1. Port capacity-sharing decisions in the post-COVID-19 pandemic era.
- Author
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Dong, Gang, Ishii, Masahiro, Zheng, Shiyuan, Tezuka, Koichiro, and Lee, Paul Tae-Woo
- Subjects
- *
COVID-19 pandemic , *PANDEMICS , *MANAGEMENT committees , *RIDESHARING , *SIPHONS - Abstract
Considering the disruption risk and congestion deterioration caused by recurrent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several ports, this study developed a port capacity decision three-stage game model by adopting a sharing approach, which comprised a combined port management committee and a two-port system. The former determines the capacity-sharing rate, and the latter sequentially chooses its terminal handling charge (THC). Through backward induction, the capacity-sharing decisions among multiple extrema are derived, and then the "siphon effect" and "spillover effect" of capacity-sharing are analyzed. A case study of Shanghai and Ningbo Zhoushan Ports is presented to further illustrate the findings. • Three-stage game model is developed by first adopting a capacity sharing approach in the post-COVID-19 pandemic era. • The three-stage game model focuses on the imbalanced capacity and congestion deterioration. • A combined port management committee and a two-port system are considered. • The optimal capacity-sharing decisions among multiple extremums are derived. • "Siphon effect" and "spillover effect" of capacity-sharing are comparatively analyzed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
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