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This monograph in military studies investigates the paradox between the bomber force we have, and the force we need. The US Air Force's fleet of convention and nuclear bombers provides Combatant Commanders with strategic firepower in times of war, and a visible deterrent in times of peace. Bomber aircraft numbers are at the lowest in the service's existence, creating a lowdensity high-demand asset that must be carefully managed. The research question asks can the US Air Force better manage these limited assets to ultimately provide COCOMs with the resources required to achieve their comprehensive strategy. The hypothesis of this paper is that the US Air Force has three options to restore America's bomber fleet to levels capable of competing with a peer adversary; repurpose the current fleet, build additional aircraft, and manage or change the command relationships that currently exist. This paper is organized to guide the reader through where we have been, where we are as of 2019, and where we are going in the future of the bomber force. The first section offers a historic narrative to illuminate the rise of the bomber force to crushing prominence in World War II and its subsequent decline in the modern force. Next, we will identify problems associated with lowdensity high-demand platforms and their unique management and strategic use. Following that will be a recommendation for a way forward. Finally, the conclusion summarizes lessons learned throughout this research about the force we have and the force we need.

Current US doctrine and the Multi Domain Operations concept are contradictory. Doctrine warns of near-peer or even peer competitors across all domains in the future. After competition leads to war, the Multi Domain Operations draft concept calls for the joint force to penetrate, dis-integrate, and exploit an enemy's Anti Access/Area Denial system. History shows that when major powers resort to global war, they fight in the peripheries in order to shape their enemy prior to penetrating into the enemy's homeland. The contradictions in current US doctrine are a result of a lack of study and understanding of the peripheries. This monograph examines past decisions to fight away from major theaters, incorporating case studies of Greenland, Iraq and Syria, and Madagascar during the Second World War. The comparative analysis of the cases leads to justifiable and necessary recommendations for amendments to doctrine. The result of this analysis is a reduction of the knowledge and research gap in existing literature and it will allow future planners and doctrine writers to make more informed decisions. This project proves if planners are able, early in a global war, to recognize their own and the enemy's critical requirements, then defend, seize, or deny them in the peripheries, they will save time, effort, and lives.

This monograph argues that the US Air Force (USAF) can utilize fighter/bomber aircraft capabilities and Air National Guard (ANG) infrastructure to help extinguish deadly US wildland fires while saving billions of dollars typically lost in the destruction. Explosive weapons technology and sonic booms create overpressure waves of air that "blow-out" fires much like a birthday candle. These concepts are proved using both anecdotal and scientific evidence from the US, Russia, and Sweden. The USAF already uses both ANG and reserve Modular Airborne Firefighting System (MAFFS) equipped C-130s to help extinguish wildfires in the continental US and territories. Current Air Force North and ANG infrastructure is ready to accept this new mission with minor changes to processes and authorities. Combining the infrastructure and technology together creates the SWiFT program. When operational, SWiFT can help save lives and precious land typically consumed by fire. This monograph also addresses social issues and effects from enacting SWiFT along with considerations leaders can take to ensure public approval. Lastly this monograph describes the next steps the USAF can take to begin testing and creation of the SWiFT program.

The emerging era of great power competition presents a clear mandate for U.S. military forces to prepare for, deter, and, if necessary, prevail in conflict against a peer adversary. Yet the primary enabler of decisive U.S. airpower—its air command and control (C2) system—is not optimized for this kind of fight. While future concepts such as Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) offer a potential path forward in the decades to come, short-term solutions are needed should a crisis arise in the interim. This study analyzes the organization of the current Air C2 system, focusing specifically on the relationship between the Air Operations Center (AOC) and the Wing, to determine the changes needed to improve the system for peer conflict. The author begins with a review of Air C2 history and theory, covering key ideas and events that explain the system as it exists today while drawing attention to areas that are problematic in peer conflict. A thorough analysis is then conducted to characterize Air C2, identify its functions, and demonstrate how the system responds to threats. The findings of the study reveal an excessively high degree of centralization at the AOC, a problem that creates a vulnerable, single point of failure in the Air C2 system. To address this issue, the author argues that the development of a tailored C2 capability at the Wing level is essential. Ultimately, recommendations are provided as to how this might be achieved quickly—within existing resource constraints—as the study calls for airpower thinkers to reconsider contemporary notions of Air C2.

America’s AF has adopted a strategy that reduces and then modernizes its remaining legacy fleet of combat aircraft. The strategy attempts to free up the necessary funding required to procure a modernized AF with all stealth bombers and fighters. It has been plagued with setbacks because of production delays and cost overruns. The newly attained stealth aircraft have also fallen short of their projected and required mission capable rates and drastically exceeded their estimated cost per flying hour. While the AF attempts to explain away the costs as temporary or as costs that will dissolve when maintenance practices are developed and matured, the history of stealth aircraft reveals differently. It reveals instead that stealth aircraft cost drastically more per flying hour than do their predecessors. Given the history of how America’s combat AF has fought to gain air superiority and provide support to the forces on the ground, it needs to procure a mixed stealth and legacy combat force capable of gaining air superiority at an acceptable cost. This total stealth and legacy force make-up should be sized to gain air superiority over the future battlefield, thus enabling a modernized legacy fleet to sustain air dominance over its enemies while achieving its nation’s objectives. This solution will prove itself affordable while allowing the AF to continue its investments toward a stronger future.

In 1996 the United States Army established the Army After Next (AAN) project. This project is tasked with the development of a military force capable of decisively nullifying any major military competitor. The cornerstone the AAN's strategic deployment and tactical maneuver capability is the air-mechanized formation. The air-mechanized formation will be able to strategically deploy from the United States to the theater of operations in less time than current modern military airlift, and immediately establishing a dominant military force. Essential to the development of the AAN concept is the analysis of its weaknesses and vulnerabilities. As the Army proceeds with the analysis of the air-mechanized formation concept, the identification of viable threat weapons is essential to the development of realistic and challenging wargaming models. In wargaming models, teams working as the enemy force have effectively used various weapons to defeat the air-mechanized formation. Among the weapons used, the man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) has proven to be an integral part of the enemy force defense while every air defense system offers substantial advantages and capabilities to ground commander, MANPADS are the distinctive weapon for use against the AAFs of the air-mechanized formation. Nations will spend a great deal of resources to develop ways of defeating the United States future military force. As part of our efforts to make the concept viable and effective, the determination of weapon systems that can be effective against the force must be used in every modeling and wargaming for proper analysis.

The Department of Defense has a mission to fight and win two major theaters of war in "close succession." Mobility is the critical link, providing the capability to deploy forces and meet mission requirements. One aspect of mobility critical to meeting current and future needs is airlift. The two types of airlift are inter-theater and intra-theater airlift. The 1998 Air Mobility Master Plan, identifies a shortfall in strategic airlift capability or inter-theater airlift. The C-17 Globemaster III will provide the core for military airlift as it replaces the ageing C-141 Starlifter. The C-17 has unique capabilities that complement Force XXI initiatives, and provide the Air Force with a new capability to provide decisive intra-theater airlift. The Department of Defense force structure reveals a heavy reliance on force projection operations and mobility. To increase mobility and maximize the C-17s intra-theater airlift capability, it is critical to devise a system that will relieve the C-17 of strategic inter-theater airlift missions. This system must provide a low cost capability to move outsize cargo and the civil reserve air fleet (CRAF) is the primary candidate for change. CRAF provides a large amount of air cargo transport capability and is critical to successful deployment of U.S. Forces during times of national crisis. However, CRAF does not provide an outsize cargo airlift capability. This monograph will recommend two courses of action that will add strategic airlift capability. This additional airlift will allow the C-17 to perform intra-theater missions. As a result forces will have a rapid response and enhanced mobility capability in the area of responsibility unlike anything experienced in the past. The C-17 has the potential to become decisive on the future battlefield.

The importance of protecting limited aircraft assets cannot be overstated. The loss of a modern aircraft entails the probable loss of highly trained and experienced crews that took years to develop. Furthermore, if a target is missed because of defensive reactions to radar-guided weapons, the sortie is lost and the target will have to be attacked again, draining valuable resources from the war effort and risking the attack package all over again. Therefore, the jamming of early warning, ground-control intercept, and acquisition radars maximizes the success of strike packages by creating significant confusion and friction inside the command and control system of an adversary by denying critical intelligence on aircraft routes, altitudes, and timing. This friction slows an adversary's ability to respond to aerial attacks and therefore contributes directly to the preservation of combat power - experienced combat crews and aircraft. Joint Publication 3-01.4 defines Electronic Warfare (EW) as "any military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy." EW is further divided into three subcategories: Electronic Attack (EA), Electronic Protect (EP), and Electronic Warfare Support (ES). All three of these subdivisions are critical to the creation of synergistic effects in the modern electromagnetic battlefield. The Department of Defense's decision to retire the EF-111A and create four EA-6B Joint Expeditionary Squadrons within the Navy highlights a significant shift in the EA philosophy of the Department of Defense. The proliferation of modern surface-to-air missile systems, early-warning and ground- controlled intercept radars, and the abundant number of anti-aircraft artillery weapon systems requires the maintenance of a robust EA capability. Though the stealthy B-2, F-117, and F-22, garner a great deal of attention, these aircraft will remain a relatively small percentage of the USAF

The importance of protecting limited aircraft assets cannot be overstated. The loss of a modern aircraft entails the probable loss of highly trained and experienced crews that took years to develop. Furthermore, if a target is missed because of defensive reactions to radar-guided weapons, the sortie is lost and the target will have to be attacked again, draining valuable resources from the war effort and risking the attack package all over again. Therefore, the jamming of early warning, ground-control intercept, and acquisition radars maximizes the success of strike packages by creating significant confusion and friction inside the command and control system of an adversary by denying critical intelligence on aircraft routes, altitudes, and timing. This friction slows an adversary's ability to respond to aerial attacks and therefore contributes directly to the preservation of experienced combat crews and aircraft. Joint Publication 3-01.4 defines Electronic Warfare (EW) as "any military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy." EW is further divided into three subcategories: Electronic Attack (EA), Electronic Protect (EP), and Electronic Warfare Support (ES). All three of these subdivisions are critical to the creation of synergistic effects in the modern electromagnetic battlefield. The Air Force's decision to retire the EF-111A and join the Navy in the creation of four EA-6B Joint Expeditionary Squadrons highlights a significant shift in the EA philosophy of the Department of Defense and forms the basis for this monograph. Though the stealthy B-2 and F-117 garner a great deal of attention, these aircraft represent only a small percentage of the United States aerial arsenal. Moreover, the proliferation of radar-directed surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery threats continue to require the U.S. to maintain a robust EA capability. Thus, the United States Air For

This monograph examines the U. S. military capability to defend strategic airlift aircraft against current and projected threats in humanitarian assistance operations. The size of the Joint Task Force (JTF) is frequently restricted by political, material, and environmental considerations. Consequently, the JTF commander must consider developing a Time Phased Force Deployment Data List that provides force protection for the airlift force that meets the possible threats and responds to mission constraints. Recent studies suggest two trends: (1) the military airlift aircraft are not equipped to handle the threat, and (2) the JTF must also provide protection to those aircraft flown by Non-Governmental Relief Organizations (NGOs) and the CRAF. This monograph is divided into five sections. Section one, the introduction, establishes the purpose of the study and the significance of the research question to the US military: Are planned air defense measures adequate to defend airlift forces against hostile threats during OOTW? Section two examines the present threat to strategic airlift aircraft in the OOTW environment and concludes that the man-portable surface-to-air missile is the ideal weapon to attack the airlift bridge at the airfields. Section three analyzes current National, Service and Joint doctrines for their force protection requirements and responsibilities of the airlift force in the humanitarian assistance environment. Doctrine recognizes the importance of airlift, but does not provide air defense to the entire airlift force, civilian aircraft are not included in this protection. Section four reviews recent military experiences during Operations RESTORE HOPE, in Somalia, and SUPPORT HOPE, in Rwanda. The force protection lessons learned during Somalia were ignored in Rwanda. Relying on only self-defense assets of strategic airlift aircraft is not the correct approach during humanitarian assistance missions. The final section answers the research question and off

This study is to analyze aircraft maintenance procedures in World War II; examine new requirements engendered by present trends; explore fields of Army, Navy, and Air Force to develop maximum common ground, and recommend maintenance methods and procedures for the future.

It is the author's contention that procurement of the UTTAS as designed in prototype models will require changes in the existing aircraft maintenance system to insure repairability at DS level. The structural design was critically studied to assess the capability of the Army's aircraft maintenance system to repair the UTTAS if damaged in combat. The airframe was the focus of the paper. Limited references to systems and components were required because of their needs for airframe mount/attaching points and the relationship of their weight to structural strength requirements. The author establishes himself as a highly experienced source and develops comparisons between the UH-lH and the UTTAS prototypes. Analogies are also drawn between the complexity of the UTTAS and the CH-47 and CH-54 helicopters. Historical examples of research and development efforts are used to point out the shortcomings which have been experienced with the "new technology" associated with some of the helicopter designs deployed in South Vietnam. Criticism of many of those aircraft and their components, systems, and airframes is correlated directly with the UTTAS. The same major problem areas that caused long term grounding periods for the UH-lH are displayed in an even more maintenance significant array on the UTTAS. Three of those areas; windshields, internal fuel cells, and the primary structural members are noticeably lacking innovations or new technology that would indicate that repairability has been enhanced. The redundantly structured airframe with heavily designed members assembled in a massive array makes the aircraft an almost total maintenance significant target for enemy gunners. This implies that it is almost impossible to hit the aircraft and miss a vital component, system element, or primary structure member. The redundancies in systems and structural members are positive characteristics for survivability and negative for repairability. When combat damage occurs, the question ari

This study investigates the Joint Vision 2010 concept of “precision engagement” and its impact on future AC-130 gunship modernization requirements. The primary purpose of this thesis is to assist long-range planners at United States Special Operations Command and Air Force Special Operations Command in the preparation of AC-130 modernization strategies which implement advanced technology precision engagement systems on the gunship. This study employs a strategy-to-task-to-need approach to derive tactical-level precision engagement mission tasks from Joint Chiefs of Staff, conventional military service, and Special Operations Forces publications which describe the employment of precision engagement systems in support of twenty-first century military operations. Based upon these tactical-level precision engagement tasks, current Department of Defense science and technology planning documents are subsequently examined for advanced material technologies related to these mission requirements. Ultimately, this thesis identifies specific material technologies and capabilities which should be installed on AC-130 gunships in order for this aircraft to provide effective firepower in support of military operations in the 2010 timeframe. The effort concludes with recommendations related to the implementation of these precision engagement capabilities on AC-130 gunships.

The Aggressors were established with the mission to provide realistic, enemy oriented, dissimilar air combat tactics training for United States Air Force fighter units. They accomplished this mission since 1973 with first the Northrop T-38 and now the Northrop F-5E. The F-5E is an acceptable simulator of the Soviet built MIG-21 Fishbed which was originally produced in the early 1960's. This is 1984 and the Russian air combat threat has changed into a more sophisticated fighter force. This study examined the capability of the F-5E to simulate modern Soviet air combat fighters, specifically, the MIG-23 Flogger, MIG-31 Foxhound, MIG-29 Fulcrum, and SU-27 Flanker. The investigation revealed that the F-5E is not an acceptable simulator for any of these aircraft. The upgraded F-5E with an improved radar, proved to be able to serve a part-task simulator for only the MIG-23 Flogger.

Unmanned aircraft are rapidly becoming the platform of choice for military and governmental leaders. In recent years, the United States (US) government has expressed great interest in Unmanned Aircraft Systems for military and other governmental agencies. With an almost insatiable appetite to gain information immediately, commanders want a persistent, responsive platform at their beck and call. However, the demand greatly outnumbers the availability of platforms, so leaders are looking at the possibility of air refueling unmanned platforms that will prolong their loiter time. Because of the senior leader pressure to get a persistent presence of unmanned aircraft through air refueling, they might have waived the “sanity check” for this, or overlooked a better way to achieve the goal. The future force of 2025 will undoubtedly include many unmanned aircraft and manned aircraft. This thesis investigates how aerial refueling and unmanned aircraft will interact in the future. The author concludes the tanker modified with multiple drogue refueling points, flying in an anchor orbit or track refueling best augments future unmanned aircraft operations.

This thesis reviews the use of the amphibious airplane in open ocean search and rescue, and examines the applicability of a seaplane to future ocean rescue operations. The author examines the history of amphibious aircraft and why they are no longer in use by the U.S. military, including the Coast Guard. Then a comprehensive review of open ocean search and rescue missions conducted by the U.S. Coast Guard between 1993 and 1995 is used to analyze and predict whether the use of seaplanes by U.S. search and rescue agencies would save additional lives over the current methods in the open ocean environment.

This study determines the essential characteristics of an air superiority fighter. Its importance stems from the assumption that air superiority is paramount in any military operation and that fighter aircraft play a major role. Air superiority as well as roles, functions, and missions are defined in chapter one to develop an understanding of the operative terms and definitions used throughout the thesis. This thesis is an in-depth study of the historical characteristics of the air superiority fighter. A complete review of air superiority fighter evolution is divided into four distinct generations. The review includes example aircraft that highlight the consistent characteristics found in each generation. The thesis research and analysis chapters focus on three key areas of interest. They are: (1) aircraft design, (2) avionics and weapons, and (3) training. The key areas of interest are coupled with a discussion of cost considerations during analysis. Fiscal constraints are a major factor in design and employment limitations. The thesis concludes that there are three essential characteristics of an air superiority fighter: (1) the aircraft is designed for the air-to-air role, (2) the aircraft has the first launch opportunity, and (3) the aircraft is flown by singularly trained air-to-air pilots.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are not new concepts. In fact, they flew long before the first manned flight. However, with the birth of manned aviation, unmanned projects were relegated to a subordinate position. In recent years, the Department of Defense has expressed more interest, directing priority funding and rapid employment. UAVs have been used in recent conflicts, proving successful in reconnaissance, targeting, and weapons delivery with Commanders requesting ever-increased use. The president has recognized the crucial role UAVs will play to ensure national defense. UAVs provide advantages, such as increased endurance and survivability, and decreased costs and risks to aircrew. UAV proponents say the most modern fighters, such as the F/A-22 and the developmental F-35, are likely the last of their kind, if they are ever produced at all. Even before full-rate production, the pilot is the limiting factor. Advocates envision UAVs conducting ninety percent of all combat sorties by the year 2020. A completely unmanned military flying force in the year 2025 is technologically possible, but not likely based on the uncertainty of technology advancement and on senior civilian and military direction. UAVs will likely integrate and not replace manned aircraft well into the future.

The purpose of this thesis is to review the evolution of aviation organization within the Army division and to appraise the ROAD aviation organization. The review begins with a discussion of circumstances in 1942 which led to the authorization of light aircraft for field artillery units. A chronological and historical review of the aviation organization follows. Logistical as well as operational aspects are included in the review. Sources of information include field manuals, tables of organization and equipment, and official historical publications. It was found that the organization of aviation and concept of operations has varied from one of decentralized control to that of centralized control. Factors which affected the degree of control and, thus, the organization are as follows: (1) concept of operations and mission of the entire division force, (2) mission of division aviation, (3) number of aircraft authorized and available. The appraisal of the ROAD organization is limited to the capability of the organization to support current missions of division aviation; no attempt was made to appraise the quantity or type of aircraft used nor to appraise the purpose or mission for which they are employed. The appraisal included the following considerations: (1) responsiveness to the commander's needs measured in time, (2) efficiency measured in utilization of available aircraft, (3) operational capability of pilots, (4) division aviation special staff officer responsibilities, (5) organizational and direct support maintenance. The appraisal was based solely on facts and opinions obtained from members of active divisions. Questionnaires were distributed to selected students attending the Army Command and General Staff College and selected personnel in fifteen Army divisions. Questionnaires were sent to commanders of the following elements in order to obtain information pertaining to both operational and logistical considerations: (1) division artillery, (2) brigades, (

Conversion of the United States military to the International System of units is in the very early stages. Little formal planning has been done to articulate the management required to complete the conversion of operational army and air force units. For those operational forces tasked to provide continuous combat readiness throughout metrication, management problems associated with the conversion are particularly difficult because of the nature of these assigned missions. This is the case for the 82nd Airborne Division ready brigade force (DRB) and the Military Airlift Command (MAC) strategic airlift system operating the C-141 and C-5A aircraft. Adequate treatment of metrication management depends upon thorough preplanning and skillful resource allocation. This paper presents a descriptive and a graphic model for management of major events in the changeover process in the DRB and the C-141/C-5A system. It includes major personnel, hardware and interfacing considerations which will be critical to both combat readiness and optional measurement system conversion. Investigation shows that metrication of these forces within prescribed readiness constraints is feasible but will require centralized management and highly decentralized execution of many conversion activities. Successful integration of military metrication steps to match the pace of non-military conversion activities and thorough preparation of small unit leaders will be key factors in conducting an optimal conversion program.

The U.S. Marine Corps has been interested in V/STOL aircraft for over thirty years. The AV-8A, the world's first operational high performance JET-V/STOL aircraft, has been utilized by the Marine air-ground task force for six years. This study examines the current posture of V/STOL aviation and whether the Marine Corps' experience with V/STOL warrants a follow on to the AV-8A. This study reviews the history of JET-V/STOL and the many concepts that have evolved over the years. The requirements for close air support are thoroughly discussed and the impact that V/STOL has had on those requirements is presented. The paper concludes with a discussion of Western world military employment concepts as well as those of the Soviet Union. V/STOL, with its many applications, is presented as a viable concept for tactical aviation. This innovative concept has provided the ground commander, particularly in the area of close air support, a responsiveness through basing flexibility that heretofore did not exist. Despite the obvious advantages of V/STOL, research revealed that there is not complete agreement on the future of the concept. The author concludes that the military advantages offered by the V/STOL concept far outweigh any political or economic considerations that could delay or eliminate the program.

The Airlift Master Plan was developed as a guide for achieving long-term military airlift objectives. The cornerstone of the plan is the development and acquisition of the C-17. Although the C-17's 'direct-delivery' concept is new, the quest for expanded aircraft versatility has been continually pursued in previous airlift aircraft development programs. Thus the C-17 is not the first aircraft that has attempted to combine the traditionally separate roles of intertheater and intratheater airlift. The most recent attempt at developing an aircraft capable of meeting both strategic and tactical requirements resulted in the C-5A. The C-5A failed to achieve the operational versatility predicted by its proponents and that failure has given rise to serious questions in regards to the C-17's probability of success in realizing its expanded airlift goals. A comparison of the C-5A and C-17 programs revealed the differences in concept formulation, design and acquisition strategy which will allow the C-17 to achieve its operational goals. The study further concludes that the 'direct-delivery' concept is a valid airlift objective and current technology permits the development of an aircraft with the performance capabilities necessary to fulfill that objective.

The combat effectiveness of tactical airpower can be assured during a conflict only if attrition is maintained at minimum levels. In today’s high threat environment, the Warsaw Pact nations outnumber the NATO allies in front line aircraft by a factor of 2.4 to 1 and have over 1800 surface-to-air missile launchers and 1500 search radar systems. Therefore, we must have an effective and efficient defense suppression capability to effectively accomplish the counterair mission. Effective suppression of enemy radar systems is directly associated with attrition rates of fighter aircraft operating in the vicinity of the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). The focus of this thesis is to determine if Wild Weasel assets are required during a conflict and ascertain when they become cost effective in reducing attrition of strike aircraft. This study examines three aspects of the suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) mission. First is the history of electronic combat. This thesis covers the history of aerial electronic combat beginning with the introduction of radar controlled antiaircraft gun and missile systems after World War II. Other areas discussed include the development of the first Wild Weasel aircraft during the Vietnam conflict and the lessons learned from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Recent hostilities include the Falklands conflict, the Bekka Valley debacle, and the 1986 raid on Libya by U.S. forces. The second aspect covers the Soviet radar threat. Presentation of the Soviet threat discusses doctrine, employment of the Soviet air defense system, the capabilities and weaknesses of each Soviet radar system, and concludes with an insight to future Soviet weapons systems. The final portion of the thesis provides an analysis of fighter attrition and a cost effectiveness analysis to determine when the Wild Weasel force reaches a cost effective break even point. Concluding remarks discuss the validity of using Wild Weasel assets as a cost effective and viable method of

This study establishes lessons, and draws conclusions from Israeli Air Force air-to-surface operations during the battle for Golan in October, 1973. The Israeli air mission and principal operational factors are identified and described. A historical analysis then considers how the principal factors influenced Israeli fighter operations, and determines what results were achieved. The study shows that Israeli air-to-surface operations during the battle were equivalent to current US Air Force doctrine for Battlefield Air Interdiction. Enemy ground forces and their objectives, Israeli assets, threats to fighter operations, and environmental conditions are described and analyzed to establish how they influenced operations. The results of operations are then measured against the doctrinal goals of Battlefield Air Interdiction to determine Israeli success. The study concludes that Israeli air operations effectively contributed to the defeat of enemy ground forces, but the delayed nature of the effects produced important risks to the outcome of the battle. Further, the principle factors had a significant and mixed influence on the results of air operations.