1. German training revisited: an appraisal of corporatist governance.
- Author
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Lange, Thomas
- Subjects
RESEARCH ,CORPORATE governance ,TRAINING ,CORPORATE state ,ECONOMIC research ,APPRENTICESHIP programs - Abstract
Purpose |!|#8211; The aim of this paper is to re-examine the unique political economy of Germany|!|#39;s dual apprenticeship training model and its underlying philosophy of corporatist governance. It responds to recent arguments suggesting that Germany|!|#39;s collectivist skill regime is under threat, increasingly giving way to the introduction of |!|#34;segmentalism|!|#34;. Design/methodology/approach |!|#8211; The paper reviews the political roots of a training system, which is moulded and shaped by corporatist interventions and neocorporatist compromises. It applies |!|#34;public choice|!|#34; theory to different interest groups in Germany|!|#39;s training market. The focus is on the German apprenticeship system as a social and political institution. The paper is positioned in the tradition of inductive enquiry, which draws on an interpretive framework and is informed by reference to a cross-section of the extant literature in several social science disciplines. Findings |!|#8211; The German training system is the product of a wider post-war consensus, yet continues to face social inequality concerns, which culminate in significant economic and societal costs. Despite modernisation attempts, the German apprenticeship is the outcome of a complicated political process, linked to its historical origins, which allows for a considerable degree of self-interest alongside its corporatist roots and values. Amongst Germany|!|#39;s social partners, heterogeneous self-interests and corporatism can co-exist, thus identifying an alternative model to collectivism and segmentalism. Originality/value |!|#8211; The paper rejects recent suggestions that the German system moves towards a model of |!|#34;segmentalism|!|#34;. Instead, it interprets the German system as an example for a specific socio-political constellation where significant self-interests and corporatist rules can co-exist. Against this background, it demonstrates that continuing demands to copy the German apprenticeship model |!|#8211; if thought desirable |!|#8211; are unlikely to be successful unless this tangled web of political processes and interests is fully understood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2012
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