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Highlights • Insula and opercula perform various and complicated functions. • Insula have functions in cardiovascular systems. • Posterior insula and parietal operculum related to body-ownership symptoms. • Complicated visual phenomena related to temporal operculum. Abstract Purpose Using direct intracerebral electrical stimulation (ES) in epileptic patients to evoke symptoms to help identify the functional neuroanatomy of the insular lobe and opercula. Methods We selected 43 patients who had at least 1 electrode inserted into the insula or opercula via an oblique approach among 135 patients with intractable epilepsy. Bipolar stimulation was chosen, and the stimulation parameters of the biphasic waves included a pulse width of 0.2 ms, a frequency of 50 Hz, a duration of 3 s, and an intensity gradually increasing from 0.5 to 4 mA. Results In total, 93 electrodes were implanted into the insula or insular opercula, and 169 of 281 contacts (60.1%) evoked 212 responses by ES of the insula. 142 responses were induced by stimulating the insular opercula in 126 of 343 sites (36.7%). Usual responses, such as somatosensory, visceral sensory, speech, auditory, and motor responses, were evoked. In addition, rarely reported responses, including cardiovascular symptoms (tachycardia), visual symptoms evoked by ES of the parietal and temporal opercula, and vestibular symptoms (like the loss of ownership of the body) evoked following stimulation of the posterior insula and parietal operculum, were also induced in our study. Conclusions The insula and opercula perform various and complicated functions. The posterior insula and parietal operculum could play important roles in body-ownership symptoms. The complicated visual phenomena were partially related to the temporal operculum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interoceptive and exteroceptive information are both essential for the construction and update of self-awareness. Whereas several studies have shown how interoceptive accuracy or cardiac feedback influences body-awareness, no studies have looked at the reverse effect, namely how exteroceptively-driven changes in body-ownership and self-identification can influence individuals' ability to detect internal bodily signals. We exposed participants to the Rubber Hand Illusion (Experiment 1) and to the Enfacement Illusion (Experiment 2), and tested how this change in the sense of body-ownership and self-identification affected their interoceptive accuracy (IAcc). The heartbeat-counting task was used to measure IAcc before the bodily illusions, and then the same task was interleaved with periods of visuo-tactile stimulation, during which synchronous and asynchronous multisensory stimulation was applied. We found that a change in body-ownership significantly improved performance of participants with lower interoceptive accuracy. In contrast, a change in self-identification significantly decreased performance of participants with higher interoceptive accuracy. These results suggest that changes in different domains of self-awareness can differentially impact individuals' ability to accurately detect signals arising from within the body, highlighting the distinct role that interoceptive signals play for different facets of bodily self-consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stroke can lead to motor impairments that can affect the body structure and restraint mobility. We hypothesize that brain lesions and their motor sequelae can distort the body schema, a sensorimotor map of body parts and elements in the peripersonal space through which human beings embody the reachable space and ready the body for forthcoming movements. Two main constructs have been identified in the embodiment mechanism: body-ownership, the sense that the body that one inhabits is his/her own, and agency, the sense that one can move and control his/her body. To test this, the present study simultaneously investigated different embodiment subcomponents (body-ownership, localization, and agency) and different neurophysiological measures (galvanic skin response, skin temperature, and surface electromyographic activity), and the interaction between them, in clinically-controlled hemiparetic individuals with stroke and in healthy subjects after the rubber hand illusion. Individuals with stroke reported significantly stronger body-ownership and agency and reduced increase of galvanic skin response, skin temperature, and muscular activity in the stimulated hand. We suggest that differences in embodiment could have been motivated by increased plasticity of the body schema and pathological predominance of the visual input over proprioception. We also suggest that differences in neurophysiological responses could have been promoted by a suppression of the reflex activity of the sympathetic nervous system and by the involvement of the premotor cortex in the reconfiguration of the body schema. These results could evidence a body schema plasticity promoted by the brain lesion and a main role of the premotor cortex in this mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The exact relation between the sense that one''s body is one''s own (body-ownership) and the sense that one controls one''s own bodily actions (agency) has been the focus of much speculation, but remains unclear. On an ‘additive’ model, agency and body-ownership are strongly related; the ability to control actions is a powerful cue to body-ownership. This view implies a component common to the senses of body-ownership and agency, plus possible additional components unique to agency. An alternative ‘independence’ model holds that agency and body-ownership are qualitatively different experiences, triggered by different inputs, and recruiting distinct brain networks. We tested these two specific models by investigating the sensory and motor aspects of body-representation in the brain using fMRI. Activations in midline cortical structures were associated with a sensory-driven sense of body-ownership, and were absent in agency conditions. Activity in the pre-SMA was linked to the sense of agency, but distinct from the sense of body-ownership. No shared activations that would support the additive model were found. The results support the independence model. Body-ownership involves a psychophysiological baseline, linked to activation of the brain''s default mode network. Agency is linked to premotor and parietal areas involved in generating motor intentions and subsequent action monitoring. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Empirical research on the bodily self has only recently started to investigate how the link between a body and the experience of this body as mine is developed, maintained or disturbed. The Rubber Hand Illusion has been used as a model instance of the normal sense of embodiment to investigate the processes that underpin the experience of body-ownership. This review puts forward a neurocognitive model according to which body-ownership arises as an interaction between current multisensory input and internal models of the body. First, a pre-existing stored model of the body distinguishes between objects that may or may not be part of one''s body. Second, on-line anatomical and postural representations of the body modulate the integration of multisensory information that leads to the recalibration of visual and tactile coordinate systems. Third, the resulting referral of tactile sensation will give rise to the subjective experience of body-ownership. These processes involve a neural network comprised of the right temporoparietal junction which tests the incorporeability of the external object, the secondary somatosensory cortex which maintains an on-line representation of the body, the posterior parietal and ventral premotor cortices which code for the recalibration of the hand-centred coordinate systems, and the right posterior insula which underpins the subjective experience of body-ownership. The experience of body-ownership may represent a critical component of self-specificity as evidenced by the different ways in which multisensory integration in interaction with internal models of the body can actually manipulate important physical and psychological aspects of the self. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: We constantly feel, see and move our body, and have no doubt that it is our own. The brain possesses a distinction between the body and the objects in the outside world. This distinction may be based on a process that monitors whether sensations, events and objects should be attributed to one''s body or not. We controlled whether an external object was represented as part of the body or not, by experimentally inducing a bodily illusion using correlated visual and tactile stimulation. We then studied the role of right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) in the processing of multisensory events that may or may not be attributed to one''s body. Disruption of rTPJ using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) made the distinction between what may or may not be part of one''s body on the basis of multisensory evidence more ambiguous, suggesting that the rTPJ is actively involved in maintaining a coherent sense of one''s body, distinct from external, non-corporeal, objects. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]