1. Regulatory restrictions on selective contracting: an empirical analysis of "any-willing-provider" regulations.
- Author
-
Vita MG
- Subjects
- Contract Services economics, Contract Services legislation & jurisprudence, Fee-for-Service Plans legislation & jurisprudence, Health Services Research, Humans, Insurance Selection Bias, Managed Care Programs legislation & jurisprudence, Models, Econometric, Regression Analysis, United States, Fee-for-Service Plans economics, Health Expenditures statistics & numerical data, Managed Care Programs economics, Patient Freedom of Choice Laws
- Abstract
"Any-willing-provider" (AWP) laws compel managed care plans to accept any provider willing to accept the plan's terms and conditions, potentially undermining managed care's ability to constrain spending. However. AWP laws potentially respond to inefficient risk-selection by providers of managed care. With risk selection, observed reductions in expenditures in the managed care sector may be offset by increases in the fee-for-service (FFS) sector, with no net decrease. This paper uses panel data on state expenditures to compare per capita spending levels in states with and without AWP laws. The results indicate that expenditures are higher when AWP laws are enacted.
- Published
- 2001
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