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The author responds to the critical remarks in the comments by Ferro & Riefolo (2023) and by Fornaro (2023). The main points are, in the first comment, the status of reality in psychoanalysis, enactment, the various conceptions of the unconscious, self-disclosure, and the dialogue between philosophy and psychoanalysis. As for the second comment, on the other hand, the issues addressed concern the interpretation of Husserl's contribution to a better definition of the concept of intersubjectivity in psychoanalysis and methodological aspects related to the use of notions derived from speculative thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Criticizing the interpretations that Civitarese (2023a, 2023b) has given of the philosophers he relies on in order to justify his idea of intersubjectivity, Fornaro (2023b) neglects the recent historiography which includes leading researchers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary psychoanalysis lacks a clear and distinct definition of intersubjectivity. For the most part, the term is used in reference to relational models and the exchanges that take place between two separate subjects. It then serves to indicate the deep involvement of the analyst in the process of the cure. The author argues that this usage, roughly as a synonym for interaction or interpersonal, is trivial and not true to its meaning in Husserl's philosophy. The German philosopher was the first to speak of intersubjectivity in order to explain that if the subject has access to the other and vice versa, it is because on the ontological level a dimension of mutual co-being and co-implication (a common transcendental field) already always exists. If, then, we wish to formulate a clear and distinct, but above all specific, definition of intersubjectivity, we must recover this intuition and translate it into coherent principles of technique. On the basis of these two simple rules, fidelity to the original speculative meaning of the concept and its translation into technical tools, it becomes possible to differentiate the various models of psychoanalysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to understand the "late" Bion, i.e. his production from Learning from Experience onwards, the most difficult and controversial, it is worth re-reading not only the essays in Second Thoughts, but also Experiences in Groups. The hypothesis of this work is that Bion spent his life as a scholar - probably without even being fully aware of it, since he never talks about it - to transpose his theory of groups into his theory of individual psycho-analysis. To illustrate this thesis, the author systematically compares some of the principles of both. Going back to Experiences in Groups, then, is also useful for another reason. Bion revolutionises theory but still works as a Kleinian. Despite brilliant suggestions, he does not fully develop a new technique. To have a tool box that anyone can use, we have to wait the analytic field theory, which is an original development of his thought. In this model the analyst sees in the analytical pair not two isolated subjects that interact, but a group. There is no 'fact' of analysis that cannot be heard as unconsciously co-created. Here then, highlighting the group inspiration of late Bion's helps us to grasp the meaning of this technical principle, so easily misunderstood, and vice versa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]