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This article discusses discourses on differentiated integration (DI) in Finland both from the quantitative and qualitative perspectives. It illustrates how salient DI has been in Finland between 2004 and 2019 and how government and opposition parties have approached DI, with special focus on the Prüm Convention and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in defence. It also examines approaches towards polity differentiation, i.e., the idea of multi-speed or multi-end Europe, as well as discourses on DI mechanisms, namely enhanced cooperation and opt-outs. The article concludes that the Finnish approach towards DI is pragmatic and generally positive, as the country has joined almost all instances of enhanced cooperation, unlike its Nordic neighbours Denmark and Sweden. This may be due to the lack of politicisation of DI in Finland, which has also allowed the country to join those instances.

This article analyses the salience of and governmental positions on differentiated integration (DI) in Portugal in the 2004-2020 period. Employing quantitative and qualitative analyses, it first examines the salience and position of the successive Portuguese governments towards DI using documents such as government programmes, Prime-Ministerial speeches, parliamentary debates, and statements by the Prime Minister in European Council meetings. The results from the salience analysis demonstrate a low saliency of DI. Salience was enhanced by an increasing intersection between domestic and European politics during the euro crisis period, politicising the debate especially around DI instances of an economic nature. The position of Portuguese governments regarding DI during the period analysed was overwhelmingly negative. A wide consensus stood out among Portuguese political parties that DI models clearly go against both the European – by risking a disaggregation of the EU – and the national interest – by possibly pushing Portugal into an even more peripheral position.

The concept of differentiated integration (DI) provides a way to talk about the accommodation of diversity in the EU. However, DI can also be perceived as a means to discriminate between the more economically advanced, typically older and Western EU Member States, and newer EU Member States. One of the EU countries that perceives DI as both an opportunity for deeper European integration and as a potential source of discrimination among the EU Member States, is Romania. To get a better understanding of successive Romanian governments’ approach to DI and of the salience that DI has in that country, this paper undertakes a quantitative and qualitative analysis of official communications and pronouncements made by Romanian decision-makers on the subject of EU integration between 2006-2020. My analysis indicates that there has been a relatively low salience of DI models (i.e. multi-speed and multi-end EU) and DI mechanisms (i.e. enhanced cooperation and opt-outs) but a high salience of DI instances (i.e. differentiated EU policies) in the official discourse emanating from Romanian government sources during this period. The position of successive Romanian governments with regard to DI was strongly in favour of more integration, especially when it comes to the country’s accession both to the Schengen area and to the Eurozone; however, successive governments have fervently opposed any type of DI models. This is explained in part by Romania’s majority pro-European electorate and decision-makers, and also by the desire of Romanian governments to be seen as existing on an equal footing with other EU Member States within the EU’s decision-making processes.

The European Banking Union (EBU), a system of unified financial supervision, regulation and resolution, arguably represents the biggest transfer of national sovereignty in Europe since the launch of the euro. Participation in the EBU is mandatory for the Eurozone states and voluntary for the non-Eurozone states, which makes it an example of differentiated integration (DI). This article analyses the implications of DI in the context of the EBU. The central question is whether the current EBU arrangements are going to result in uniform integration or continued differentiation. After outlining the main pillars of EBU, the article discusses whether we can envision more non-Eurozone states following the examples of Bulgaria and Croatia by opting into EBU before adoption of the euro, or whether there is a risk of more division between the EBU members and non-members. The focus is on the main economic and political considerations that affect the EBU in the medium term. The article shows that only the non-Eurozone states willing to relinquish their national sovereignty in financial supervision seek to join the EBU and that in the post-Brexit EU the differentiated EBU can potentially move towards more integration.

This paper investigates the salience of and the position on Differentiated integration (DI) for the Austrian government. The analysis is based on both an analysis of government programmes, programmatic government speeches and parliamentary debates between 2004 and 2019/20. It shows that DI is overall not a salient issue in Austria, at least with regard to general DI concepts and models. Specific instances of DI were, of course, subjects of intense debates but, with very few exceptions such as the financial transaction tax as an instance of enhanced cooperation, rarely discussed with specific reference to DI. Overall, most Austrian parties are also not generally in favour of DI, quite the opposite. The dominant vision of the EU is that of a community of closely cooperating Member States with the same rights and responsibilities where opt-outs are seen as cherry picking. Only one party has forcefully supported the development of a core Europe, namely the right-wing populist Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria, BZÖ). In this case, however, DI is mainly regarded as a means to exclude groups of Member States (especially the financially more vulnerable or net recipients) from areas of integration.

The concept of differentiated integration (DI) is practically invisible in Slovenian politics. The analysis showed that the key words associated with DI are seldom used in parliamentary debates, coalition programmes or prime ministerial speeches. This suggests that the issue of DI is more a topic of academic discussion than of daily politics. While the low salience of DI in Slovenian political debates makes it hard to establish governmental positions in detail, the common thread throughout Slovenian foreign policy from independence in 1991 onwards has been that a strong and united EU is of key importance for Slovenia. The few instances where wording related to DI models was used reflect a concern about a multi-speed Europe, especially a fear that a multi-tier EU would mean fewer opportunities for future Slovenian governments and in general, fewer opportunities for smaller and/or less developed countries.