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The paper, focused on the analysis of the first four lessons of the Transzendentale Logik II of 1812, deals with the status of transcendental logic in the construction of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre. From the historical and textual point of view, the problem investigated involves the definition of transcendental logic as an introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre (§ 2) and the relationship of this definition with different approaches to logic in the post-kantian debate (Fries, Reinhold, Bardili, Kant § 3). From a theoretical point of view the paper involves a reflection on the meaning of the so-called recursivity of the Wissenschaftslehre and draws attention to the ways in which the recursivity allows for a restructuring of experience and rationality. This perspective allows us to clarify two elements implicit in Fichte’s transcendental approach: the difference between formal and transcendental logic and the propaedeutic dimension of this difference, which would show its proximity to the assumptions of the Dewey´s theory of investigation (§ 4).

The paper aims to discuss some elements of Fichte´s confrontation with the rational realism of Reinhold and Bardili, developed in the Grundriss der ersten Logik (1800) and in the Beytrage of 1801-1803, which allows to clarify the evolution of the Fichtean thought in relation to the primacy of the practical, affirmed throughout his doctrine of science. Based on a reconstruction of the critiques to the Wissenschaftslehre developed by Bardili and Reinhold in 1801 (§§ 2-3), the article focuses on the concepts of faith and of Trieb im Sein (§§ 4-5), developed in the expositions of the Wissenschaftslehre of 1804, 1805 and 1807. In doing this, the paper points out the similarities between the Fichtean perspective and the rational realism already sought by Reinhold in a letter of 1804.

The paper aims to a discussion of the possibility of reading Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre such as a form of “art of living”. Firstly, it will be presented and discussed Fichte’s conception of ascetic, such as it was treated in the Aschetik als Anhang zur Moral of 1798 (§§ 2-3) and Fichte’s interpretation of the Besonnenheit in the commentary to the chapter XXV of Machiavelli’s Prince, that constitute a central element of 1807’s essay Machiavelli als Schriftsteller (§ 4). Finally, it will be critically valued the conditions of possibility for approximating Fichte’s concept of ascetic to the contemporary reflection upon the art of living developed from Michel Foucault and Wilhelm Schmid (§§ 4-5).