain-typical). The emergence of this pattern across diverse tasks in the same patients indicates that semantic memory plays a key role in all of these types of “pre-semantic” processing. However, this claim remains controversial because semantically impaired patients sometimes fail to show an influence of regularity. This study demonstrates that (a) the location of brain damage and (b) the underlying nature of the semantic deficit affect the likelihood of observing the expected relationship between poor comprehension and regularity effects. We compared the effect of multimodal semantic impairment in the context of semantic dementia and stroke aphasia on the seven “pre-semantic” tasks listed above. In all of these tasks, the semantic aphasia patients were less sensitive to typicality than the semantic dementia patients, even though the two groups obtained comparable scores on semantic tests. The semantic aphasia group also made fewer regularisation errors and many more unrelated and perseverative responses. We propose that these group differences reflect the different locus for the semantic impairment in the two conditions: patients with semantic dementia have degraded semantic representations, whereas semantic aphasia patients show deregulated semantic cognition with concomitant executive deficits. These findings suggest a reinterpretation of single-case studies of comprehension-impaired aphasic patients who fail to show the expected effect of regularity on “pre-semantic” tasks. Consequently, such cases do not demonstrate the independence of these tasks from semantic memory. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: In three experiments we assessed the colour knowledge of patients with semantic dementia, a neuro-degenerative condition that gradually erodes conceptual knowledge. In Experiment 1, the patients’ colour naming performance correlated strongly with their object naming for frequency-matched items, with no patient showing better-than-expected naming of colours relative to objects. In Experiment 2, where patients were asked to colour black-and-white line drawings of common objects, all patients were impaired relative to controls, and performance correlated strongly with degree of semantic deficit. The fact that patients often erroneously selected green for fruits or vegetables, and brown for animals, suggests some preservation of general knowledge about the colours that typify a given domain. In Experiment 3, patients were given pairs of identical line drawings of familiar animals, fruits and vegetables—one of each pair coloured correctly, and one incorrectly—and were asked to choose the correct one. When the target''s colour was characteristic of the domain, patients scored well; but when the distractor had a typical hue and the target''s colour was unusual (e.g. a green versus an orange carrot), performance was far poorer. The results are discussed with reference to alternative theories about the neural basis of conceptual knowledge. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

State-of-the-art brain imaging studies have recently produced a variety of sometimes contradictory conclusions about the neural systems that support human semantic memory. Multivariate techniques deployed in this work adopt implicit or explicit assumptions that limit the types of signal they can detect, and thus the types of hypotheses they can test. We lay out the space of possible cognitive and neural representations and then critically review contemporary methods to determine which analyses can test which hypotheses. The results account for the heterogeneity of recent findings and identify an important empirical and methodological gap that makes it difficult to connect the imaging literature to neurocomputational models of semantic processing. A key goal for cognitive neuroscience is to understand the neurocognitive systems that support semantic memory. Recent multivariate analyses of neuroimaging data have contributed greatly to this effort, but the rapid development of these novel approaches has made it difficult to track the diversity of findings and to understand how and why they sometimes lead to contradictory conclusions. We address this challenge by reviewing cognitive theories of semantic representation and their neural instantiation. We then consider contemporary approaches to neural decoding and assess which types of representation each can possibly detect. The analysis suggests why the results are heterogeneous and identifies crucial links between cognitive theory, data collection, and analysis that can help to better connect neuroimaging to mechanistic theories of semantic cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Connectionist and dynamical systems approaches explain human thought, language and behavior in terms of the emergent consequences of a large number of simple noncognitive processes. We view the entities that serve as the basis for structured probabilistic approaches as abstractions that are occasionally useful but often misleading: they have no real basis in the actual processes that give rise to linguistic and cognitive abilities or to the development of these abilities. Although structured probabilistic approaches can be useful in determining what would be optimal under certain assumptions, we propose that connectionist, dynamical systems, and related approaches, which focus on explaining the mechanisms that give rise to cognition, will be essential in achieving a full understanding of cognition and development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]