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Children autonomously make sound moral judgments based on internal criteria, but they tend to make erroneous judgments in the presence of social influences, and the reasons for these errors are not well understood. Thus, the current research investigated how the presence of observers who can see and listen to 3-year-old children's judgments but who do not present their opinions influences children's conformity in moral judgment behavior. In Experiment 1, the children (N = 30) were presented with pictures depicting prosocial behaviors and asked whether the behaviors were acceptable. The children's tendency to change their answers after hearing the counterintuitive opinions of informants was then measured. The results showed that the children's moral judgments were more likely to conform to that of the group in the presence of observers. Experiment 2 aimed to determine the reason children were more likely to conform to a group when being watched by observers in Experiment 1. Children (N = 30) were randomly assigned to two conditions with different observer conditions as follows. Observers were either wearing headsets, indicating that they could not hear the children's responses, or had them hanging around their necks, indicating that they could. The results showed that children's conformity behavior depended on whether observers could hear what they were saying. The current findings are expected to help elucidate not only social factors that affect children's moral judgments but also the developmental mechanism of an observer effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although it is well known that children of East Asian immigrants show higher academic achievement than native-born North American children, the social-cognitive determinants of this difference remain poorly understood. Given the importance of executive functions (EF) for academic achievement, and evidence that EF develops more quickly in East Asian compared to North American cultures, it is conceivable that differences in academic achievement might be rooted in EF differences between these groups. We examine this possibility by reviewing evidence of cross-cultural differences in EF development but find core concepts and findings limited in several key respects. To address these limitations, we propose a framework for relating EF, culture, and academic achievement that draws on new theoretical ideas about the nature of EF and its relation to social context. We conclude by discussing avenues for future research on the relations between culture, executive functions, and academic achievement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although young children demonstrate knowledge of fairness norms, their actual sharing is often inconsistent with their understanding. A possible explanation for this discrepancy is the failure of behavioral control in young children. Thus, the present research manipulated behavioral control experimentally and examined its effect on the sharing behavior in 3- to 4-year-olds (N = 64). Children were randomly assigned to either the behavioral control or the neutral prime conditions. In the behavioral control prime condition, the children listened to a story in which a protagonist exerted behavioral control actively, refraining from eating candies. In the neutral prime condition, the children listened to a story in which a protagonist did not explicitly engage in behavioral control. The children then participated in the dictator game. The experimenter asked the children to share as many stickers as they wanted or should with an anonymous child. Children in the behavioral control prime condition shared more stickers than those in the neutral prime condition. However, the two groups did not differ in their judgments of fairness and emotional experiences. The current research provides evidence that preschoolers' sharing behaviors can be facilitated by behavioral control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current research examined how infants exploit linguistic information to update an agent’s false belief about an object’s location. Fourteen- to eighteen-month-old infants first watched a series of events involving two agents, a ball, and two containers (a box and a cup). Agent1 repeatedly acted on the ball and then put it in the box in the presence of agent2. Then agent1 disappeared from the scene and agent2 switched the ball’s location from the box to the cup. Upon agent1’s return, agent2 told her, “The ball is in the cup!” Agent1 then reached for either the cup (cup event) or the box (box event). The infants looked reliably longer if shown the box event as opposed to the cup event. However, when agent2 simply said, “The ball and the cup!” – which does not explicitly mention the ball’s new location – infants looked significantly longer if shown the cup event as opposed the box event. These findings thus provide new evidence for false-belief understanding in infancy and suggest that infants expect an agent’s false belief to be updated only by explicit verbal information.