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In this paper, we investigate how much a major currency is used for trade invoicing by focusing primarily on the experiences of the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, and the Deutsche mark (DM) in the 1970s through the 1990s. We then attempt to draw lessons for China's renminbi (RMB) internationalization. Our data on the shares of the three major currencies in export invoicing show that the dollar was unequivocally a global invoicing currency, and that the DM was the most important regional currency in Europe while the yen was never a global or a regional currency. DM invoicing was driven by European countries’ trade ties with Germany. In contrast, the yen was not widely used for trade invoicing by Asia–Oceania countries despite the latter's strong trade ties with Japan. Our regression analysis on the determinants of the major currency share in trade invoicing (also including UK pound sterling, the French franc, the Italian lira, and the Swiss franc) in the 1970–1998 period shows that the invoicing share of a major currency tended to be positively affected by the degree of other economies’ trade ties with the major currency country and negatively affected by the degree of their financial development or openness. Also, the major currency share in trade invoicing was affected by both other economies' assigned weights of the major currency in their implicit currency baskets and these economies’ trade shares with major-currency zone countries. Economies belonging to the U.S. dollar (or DM) zone tended to invoice their trade more in the dollar (or DM) and less in the DM (or dollar). The use of yen for trade invoicing was not much affected by these factors. European countries largely belonged to the DM zone and tended to use the DM for trade invoicing, whereas Asia–Oceania countries belonged mainly to the U.S. dollar zone, leading to a high degree of dollar use. We also find that major currency countries tended to invoice their trade in their own currencies when they had a large presence in international trade, high levels of per capita income, and financial markets that were developed and open. For China, its low level of per capita income, limited financial openness, and the presence of U.S. dollar zone countries in Asia stand as a challenge to the nation's ambition to promote the RMB as a major trade-invoicing currency.

This paper examines whether the renminbi (RMB) has supplanted the US dollar as the major anchor currency in the implicit currency baskets of East Asian economies. First, we demonstrate that existing techniques to address the problem of severe multicollinearity in estimations of the Frankel–Wei regression model, with the movements in both the US dollar and the RMB included on the right-hand side of the equation, remain limited in providing stable and robust results. We then propose a simple modification of the Frankel–Wei regression model to estimate the RMB weight in an economy's implicit currency basket. We show that this new method yields results that are superior to those obtained by existing techniques. Using the new method, we find that the US dollar continues to be the dominant anchor currency and that there is not yet an RMB bloc in East Asia, contrary to claims made by some recent studies. The RMB has taken on some importance in the implicit currency baskets of several East Asian economies in recent years and this appears to have occurred at the expense of the yen. In short, despite the rising importance of the RMB, it has not eclipsed the US dollar as the dominant anchor currency in East Asia. These conclusions are robust to alternative specifications of the modified Frankel–Wei regression model and the use of a structural break estimation technique.

Although a latecomer, economically important Asia has emerged at the forefront of global free trade agreement (FTA) activity. This has sparked concerns about the negative effects of Asian FTAs, including the “noodle bowl” problem. Amid slow progress in the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Doha negotiations and the global financial crisis, however, Asian regionalism seems to be here to stay. The focus for policy makers should then be how best to minimize the costs of FTAs while maximizing their benefits. Adopting a pragmatic perspective, this paper examines key trends and challenges in Asian FTAs. It provides new evidence from firm surveys, analysis of specific agreements, and computable general equilibrium estimates. It provides the following set of recommendations: strengthen the support system for using FTAs; rationalize rules of origin and upgrade their administration; ensure better coverage of agricultural trade; forge comprehensive “WTO-plus” agreements; and encourage a regionwide FTA. Political economy considerations suggest that a likely scenario is for FTA consolidation in Asia – by creating a People’s Republic of China-Japan-Republic of Korea FTA, combining it with ASEAN 1 FTAs, and then involving Australia, India, and New Zealand – to be followed by connections with North America and Europe. In conclusion, the analysis suggests that a bottom-up approach to a Doha Round Agreement should be adopted.

Using a global general equilibrium trade model, this paper assesses the long-term implications of global rebalancing for Asian economies and explores the benefits of China–Japan–United States (US) integration. The analysis suggests that consumption evaporation, a growth slowdown in the US, and the consequent current account correction would force China, Japan, and other East Asian economies to undergo substantial structural adjustments. A combination of domestic reform aimed at boosting service sector productivity and external liberalization aimed at fostering broader economic integration will be critical for East Asian economies to facilitate their economic rebalancing and sustained growth. Our global computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis suggests that China and Japan need to strengthen their economic ties with the US while at the same time bringing other East Asian economies into this integration process.

The episodes of financial crises in many parts of the world during the 1990s have sparked interest in identifying channels through which such crises spread from one country to another. Researchers have identified several factors that may have sparked and induced contagion. This study further extends the existing research by identifying and testing three financial market variables to trace the alleged origin and the subsequent path of the contagion during the 1997 Asian Crisis. Foreign exchange rates, stock market prices and interest rates are three main financial market indicators, representing the currency, stock and money markets, respectively. We use a sample of nine East Asian countries, including Japan, construct a VAR model and use daily observations for empirical estimation. We investigate the interlinkages among different markets and different countries within the Asian region using the Granger causality. The empirical evidence, in this paper, does not find strong support for contagion. We further extend the analysis by looking at the impulse responses. The results still do not find strong support for a contagion case.

In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, East Asian finance ministers launched several new initiatives for regional financial cooperation including: (i) regional economic surveillance; (ii) a regional liquidity support arrangement; and (iii) Asian bond markets initiative. This paper evaluates the progress of such initiatives—particularly the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM)—and explores the possible evolution of the CMIM toward an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). The paper argues that for an AMF to emerge, East Asian authorities need to strengthen regional surveillance and upgrade their capacity to formulate independent conditionality in the event of crisis lending so that the CMIM can be delinked from IMF programs. The paper also makes a case for more flexible use of CMIM when the type of external shock that affected the Republic of Korea in the fall of 2008 following the Lehman collapse hits Asia once again in the future. Given capital inflow risks, the paper suggests the authorities to prepare for exchange rate policy coordination—through intensive policy dialogue—to better manage macroeconomic and financial conditions while keeping intraregional exchange rate stability. An Asian Currency Unit should be developed to facilitate such policy dialogue for exchange rate policy coordination. Acknowledgment: This paper is prepared for the conference on the "Future Global Reserve System" organized by Columbia University in partnership with ADB and ADBI in Tokyo on 17-18 March 2010. It is a revised version of the discussion paper presented for the first phase of the ADB International Monetary Advisory Group (IMAG) meeting held in New York, 16-17 September 2009. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in the paper are solely the author's alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the Asian Development Bank, its Institute, their respective executive directors, or the countries they represent.

This paper explores the long-term challenges for trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The region has emerged as an important production base for multinational corporations by joining East Asia’s supply chains. While proceeding to establish the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by the end of 2015, ASEAN has also forged five major free trade agreements (FTAs) with its dialogue partners (People’s Republic of China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Australia–New Zealand) and is currently negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). In addition, four ASEAN member states are working on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations. Econometric evidence suggests that (i) trade flows and inward FDI mutually reinforce each other, i.e., an increase in trade flows stimulates inward FDI and vice versa; (ii) a larger market attracts more inward FDI; (iii) FTAs tend to help stimulate inward FDI; and (iv) strong institutions, good physical infrastructure, and low costs of doing business are critical in boosting inward FDI. The paper concludes that in the long run ASEAN should aim to further integrate itself with the rest of Asia and the world (through a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific and an Asia-Europe FTA), while substantially deepening its internal integration (by moving from the AEC to a customs and economic union) and thereby maintaining ASEAN centrality.

This paper assesses the impact of unconventional United States (US) and Japanese monetary policies on emerging economies, and explores policy coordination issues to promote macroeconomic and financial stability in developed and emerging economies. The paper first considers a theoretical framework that allows us to analyze the impact of one country's monetary policy on other economies. There are two important theoretical predictions. One is that the greater the positive impact of monetary policy easing on a country's real output, the less its beggar-thy-neighbor impact on other countries. The other is that news on future changes in monetary policy can affect exchange rates and stock prices today as financial markets are inherently forward looking. The paper then examines the impact of the US Fed's QE policy on emerging economies, including the introduction of QE, the expectation of its tapering, and the anticipation of an eventual hike in the interest rate. It also discusses the implications of "Abenomics," particularly qualitative and quantitative easing (QQE) by the Bank of Japan (BOJ), for Asian emerging economies. It finds that the impact of BOJ QQE has been positive and, in contrast to US QE1, has not created negative consequences for emerging economies. The paper finally explores policy implications for both developed and emerging economies and suggests policies to be adopted at the country, regional and global levels, emphasizing the importance of communication among central banks and with the market and the need to strengthen global financial safety nets.

This paper studies the evolution of exchange rate arrangements of almost all countries in the world over the period 1970–1996. It examines both officially reported and empirically observed exchange rate arrangements. Several findings are obtained. First, the relative economic size of countries under fixed exchange rate regimes has not declined as dramatically as the measure based on reported arrangements would indicate. Second, the U.S. dollar has been the most dominant, global anchor currency because many developing economies, particularly those in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, have attempted to stabilize their exchange rates to the dollar. Third, the reserve currency composition is determined by the constructed measure of the net currency-area size in addition to the own-economic size of the reserve currency country. Fourth, as a result of the transition to the final stage of EMU, the euro is expected to emerge as the world's second most dominant anchor currency. While the Japanese yen will continue to play a less significant role as nominal anchor, its role in East Asia is expected to rise gradually. J. Japan. Int. Econ. December 1998, 12 (4), pp. 334–387. World Bank, 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433 and Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113, Japan. Copyright 1998 Academic Press. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers F31, F33, F36.

This paper examines the international transmission effects that a positive supply shock in emerging economies may have on inflation in developed economies. A three-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model is constructed to analyze the impact of a supply shock in an emerging economy, the People's Republic of China (PRC), on inflation rates in two developed economies, Japan and the United States (US). The assumed asymmetric trade structures among the three countries and the PRC's choice of exchange rate regime appear to influence the international transmission of a supply shock in the PRC. Specifically, Japan is under a greater deflationary pressure than the US because of its vertical trade specialization vis-à-vis the PRC and the PRC's US-dollar-pegged regime. This outcome suggests that, even though Japan and the US may face common positive supply shocks from emerging economies, the deflationary impact of the shock is greater for Japan.

This paper provides an overview of the potential international role of the renminbi (RMB). Reviewing the current state, the paper finds that much progress has been made on RMB settlements for trade involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and on RMB-denominated bond issuance in Hong Kong, China, but that RMB internationalization is still limited due to capital account controls. It argues that a high degree of RMB internationalization requires significant capital account liberalization, which in turn would call for greater exchange rate flexibility so that the central bank can enjoy monetary policy autonomy. This, however, would pose a challenge for PRC authorities as hasty capital account liberalization could expose its financial markets to the risk of crisis. The paper also emphasizes the importance of institutional reforms to make the RMB a truly international reserve currency.

This paper discusses Japan's strategy for Asian monetary integration. It argues that Japan faces three major policy challenges when promoting intraregional exchange rate stability. First, there must be some convergence of exchange rate regimes in East Asia, and the most realistic option is for the region's emerging economies to adopt similar managed floating regimes — rather than a peg to an external currency. This requires major emerging economies — particularly the People's Republic of China (PRC) — to move to a more flexible regime vis-a-vis the US dollar. Second, given the limited degree of the yen's internationalization and the lack of the renminbi's (or the prospect of its rapid) full convertibility, it is in the interest of East Asia to create a regional monetary anchor through a combination of some form of national inflation targeting and a currency basket system. Emerging economies in the region need to find a suitable currency basket for their exchange rate target, such as a special drawing rights-plus (SDR ) currency basket — i.e., a basket of the SDR and emerging East Asian currencies. Third, if the creation of a stable regional monetary zone is desirable, the region must have a country or countries assuming a leadership role in this endeavor. There is no question that Japan and the PRC are such potential leaders, and the two countries need to collaborate closely with each other.To assume a leadership role, together with the PRC, in creating a stable monetary zone in Asia, Japan needs to make significant efforts at the national and regional levels and further strengthen financial cooperation. Practical steps that Japan could take include (i) restoring sustained economic growth through Abenomics; (ii) transforming Tokyo into a globally competitive international financial center; (iii) further strengthening regional economic and financial surveillance (Economic Review and Policy Dialogue and ASEAN 3 Macroeconomic Research Office) and regional financial safety nets (Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization) and creation of an Asian currency unit index; and (iv) launching serious policy discussions focusing on exchange rate issues to achieve intraregional exchange rate stability.

Using monthly data for the G7 countries in the post-Bretton Woods floating rate period, this paper demonstrates that almost all bilateral real exchange rates have unit roots and, hence, are nonstationary. Consequently, it rejects simple PPP as a long-run relationship. The paper also shows that many of these real exchange rates are cointegrated with other real economic variables such as relative labor productivity, terms-of-trade ratios, real trade balance ratios, and long-term real interest rate differentials. In particular, relative labor productivity is statistically significant with the correct sign for more than half of the country pairs for which cointegration is confirmed. This finding lends support to the Balassa–Samuelson productivity-bias hypothesis. These results imply that nonstationarity of real exchange rates and the consequent rejection of simple PPP can be consistent with the notion that real exchange rates revert to an equilibrium in the long run without deviating arbitrarily far from this equilibrium position. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 1997, pp. 523–547. Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113, Japan, and Faculty of Business and Commerce, Meiji University, 1-1 Kanda, Surugadai, Chiyada-ku, Tokyo 101, Japan.

The main bank system can play an important financial role for Japanese firms in distress by alleviating the firm's financial cost. First, firms pay positive premia on interest rates at the time of financial distress. Second, firms with positive bank borrowing tend to pay significantly lower though still statistically significantly positive interest-rate premia, in periods of financial distress than do firms with zero bank borrowing. Third, if we focus on firms with positive bank borrowing, firms with main banks pay significantly lower interest-rate premia than do firms without main banks. Fourth, the discounting notes receivable, due to intra-firm trade credit, plays an important role for liquidity-constrained firms without main banks.

Japan’s “two lost decades” perhaps represent an extreme example of a weak recovery from a financial crisis, and are now referred to as “Japanization.” More recently, widespread stagnation in advanced economies in the wake of the global financial crisis led to fears that Japanization might spread to other countries. This study examines the dimensions of Japanization — including low trend growth, debt deleveraging, deflation and massive increases in government debt — and analyzes their possible causes — including inadequate macroeconomic policy responses, delayed banking sector restructuring, inadequate corporate investment, loss of industrial competitiveness, a slowdown in total factor productivity (TFP) growth due to excessive regulation and economic rigidities, and an aging society.

Motivated by the proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs) in Asia over the last decade, this paper studies the challenges faced by the Asian “noodle bowl” — overlapping, multiple trade rules, regulations, and standards in Asia — in the process of regional and global trade integration. The paper first highlights the importance of trade and investment linkages among Asian economies that have formed Asian supply chains, called Factory Asia. It then considers ways and means of multilateralizing Asian trade regionalism by discussing the pros and cons of various approaches — such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-centered regional trade agreements, including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement, and cross-regional FTAs, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement and a future Asia–European Union FTA. The paper emphasizes the promising role of inclusive Asian regionalism and the need to move to global integration.

The repercussions of the Great East Japan Earthquake on 11 March 2011 spread far beyond the geographical areas directly affected. The disaster also highlighted Japan’s many other structural challenges besides reconstruction needs, including persistently low growth, population aging and low fertility, burgeoning government debt, declining international competitiveness, and uncertain energy supplies. Moreover, the global financial crisis and the ongoing euro area financial crisis suggest that Japan needs to create its own growth momentum without relying excessively on markets in the United States (US) and Europe. This paper discusses the scope of these challenges and sets out a long-term strategy for overcoming them and putting the Japanese economy on a stable growth path.

Using a dynamic global general equilibrium model, the paper assesses the short- and medium-term impacts of the global financial crisis on Asian economies and the implications of post-crisis adjustment in emerging East Asia (EEA) for the world economy. The analysis suggests that EEA is unlikely to be severely damaged permanently by the global financial crisis, and a worldwide fiscal stimulus could play an important role in stabilizing the global economy in crisis. EEA’s efforts at strengthening regional demand, in conjunction with adopting a more flexible exchange rate regime, will promote more balanced regional growth and facilitate an orderly global rebalancing. However, despite the growing size of EEA in the global economy, the region’s growth rebalancing has only modest spillover effects on the rest of the world. EEA can contribute to global growth, but it alone cannot become the sole engine driving post-crisis growth in the world economy.

The global economic and financial landscape has been transformed over the past decade by the growing economic size and financial power of emerging economies. The new Group of Twenty summit process, which includes the largest emerging economies, has established high‐level international policy cooperation in this new setting. This article argues that effective global economic governance will also require changes in key global organizations - such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade Organization, and the Financial Stability Board - and closer collaboration between global and regional organizations. We suggest that federalism be introduced on a global scale by creating hierarchies of global and regional organizations with overlapping ownership structures in various functional areas (as is already the case with the World Bank and regional development banks in the area of development finance). Asia could contribute to this transformation by building effective institutions to promote macroeconomic and financial stability and deepen regional trade and investment integration. Similar logic could be applied to a broader issue of providing international public goods, such as environmental and climate protection, communicable disease control, and disaster risk management.

Although a latecomer, economically important Asia has emerged at the forefront of global free trade agreement (FTA) activity. This has sparked concerns about the negative effects of Asian FTAs, including the “noodle bowl” problem. Amid slow progress in the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Doha negotiations and the global financial crisis, however, Asian regionalism seems to be here to stay and the focus for policymakers should be how best to minimize the costs of FTAs while maximizing their benefits. Adopting a pragmatic perspective, this paper examines key trends and challenges in Asian FTAs. It provides new evidence from firm surveys, analysis of specific agreements, and computable general equilibrium estimates. It makes a case for strengthening the support system for using FTAs, rationalizing rules of origin and upgrading their administration, ensuring better coverage of agricultural trade, forging comprehensive “WTO-plus” agreements, and encouraging a region-wide FTA. Political economy considerations suggest that a likely scenario is for FTA consolidation in Asia to be followed by connections with North America and Europe. In conclusion, a bottom-up approach to a Doha Round Agreement emerges from the analysis.

A lively debate is taking place over the impact of free trade agreements (FTAs) on East Asia's business between those who view the agreements as a harmful Asian "noodle bowl" of trade deals and others who see net beneficial effects in terms of regional liberalization and a building block to multilateral liberalization. A lack of enterprise-level data has made it has made it difficult to resolve the debate. Providing new evidence from surveys of 609 East Asian firms (in Japan, Singapore, Korea, Thailand and the Philippines), this paper seeks to address the critical question of whether the Asian noodle bowl of multiple overlapping FTAs is harmful to business activity particularly small SMEs. The surveys suggest that the Asian "noodle bowl" does not seem to have severely harmed the region's business activity to date. Use of FTA prefences (22% of responding firms) is higher than expected from previous studies. Furthermore, only 27% of responding firms said that multiple rules of origin significantly added to business cost. As more FTAs under negotiation take effect and the complexity of the Asian "noodle bowl" increases, however, the business impact is likely to intensify. Implementation of key policies and closer public-private sector cooperation can help mitigate negative effects and facilitate a more SME-inclusive business response to FTAs. Suggestions include: encouraging MFN liberalization, rationalisation of rules of origin, upgrading origin administration, increased awareness of FTA provisions, improving business participation in FTA consultations and SME support.

This paper shows that East Asian trade pattern exhibits a dynamic shift in the regional value chain. Several developing Asian economies including China notably gained comparative advantage in the production and exporting of medium-and-high technology products. Japan and the NIEs further deepened their intra-regional comparative advantage across product lines. Nonetheless, the region significantly depends on final demands from the Americas and Europe. The build-up of an unsustainable payment imbalance in the US was substantially mirrored in the reserve accumulation by East Asian countries. Given that a disorderly unwinding of the imbalance is in progress amid the global financial crisis and a fear of prolonged recession, the present study examines how real exchange rate changes and a shift in relative demand will affect exports from the East Asian countries. The findings show that both the real exchange rate change and a shift in relative foreign income would significantly reduce exports from East Asia. The findings further show that with the value chain becoming increasingly fragmented along the production network, changes in the intra-regional exchange rates significantly affect their exports but in an asymmetric way. The implication is that the production network has called for a greater symmetry in their intra-regional real exchange rates. An arrangement whereby East Asian exchange rates converge to relative stability within the region but greater flexibility against others (particularly the US dollar and Euro) would itself be a mechanism for international adjustment.

As East Asia becomes increasing integrated through market-driven trade and FDI, free trade agreements (FTAs) are proliferating. Consodildation of mutiple and overlapping FTAs into a single East Asian FTA can help mitigate the harmful noodle bowl effects of different or competing tariffs, standards and rules. A region-wide FTA will also encourage participation of low-income countries and reduce trade-related business costs, particularly for small and medium enterprises. A computable general equibrium (CGE) model examines the economic impact of various types of FTAs in East Asia (among ASEAN 1's, ASEAN 3, and ASEAN 6) finding that consolidation at the ASEAN 6 level would yield the largest gains to East Asia among plausible regional trade agreements.

The paper examines a risk-averse firm's decisions on the level of trade, when the exchange rate and the commodity price are uncertain, and the extent of forward exchange and commodity futures commitments. First we verify the Separation Theorem and the Full Double Hedging Theorem. Second, we investigate the implications of the existence of both forward foreign exchange and commodity futures markets in comparison to the case where only one (or no) market is available to the firm. The second exercise enables us to focus on conditions under which establishing forward-futures arrangements promotes international trade.

The demand for rental housing using the Annual Housing Survey SMSA sample for 1977 is estimated. The principal determinants of rental housing demand, namely housing price and permanent/transitory income, are computed through spatially varying hedonic price techniques and instrumental variables methods (relating to human and nonhuman capital), respectively. Based on the demand estimation results, impacts of hypothetical cash and rent subsidy programs are analyzed in terms of “housing” and “welfare” effects. It is found that a rent subsidy achieves considerably larger effects than does a cash subsidy.

Housing demand is examined by looking quite specifically at the income and price variables based on individual household data. Permanent and transitory incomes are computed through instrumental variables related to human and nonhuman wealth. A price is constructed by spatially varying hedonic techniques. Separation of measured income into permanent and transitory components substantially improves the predictive power of the housing demand estimation and leads to demand elasticities of +1 and −1 with respect to permanent income and price. The permanent income elasticity is roughly twice the measured income elasticity.

This paper addresses issues of functional form and sample selection in estimating housing demand. Urban economic theory suggests that income and price elasticities be allowed to vary with reference incomes and housing prices. A generalized Box-Cox estimator rejects linear and log-log forms; semi-log forms are accepted in some cases. Sample truncation leads to downward biases in permanent income regressions, but to slightly upward-biased income elasticities. Price elasticities are generally unchanged.

3,5-Dichlorophenyl methyl sulfide and its oxidized compounds, metabolites of m-dichlorobenzene, increased the activity of aniline hydroxylase and aminopyrine N-demethylase and the content of cytochromes P-450 and b5 in rat liver microsomes. Hexobarbital sleeping time was reduced by these three compounds. After the administration of the sulfide to rats, 3,5-dichlorophenyl methyl sulfone appeared in blood, liver, and kidneys, and remained detectable in the blood and the tissues between 120 and 240 hr. The sulfone was considered to play a principal role in the induction by these compounds. Other chlorophenyl methyl sulfones also showed similar induction activity.